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	  Banking Union Time Bomb:  
	  Eurocrats Authorize Bailouts AND Bail-Ins
	   
	  By Ellen Brown 
      Al-Jazeerah, CCUN, April 6, 2014 
	     “As things stand, the banks are the permanent government of 
	  the country, whichever party is in power.”    – Lord Skidelsky, 
	  House of Lords, UK Parliament, 31 March 2011)    On March 20, 2014, 
	  European Union officials
	  
	  reached an historic agreement to create a single agency to handle 
	  failing banks. Media attention has focused on the agreement involving the 
	  single resolution mechanism (SRM), a uniform system for closing failed 
	  banks. But the real story for taxpayers and depositors is the heightened 
	  threat to their pocketbooks of a deal that now authorizes both bailouts 
	  and “bail-ins” – the confiscation of depositor funds. The deal involves 
	  multiple concessions to different countries and
	  
	  may be illegal under the rules of the EU Parliament; but it is being 
	  rushed through to lock taxpayer and depositor liability into place before 
	  the dire state of Eurozone banks is exposed.   The bail-in 
	  provisions were agreed to last summer.
	  
	  According to Bruno Waterfield, writing in the UK Telegraph in June 
	  2013:    Under the deal, after 2018 bank shareholders will be first 
	  in line for assuming the losses of a failed bank before bondholders and 
	  certain large depositors. Insured deposits under £85,000 (€100,000) are 
	  exempt and, with specific exemptions, uninsured deposits of individuals 
	  and small companies are given preferred status in the bail-in pecking 
	  order for taking losses . . . Under the deal all unsecured bondholders 
	  must be hit for losses before a bank can be eligible to receive capital 
	  injections directly from the ESM, with no retrospective use of the fund 
	  before 2018.   As noted in my earlier articles,
	  the ESM 
	  (European Stability Mechanism) imposes an open-ended debt on EU member 
	  governments, putting taxpayers on the hook for whatever the Eurocrats (EU 
	  officials) demand. And
	  
	  it’s not just the EU that has bail-in plans for their troubled 
	  too-big-to-fail banks. It is also the US, UK, Canada, Australia, New 
	  Zealand and other G20 nations. Recall that
	  
	  a depositor is an unsecured creditor of a bank. When you deposit money 
	  in a bank, the bank "owns" the money and you have an IOU or promise to 
	  pay.    Under the new EU banking union, before the taxpayer-financed 
	  single resolution fund can be deployed, shareholders and depositors will 
	  be "bailed in" for a significant portion of the losses. The bankers thus 
	  win both ways: they can tap up the taxpayers’ money and the depositors’ 
	  money.    The Unsettled Question of Deposit Insurance   But at 
	  least, you may say, it’s only the uninsured deposits that are at risk 
	  (those over €100,000—about $137,000). Right?    Not necessarily.
	  
	  According to ABC News, “Thursday's result is a compromise that differs 
	  from the original banking union idea put forward in 2012. The original 
	  proposals had a third pillar, Europe-wide deposit insurance. But that idea 
	  has stalled.”    European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, 
	  speaking before the March 20th meeting in the Belgian capital, hailed the 
	  compromise plan as “great progress for a better banking union. Two pillars 
	  are now in place” – two but not the third. And two are not enough to 
	  protect the public.
	  
	  As observed in The Economist in June 2013, without Europe-wide deposit 
	  insurance, the banking union is a failure: [T]he third pillar, sadly 
	  ignored, [is] a joint deposit-guarantee scheme in which the costs of 
	  making insured depositors whole are shared among euro-zone members. Annual 
	  contributions from banks should cover depositors in normal years, but they 
	  cannot credibly protect the system in meltdown (America’s prefunded scheme 
	  would cover a mere 1.35% of insured deposits). Any deposit-insurance 
	  scheme must have recourse to government backing. . . . [T]he banking 
	  union—and thus the euro—will make little sense without it.  All 
	  deposits could be at risk in a meltdown. But how likely is that? Pretty 
	  likely, it seems . . . . 
	  What the Eurocrats Don’t Want You to Know  
	  Mario Draghi was vice president of Goldman Sachs Europe before he 
	  became president of the ECB. He had a major hand in shaping the banking 
	  union. And
	  
	  according to Wolf Richter, writing in October 2013, the goal of Draghi 
	  and other Eurocrats is to lock taxpayer and depositor liability in place 
	  before the panic button is hit over the extreme vulnerability of Eurozone 
	  banks: European banks, like all banks, have long been hermetically 
	  sealed black boxes. . . . The only thing known about the holes in the 
	  balance sheets of these black boxes, left behind by assets that have 
	  quietly decomposed, is that they’re deep. But no one knows how deep. And 
	  no one is allowed to know – not until Eurocrats decide who is going to pay 
	  for bailing out these banks.  When the ECB becomes the regulator of the 
	  130 largest ECB banks, says Richter, it intends to subject them to more 
	  realistic evaluations than the earlier “stress tests” that were nothing 
	  but “banking agitprop.”  But these realistic evaluations won’t happen 
	  until the banking union is in place. How does Richter know? Draghi himself 
	  said so. Draghi said:  
	   “The effectiveness of this exercise will depend on the availability of 
	  necessary arrangements for recapitalizing banks ... including through the 
	  provision of a public backstop. . . . These arrangements must be in 
	  place before we conclude our assessment.” Richter translates that to 
	  mean:  
	  The truth shall not be known until after the Eurocrats decided who 
	  would have to pay for the bailouts. And the bank examinations won’t be 
	  completed until then, because if any of it seeped out – Draghi forbid – 
	  the whole house of cards would collapse, with no taxpayers willing to pick 
	  up the tab as its magnificent size would finally be out in the open! 
	  Only after the taxpayers – and the depositors – are stuck with the tab 
	  will the curtain be lifted and the crippling insolvency of the banks be 
	  revealed. Predictably, panic will then set in, credit will freeze, and the 
	  banks will collapse, leaving the unsuspecting public to foot the bill.  
	    What Happened to Nationalizing Failed Banks?   Underlying all 
	  this frantic wheeling and dealing is the presumption that the “zombie 
	  banks” must be kept alive at all costs – alive and in the hands of private 
	  bankers, who can then continue to speculate and reap outsized bonuses 
	  while the people bear the losses.    But that’s not the only 
	  alternative. In the 1990s, the expectation even in the United States was 
	  that failed megabanks would be nationalized. That route was pursued quite 
	  successfully not only in Sweden and Finland but in the US in the case of 
	  Continental Illinois, then the fourth-largest bank in the country and the 
	  largest-ever bankruptcy. According to
	  
	  William Engdahl, writing in September 2008:   [I]n almost every 
	  case of recent banking crises in which emergency action was needed to save 
	  the financial system, the most economical (to taxpayers) method was to 
	  have the Government, as in Sweden or Finland in the early 1990’s, 
	  nationalize the troubled banks [and] take over their management and assets 
	  … In the Swedish case the end cost to taxpayers was estimated to have been 
	  almost nil.  
	  Typically, nationalization involves taking on the insolvent bank’s bad 
	  debts, getting the bank back on its feet, and returning it to private 
	  owners, who are then free to put depositors’ money at risk again. But 
	  better would be to keep the nationalized mega-bank as a public utility, 
	  serving the needs of the people because it is owned by the people. 
	  
	  
	  As argued by George Irvin in Social Europe Journal in October 2011:
	     [T]he financial sector needs more than just regulation; it needs 
	  a large measure of public sector control—that’s right, the n-word: 
	  nationalisation. Finance is a public good, far too important to be run 
	  entirely for private bankers. At the very least, we need a large public 
	  investment bank tasked with modernising and greening our infrastructure . 
	  . . . [I]nstead of trashing the Eurozone and going back to a dozen minor 
	  currencies fluctuating daily, let’s have a Eurozone Ministry of Finance 
	  (Treasury) with the necessary fiscal muscle to deliver European public 
	  goods like more jobs, better wages and pensions and a sustainable 
	  environment.    A Third Alternative – Turn the Government Money Tap 
	  Back On A giant flaw in the current banking scheme is that private 
	  banks, not governments, now create virtually the entire money supply; and 
	  they do it by creating interest-bearing debt. The debt inevitably grows 
	  faster than the money supply, because the interest is not created along 
	  with the principal in the original loan.  
	  For a clever explanation of how all this works in graphic cartoon form, 
	  see the short French video “Government Debt Explained,” linked
	  here.  
	  The problem is exacerbated in the Eurozone, because no one has the 
	  power to create money ex nihilo as needed to balance the system, not even 
	  the central bank itself. This flaw could be remedied either by allowing 
	  nations individually to issue money debt-free or, as suggested by George 
	  Irvin, by giving a joint Eurozone Treasury that power. 
	  The Bank of England just
	  
	  admitted in its Quarterly Bulletin that banks do not actually lend the 
	  money of their depositors. What they lend is bank credit created on their 
	  books. In the U.S. today, finance charges on this credit-money amount to 
	  between 30 and 40% of the economy, depending on whose numbers you believe. 
	   In a monetary system in which money is issued by the government and 
	  credit is issued by public banks, this “rentiering” can be avoided. 
	   Government money will not come into existence as a debt at 
	  interest, and any finance costs incurred by the public banks' debtors will 
	  represent Treasury income that offsets taxation. New money can be added 
	  to the money supply
	  
	  without creating inflation, at least to the extent of the “output gap” 
	  – the difference between actual GDP or actual output and potential GDP.
	  In the US, that 
	  figure is about $1 trillion annually; and
	  for the EU is 
	  roughly €520 billion ($715 billion). A joint Eurozone Treasury could add 
	  this sum to the money supply debt-free, creating the euros necessary to 
	  create jobs, rebuild infrastructure, protect the environment, and maintain 
	  a flourishing economy. _________________
  
	  Ellen Brown is an attorney, founder of the Public 
	  Banking Institute, and a candidate 
	  for California State Treasurer running on a state bank platform. She 
	  is the author of twelve books, including the best-selling Web 
	  of Debt and her latest book, The 
	  Public Bank Solution, which explores successful public banking models 
	  historically and globally.     
       
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