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 Think Your Money is Safe in an Insured Bank Account? Think Again By Ellen Brown Al-Jazeerah, CCUN, July 11, 2013 
	 
	A trend to 
	shift responsibility for bank losses onto blameless depositors lets banks 
	gamble away your money. When 
	Dutch Finance Minister
	
	Jeroen Dijsselbloem told reporters 
	on March 13, 2013, that the Cyprus deposit confiscation scheme would be the 
	template for future European bank bailouts, the statement 
	caused so much furor that he had to retract it. But the “bail in” of 
	depositor funds is now being made official EU policy. On June 26, 2013,
	
	
	The New York Times reported 
	that EU ministers have agreed on a plan that shifts the responsibility for 
	bank losses from governments to bank investors, creditors and uninsured 
	depositors.   
	
	Insured deposits (those under €100,000, or about $130,000) will allegedly be 
	“fully protected.” But protected by whom? The national insurance funds 
	designed to protect them are inadequate to cover another system-wide banking 
	crisis, and the court of the European Free Trade Association ruled in the 
	case of Iceland that the insurance funds were not intended to cover that 
	sort of systemic collapse.  
	
	Shifting the burden of a major bank collapse from the blameless taxpayer to 
	the blameless depositor is another case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, while 
	the real perpetrators carry on with their risky, speculative banking 
	schemes. 
	
	Shuffling the Deck Chairs on the Titanic  
	Although the bail-in template did not hit the news until it was imposed on 
	Cyprus in March 2013, it is a global model that goes back to
	
	a directive from the Financial Stability Board (an arm of the Bank for 
	International Settlements) dated October 2011, endorsed at the G20 summit in 
	December 2011. In 2009, the G20 nations agreed to be regulated by the 
	Financial Stability Board; and bail-in policies have now been established 
	for the US, UK, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, among other countries. (See
	earlier articles here and here.) 
	
	The EU bail-in plan, which still needs the approval of the European 
	Parliament, would allow European leaders to dodge something they evidently 
	regret having signed, the agreement known as the
	European 
	Stability Mechanism (ESM). Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who 
	
	played a leading role in imposing 
	
	the deposit confiscation plan on Cyprus, said on March 13 
	that “the 
	aim is for the ESM never to have to be used.” 
	
	Passed with little publicity in January 2012, the ESM imposes an open-ended 
	debt on EU 
	member governments, putting taxpayers on the hook for whatever the ESM’s 
	overseers demand. Two days before its ratification on July 1, 2012, the 
	agreement was
	
	modified to make the permanent bailout fund cover the bailout of private 
	banks. It was a bankers’ dream – a permanent, mandated bailout of 
	private banks by governments.  
	But EU governments are now balking at that heavy commitment.  In Cyprus, the confiscation of depositor funds was 
	not only approved but mandated by the EU, along with the European Central 
	Bank (ECB) and the IMF. They told the Cypriots that deposits
	below €100,000 in two major 
	bankrupt banks would be subject to a 6.75 percent levy or “haircut,” while 
	those over €100,000 would be hit with a 9.99 percent “fine.” When the Cyprus 
	national legislature overwhelming rejected the levy, the insured deposits 
	under €100,000 were spared; but it was
	
	at the expense of the uninsured deposits, which took a much larger hit, 
	estimated at about 60 percent of the deposited funds. 
	The Elusive Promise of 
	Deposit Insurance 
	While the insured depositors escaped in Cyprus, they might not fare so well 
	in a bank collapse of the sort seen in 2008-09. As Anne Sibert, Professor of 
	Economics at the University of London, observed in
	
	an April 2nd article on VOX:   
	Even though it wasn’t adopted, the extraordinary proposal that small 
	depositors should lose a part of their savings – a proposal that had the 
	approval of the Eurogroup, ECB and IMF policymakers – raises the question: 
	Is there any credible protection for small-bank depositors in Europe?
 
	 
	
	She noted that members of the European Economic Area (EEA) – which includes 
	the EU, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland – are required to set up 
	deposit-insurance schemes covering most depositors up to €100,000, and that 
	these schemes are supposed to be funded with premiums from the individual 
	country’s banks.  But the 
	enforceability of the EEA insurance mandate came into question when the 
	Icelandic bank Icesave failed in 2008. The matter was taken to the 
	
	court of the European Free Trade Association, 
	which said that Iceland 
	
	did not breach EEA directives on deposit guarantees by not compensating U.K. 
	and Dutch depositors holding Icesave accounts. The reason: 
	
	“The court accepted Iceland’s argument that the EU directive was never meant 
	to deal with the collapse of an entire banking system.” Sibert comments: 
	 
	
	[T]he 
	precedents set in Cyprus and Iceland show that deposit insurance is only a 
	legal commitment for small bank failures. In systemic crises, these are more 
	political than legal commitments, so the solvency of the insuring government 
	matters.  
	 
	
	The EU can mandate that governments arrange for deposit insurance, but if 
	funding is inadequate to cover a systemic collapse, taxpayers will again be 
	on the hook; and if they are unwilling or unable to cover the losses (as 
	occurred in Cyprus and Iceland), we’re back to the unprotected deposits and 
	routine bank failures and bank runs of the 19th century. 
	 
	
	In the US, deposit insurance faces similar funding problems. 
	
	As of June 30, 2011, the FDIC deposit insurance fund had a balance of only 
	$3.9 billion to provide loss protection on $6.54 
	trillion of insured deposits.
	
	
	That means every $10,000 in deposits was protected by only $6 in reserves. 
	The FDIC fund could borrow from the Treasury, but the
	
	
	
	Dodd-Frank Act (Section 716) now 
	bans taxpayer bailouts of most speculative derivatives activities; and these 
	would be the likely trigger of a 2008-style collapse.  
	
	Derivatives claims have “super-priority” in bankruptcy, meaning they take 
	before all other claims. In the event of a major derivatives bust at 
	JPMorgan Chase or Bank of America, both of which hold derivatives with 
	notional values exceeding $70 trillion, the collateral is liable to be gone 
	before either the FDIC or the other “secured” depositors (including state 
	and local governments) get to the front of the line. (See 
	
	
	here and here.)    
	 
	
	Who Should Pay? 
	
	Who should bear the loss in the event of systemic collapse? The choices 
	currently on the table are limited to taxpayers and bank creditors, 
	including the largest class of creditor, the depositors. Imposing the losses 
	on the profligate banks themselves would be more equitable , but if they 
	have gambled away the money, they simply won’t have the funds. The rules 
	need to be changed so that they cannot gamble the money away.  
	
	One possibility for achieving this is area-wide regulation. Sibert writes: 
	
	 [I]t is unreasonable to expect the 
	area as a whole to bail out a particular country’s banks unless it can also 
	supervise that country’s banks. This is problematic for the EEA or even the 
	EU, but it may be possible – at least in the Eurozone – when and if [a] 
	single supervisory mechanism comes into being. A single regulatory agency for all Eurozone 
	banks is being negotiated; but even if it were agreed to, the US experience 
	with the Dodd-Frank regulations imposed on US banks shows that regulation 
	alone is inadequate to curb bank speculation and prevent systemic risk.
	In a July 2012 article in The 
	New York Times titled “Wall 
	Street Is Too Big to Regulate,” Gar Alperovitz observed: With high-paid lobbyists contesting every 
	proposed regulation, it is increasingly clear that big banks can never be 
	effectively controlled as private businesses. 
	If an enterprise (or five of them) is so large and so concentrated 
	that competition and regulation are impossible,
	the most market-friendly step is to 
	nationalize its functions. 
	The Nationalization Option Nationalization of bankrupt, 
	systemically-important banks is not a new idea. It was done very 
	successfully, for example,
	
	in Norway and Sweden in the 1990s. But having the government clean up 
	the books and then sell the bank back to the private sector is an inadequate 
	solution. Economist
	
	Michael Hudson maintains:  
	
	Real nationalization occurs when governments act in the public interest to 
	take over private property. . . . Nationalizing the banks along these lines 
	would mean that the government would 
	supply the nation’s credit needs. The Treasury would become the source of 
	new money, replacing commercial bank credit. Presumably this credit 
	would be lent out for economically and socially productive purposes, not 
	merely to inflate asset prices while loading down households and business 
	with debt as has occurred under today’s commercial bank lending policies. 
	 
	
	Anne Sibert proposes another solution along those lines. Rather than 
	imposing losses on either the taxpayers or the depositors, they could be 
	absorbed by the central bank, which would have the power to simply write 
	them off. 
	
	As lender of last resort, the central bank (the ECB or the Federal Reserve) 
	can create money with computer entries, without drawing it from elsewhere or 
	paying it back to anyone.  
	 
	
	That solution would allow the depositors to keep their deposits and would 
	save the taxpayers from having to pay for a banking crisis they did not 
	create. But there would remain the problem of “moral hazard” – the 
	temptation of banks to take even greater risks when they know they can dodge 
	responsibility for them. That problem could be avoided, however, by making 
	the banks public utilities, mandated to operate in the public interest. And 
	if they had been public utilities in the first place, the problems of 
	bail-outs, bail-ins, and banking crises might have been averted altogether.  
	
	Ellen Brown is an attorney, president of the Public Banking Institute, and 
	author of twelve books, including Web of 
	Debt and its recently-published sequel 
	The Public Bank Solution. 
	Her websites are 
	
	http://WebofDebt.com,
	http://PublicBankSolution.com, 
	and http://PublicBankingInstitute.org.
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