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      A Good Deal for Iran 
  By David 
	  Morrison 
	Al-Jazeerah, CCUN, December 23, 2013 
	     A Joint Plan of Action
	  [1] 
	  was agreed between Iran and the US in Geneva on 24 November 2013.   
	  Nominally, this agreement was between Iran and the P5+1 (that is, the five 
	  permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) but in reality it 
	  was between Iran and the US.  The groundwork for it was laid in 
	  secret high-level discussions between Iran and the US which began in March 
	  2013, while President Ahmadinjad was still in power in Iran
	  [2]. 
	    Israel was kept in the dark about these discussions until late 
	  September. By then, President Rouhani had concluded a very successful 
	  visit to New York, which included addressing the UN General Assembly and 
	  culminated in a telephone conversation with President Obama.  Only 
	  then, when a deal seemed to be in the offing, was Prime Minister Netanyahu 
	  informed about these secret discussions.  He was told by President 
	  Obama, when they met in the White House on 30 September 2013 – which may 
	  account for his near hysterical speech to the UN General Assembly the next 
	  day.     The Joint Plan of Action   The Joint Plan of 
	  Action consists of an interim agreement lasting for six months at least, 
	  setting out a series of steps to be taken by Iran, in exchange for a small 
	  scale reduction in economic sanctions.  The Plan also establishes the 
	  principles on which “a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution 
	  that would ensure Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful” 
	  is to be based:   ·         
	  An Iranian reaffirmation that “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek 
	  or develop any nuclear weapons”   ·         
	  “Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
	  under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations 
	  therein”   ·         “A 
	  mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and 
	  transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme”   
	  ·         “The comprehensive 
	  lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and 
	  national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme”   So, the US 
	  has agreed that Iran is going to have enrichment capability on a permanent 
	  basis, albeit with mutually agreed constraints on its operation and 
	  sufficient transparency measures to assure the outside world that its 
	  nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes.   In other words, the 
	  endgame for the US is that Iran be treated like other states in this 
	  world, which possess enrichment facilities but have not developed nuclear 
	  weapons, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan and the 
	  Netherlands.  As John Kerry said at his press conference afterwards: 
	    “Iran says it doesn’t want a nuclear weapon … .Therefore, it ought to 
	  be really easy to do the things that other nations do who enrich, and 
	  prove that their program is peaceful. So that’s what we’re looking for.”
	  [3]
	       Extraordinary U-turn by the US   This amounts to an 
	  extraordinary U-turn by the US, which has barely got a mention in 
	  mainstream media reporting on the agreement.   The BBC’s Middle East 
	  Editor Jeremy Bowen described it as “a quite remarkable diplomatic 
	  breakthrough” but he didn’t give the slightest clue as to why, having been 
	  at daggers drawn over Iran’s nuclear activities for more than a decade, 
	  there was suddenly a meeting of minds between the US and Iran.  The 
	  answer is that the US has reversed its policy and the final agreement will 
	  be essentially on Iran’s terms, since it will include Iran’s bottom line, 
	  namely, the continuation of enrichment.   The other fundamental fact 
	  about the agreement is that, as we will see, it could have been reached in 
	  2005, on less favourable terms for Iran, had the US been prepared to 
	  concede Iran’s bottom line at that time.   For the last decade and 
	  more, the US has expended an immense amount of political capital 
	  dragooning the world into applying political and economic pressure on Iran 
	  in an attempt to force it to cease enrichment.  These efforts have 
	  failed abysmally: a decade ago there were no centrifuges enriching uranium 
	  in Iran; today, according to an IAEA report last August
	  
	  [4], around 19,000 centrifuges are installed (though only about 10,000 
	  of them are in operation).   At the instigation of the US, the 
	  Security Council passed six Chapter VII resolutions, the first in 2006 and 
	  the sixth in 2010, demanding that Iran cease enrichment and various other 
	  nuclear activities. Four of these six resolutions included tranches of 
	  economic sanctions. These UN-approved sanctions were rather limited, 
	  because Russia and China opposed more severe ones.  However, over the 
	  past two years Iran has been subject to ferocious economic sanctions, 
	  which were not approved by the UN, but are the product of legislation 
	  passed by the US Congress in December 2011 at the behest of the Israeli 
	  lobby in the US.  The legislation requires the US administration to 
	  bully other states around the world to stop (or at least reduce) purchases 
	  of Iranian oil, by threatening to cut off foreign financial institutions 
	  from the US financial system, if they conduct transactions with the 
	  Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian financial institutions.   Now, 
	  despite the continued existence of six Security Council resolutions 
	  demanding that enrichment cease, the interim agreement allows Iran to 
	  continue enrichment over the next six months, albeit with minor 
	  curtailments, and there isn’t the slightest doubt that any long-term 
	  comprehensive agreement will do likewise.  Simply put, the US has 
	  conceded defeat.     No right to enrichment   At his press 
	  conference, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, was at pains to 
	  emphasise that the agreement “does not say that Iran has a right to 
	  enrichment”.   He continued:   “No matter what 
	  interpretive comments are made, it is not in this document. There is no 
	  right to enrich within the four corners of the NPT. And this document does 
	  not do that.”   It is true that the Plan of Action does not state 
	  explicitly that Iran has a right to enrichment under the NPT, but what 
	  does that matter when it is going to have enrichment in practice with US 
	  approval.   (It was strange to hear this coming out John Kerry’s 
	  mouth, since in an interview with the Financial Times in June 2009
	  
	  [5], when he was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
	  he said that Iran had “a right to peaceful nuclear power and to enrichment 
	  in that purpose” and described the inflexibility by the Bush 
	  administration about Iran as “bombastic diplomacy” that “wasted energy” 
	  and “hardened the lines”.)     Kerry acknowledges US failure   
	  John Kerry actually acknowledged that the US inspired sanctions against 
	  Iran had been a complete failure, saying:   “In … 2003, when the 
	  Iranians made an offer to the former Administration with respect to their 
	  nuclear program, there were 164 centrifuges. That offer was not taken. 
	  Subsequently, sanctions came in, and today there are 19,000 centrifuges 
	  and growing.”   The offer to which he is referring was actually made 
	  in 2005 when President Rouhani was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator.  
	  To be precise, it was made on 23 March 2005 in the Quai d’Orsay in Paris
	  
	  [6] to representatives of the EU3 (the UK, France and Germany) by the 
	  present Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif.  It involved 
	  the continuation of domestic enrichment, but it also proposed 
	  unprecedented measures to reassure the outside world that Iran’s nuclear 
	  activities were for peaceful purposes, measures of the kind that the US is 
	  now seeking.   (This was followed by further even more generous 
	  offers from Iran, including the most remarkable offer of all by President 
	  Ahmadinejad at the UN General Assembly on 17 September 2005, when he 
	  declared that “the Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to engage in 
	  serious partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in 
	  the implementation of [a] uranium enrichment program in Iran”
	  [7]). 
	    John Kerry did not acknowledge that the EU3, and by extension the US, 
	  could have reached a settlement with Iran at that time, had the US been 
	  prepared to countenance Iran having enrichment on its own soil.  But 
	  it wasn’t – and the EU3 bowed to Washington’s wishes and refused to accept 
	  the offer even as a basis for negotiations.  With that, the 
	  possibility of a settlement, which contained unprecedented transparency 
	  measures, was aborted at a time when Iran’s enrichment programme was in 
	  its infancy.   (For discussion of this Iranian offer and the events 
	  which followed from the EU3’s refusal to even consider it, see my book 
	  with Peter Oborne A Dangerous Delusion: Why the West is Wrong about 
	  Nuclear Iran
	  
	  [8] and my article Has the US conceded defeat and accepted Iran’s 
	  right to uranium enrichment?
	  
	  [9]).     Selling point for the US   The interim 
	  agreement’s selling point for the US is that it includes arrangements that 
	  will make it next to impossible for Iran to manufacture fissile material 
	  for a nuclear weapon, if it decided to do so, without the world becoming 
	  aware of it.   Not that there is any hard evidence that Iran has, or 
	  ever had, any intention of developing a nuclear weapon.  Iran’s 
	  leaders have repeatedly denied that they have any ambitions to do so.  
	  What is more, in 2005 the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
	  issued a fatwa – a religious edict – saying that “the production, 
	  stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that 
	  the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons”
	  
	  [10] (page 121) and he has repeated this message many times since then
	  
	  [11].   Recently (8 October 2013), Sergey Lavrov had this to say 
	  about the issue in an interview with RT:   “As for the statements 
	  regarding the Iranians playing another game and trying to dupe people, I 
	  haven't seen any confirmation by any intelligence – be it Russian, be it 
	  European, be it the United States, be it Mossad, which would categorically 
	  say that the Iranian leadership has taken a political decision to have a 
	  military nuclear program. No intelligence agency on earth was able so far 
	  to make this conclusion. And we spoke to our American colleagues just 
	  recently. They agreed that Iran hasn't taken a political decision to go 
	  military in its nuclear program … .”
	  
	  [12]     Obama says agreement cuts off Iran’s most likely 
	  paths to a bomb   President Obama declared that the interim 
	  agreement had “cut off Iran’s most likely paths to a bomb”
	  
	  [13].  This is essentially correct.  As Obama said:   
	  “Iran has committed to halting certain levels of enrichment and 
	  neutralizing part of its stockpiles.   “Iran cannot use its 
	  next-generation centrifuges, which are used for enriching uranium.   
	  “Iran cannot install or start up new centrifuges, and its production of 
	  centrifuges will be limited.   “Iran will halt work at its plutonium 
	  reactor.   “And new inspections will provide extensive access to 
	  Iran’s nuclear facilities and allow the international community to verify 
	  whether Iran is keeping its commitments.   “These are substantial 
	  limitations which will help prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon.  
	  Simply put, they cut off Iran’s most likely paths to a bomb.”   
	  These comments are more or less correct.  Let us look at each in 
	  turn:     (1)  Iran has committed to halting certain levels of 
	  enrichment and neutralizing part of its stockpiles.   Iran has 
	  agreed to limit enrichment to 5% (the level appropriate to fuel power 
	  reactors) from now on and to convert half of its existing 20% stockpile to 
	  uranium oxide to fuel its Tehran Research Reactor and dilute the other 
	  half to no more than 5%.  When this is done, there will be no 20% 
	  enriched uranium in a form that can be readily enriched to 90% for a bomb, 
	  if Iran had a mind to do so.   This means that the scenario set out 
	  by Binyamin Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly in September 2013 
	  (famously, with the aid of a cartoon) is no longer possible.  Then he 
	  envisaged Iran soon having enough 20% enriched uranium to be able to 
	  produce 90% enriched uranium for a single bomb in a matter of months, if 
	  it wasn’t stopped by military action.  Then Netanyahu predicted that 
	  Iran would have enough 90% enriched uranium for a bomb by the 
	  spring/summer of 2013:   “By next spring, at most by next summer at 
	  current enrichment rates, they will have finished the medium enrichment 
	  [that is, enrichment to 20%] and move on to the final stage [that is, 
	  enrichment to 90%].  From there, it's only a few months, possibly a 
	  few weeks before they get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb.” 
	    This prophecy like others by him about Iran’s nuclear activities has 
	  not come to pass.  Once the measures set out in the interim agreement 
	  are complete any possibility of it coming to pass will be eliminated, 
	  since there will be no 20% enriched uranium in a form that can be readily 
	  enriched to 90% for a weapon.   Ceasing to enrich to 20% is not a 
	  great imposition for Iran.  It began enriching to 20% in 2010, after 
	  failing to obtain fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor from abroad.  
	  It is generally believed that it now has enough 20% enriched uranium to 
	  manufacture fuel for this reactor for many years.  So, stopping 
	  enrichment to 20% is not a great imposition.   Iran also agreed not 
	  to increase its existing stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium held as 
	  uranium hexafluoride gas over the six month interim period.  The 
	  interim agreement does not require enrichment to 3.5% to be halted, but 
	  any uranium newly enriched to 3.5% is to be converted into uranium oxide, 
	  so that it cannot be readily enriched further.    Note that in the 
	  March 2005 offer, Iran proposed to do this immediately for all low 
	  enriched uranium.   Note that Iran will retain the capability of 
	  enriching to 20% and even to over 90%, but with inspectors in their 
	  enrichment plants daily (see below) that will not be possible without 
	  being detected by the IAEA.     (2) Iran cannot use its 
	  next-generation centrifuges, which are used for enriching uranium. Iran 
	  cannot install or start up new centrifuges, and its production of 
	  centrifuges will be limited.   Iran has installed a few 
	  next-generation centrifuges, which can enrich more quickly and therefore 
	  have the potential to enrich to weapons grade in a much shorter time. 
	   Iran has agreed not to start up these (or other) new centrifuges and to 
	  limit its building of centrifuges to those needed to replace damaged 
	  machines.  In other words, in the next six months, Iran will not be 
	  able to increase its stockpile of centrifuges, or to increase its rate of 
	  enrichment by putting more centrifuges into operation.  But it will 
	  still be able to continue to enrich to 5% using those centrifuges already 
	  in operation.     (3)  Iran will halt work at its plutonium 
	  reactor   Here Obama is referring to the heavy water reactor which 
	  Iran is in the process of building at Arak.  If it was in operation, 
	  it could be a source for plutonium, which can be used as fissile material 
	  for a bomb (as an alternative to 90% enriched uranium).  However, the 
	  reactor isn't in operation.   To obtain plutonium for a bomb it has 
	  to be extracted from "spent" fuel from the reactor (that is, fuel that has 
	  been in an operating reactor for some time, certainly months, perhaps 
	  years).  The process of extraction of plutonium from spent fuel is 
	  referred to as "reprocessing" - and Iran hasn't got any facilities for 
	  "reprocessing".  So, the Arak reactor was years away from being a 
	  possible source of fissile material for a bomb.   (There is already 
	  an operational nuclear reactor in Iran in a power station at Bushehr on 
	  the Persian Gulf.  This reactor was installed and fuelled by Russia 
	  and is operating under IAEA supervision, as the Arak reactor will be when 
	  it is operational.  Theoretically, “spent” fuel from this reactor, 
	  which is supposed to be returned to Russia, could be retained in Iran and 
	  “reprocessed” to extract plutonium, if Iran had a means of doing so.  
	  Needless to say, it couldn’t do so without the IAEA becoming aware of it.  
	  This possibility is never mentioned by those who kick up a fuss about the 
	  danger of Iran producing plutonium from the Arak reactor which isn’t 
	  operational.  This demonstrates that the fuss about the possibility 
	  of plutonium being obtained from the Arak reactor is bogus.)   Note 
	  that in the March 2005 offer, Iran proposed that it refrain from 
	  “reprocessing” spent fuel rods, thereby precluding the production of 
	  plutonium.     (4)  New inspections will provide extensive 
	  access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and allow the international community 
	  to verify whether Iran is keeping its commitments.   This includes 
	  daily access by IAEA inspectors to the enrichment plants at Natanz and 
	  Fordow.   Note that in the March 2005 offer, Iran proposed to allow 
	  much greater access than this for IAEA inspectors, namely, continuous 
	  onsite presence at its conversion and enrichment plants.   The 
	  interim agreement also includes the provision of ”certain key data and 
	  information called for in the Additional Protocol to Iran’s IAEA 
	  Safeguards Agreement [with the IAEA] and Modified Code 3.1”.  (For 
	  explanation of these, see Annex to Has the US conceded defeat and accepted 
	  Iran’s right to uranium enrichment?
	  
	  [10]).   Note that in the March 2005 offer, Iran proposed to 
	  continue to apply the Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1.  The 
	  level of access for the IAEA and of reporting to the IAEA, which has now 
	  been agreed, was in operation in 2005 and would have been continued had 
	  the EU3 had accepted Iran’s March 2005 offer.     A good deal for 
	  Iran   The interim agreement is a good deal for Iran: in exchange 
	  for minor curtailments to its present nuclear activities, it has received 
	  a small scale reduction in economic sanctions.  The latter includes 
	  ending the ban on the supply of spare parts for civil aircraft and making 
	  it easier to buy pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.   Much more 
	  important, the way has been opened for Iran’s right to enrichment being 
	  accepted internationally and sanctions being lifted completely.  That 
	  being so, it is inconceivable that Iran will fail to carry out its 
	  obligations under the agreement.  More likely, it will go further 
	  than it is required to do according to the letter of the agreement – and 
	  the US will have no excuse to re-impose the sanctions.   President 
	  Obama himself has the power to reduce sanctions as prescribed in the 
	  interim agreement.  But is it possible that the US Congress will 
	  undermine the interim deal by imposing additional sanctions in the next 
	  months?  It’s possible, but not likely.     The interim 
	  agreement says that during the interim period:   “The US 
	  Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the 
	  President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related 
	  sanctions.”   This implies that if the Congress were to legislate 
	  for more sanctions in the next six months the President would have to veto 
	  the legislation, otherwise the agreement would be breached, but if enough 
	  votes are mustered in Congress to override the presidential veto, it 
	  wouldn’t.   
	  
	    
	  
	  References: 
	  
	  
	  [1] 
	  
	  eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf 
	  
	  
	  [2] 
	  
	  www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25086236 
	  
	  
	  [3] 
	  
	  www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218023.htm 
	  
	  
	  
	  [4]  
	  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-40.pdf 
	  
	  
	  
	  [5]  
	  www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d5c6395e-55e6-11de-ab7e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2FgP41h00 
	  
	  
	  
	  [6]  
	  
	  www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_Proposal_Mar232005.pdf 
	  
	  
	  [7] 
	  
	  www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf 
	  
	  
	  [8]  
	  www.amazon.co.uk/Dangerous-Delusion-Wrong-About-Nuclear/dp/1908739894/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8& 
	  
	  
	  
	  [9]  
	  
	  www.david-morrison.org.uk/iran/us-defeated-on-enrichment.htm 
	  
	  
	  
	  [10]  
	  
	  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf 
	  
	  
	  
	  [11]
	  
	  www.juancole.com/2012/03/khamenei-takes-control-forbids-nuclear-bomb.html 
	  
	  
	  
	  [12] 
	  
	  rt.com/politics/official-word/iran-cooperation-interview-lavrov-904/ 
	  
	  
	  
	  [13]  
	  www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/statement-president-first-step-agreement-irans-nuclear-program 
	  
       
       
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