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      Trying to Be Hopeful About Peace in the Middle 
	  East  
	By James Zogby 
	Al-Jazeerah, CCUN, September 6, 2010
  
	A few years back when Washington was preparing for the then highly touted 
	Annapolis Peace Conference, I remember commenting that I was "hopeful, but 
	not optimistic". As we approach the latest incarnation of 
	Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, I'm even finding it difficult to be 
	hopeful, though I will continue to try to be supportive recognizing, as I 
	do, the consequences of failure.   
  Convening these talks at 
	this time is certainly a gutsy move for President Barack Obama. Knowing that 
	the odds of success are slim and the costs of yet another letdown are great, 
	one can only hope that the President and his seasoned and accomplished team 
	(including Secretary of State Clinton and Special Envoy Mitchell) have a 
	trick or two up their sleeves, ready to play at the appropriate moment. But 
	we've been down this road too many times, under far better circumstances, to 
	easily give ourselves over to the notion that this time surely will be 
	different. 
  To begin with, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, while 
	insisting that these talks occur without preconditions, has clearly defined 
	enough conditions of his own (though being "too clever by half" by terming 
	them "priorities"). His insistence, for example, that Palestinians recognize 
	Israel as a "Jewish State", while viewed an innocent "no-brainer” to most 
	Americans, is an especially loaded term for Arabs. Acceptance of this, 
	unless carefully defined, permanently disenfranchises the 20% of Israel's 
	population who are Palestinian Arabs. It is also intended to rule out any 
	repatriation for Palestinian refugees whose "right to return to their homes" 
	is considered an “existential threat to the Jewish State". 
  
	Netanyahu's further insistence on "security guarantees" is also seen as a 
	logical requirement to many in the U.S., but his definition of security is 
	overly broad including an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley while 
	placing severe limits on the independence of the future Palestinian state's 
	ability to control both its territory and access and egress at its borders.
	
  What is especially troubling is the failure of those who are most 
	optimistic about these talks to recognize that the language they use and the 
	framework they have embraced is so thoroughly tone deaf to Palestinian 
	realities and concerns as to be "Pollyannaish", at best, or insulting, at 
	worst. For example, they flippantly toss out terms like "land swaps", 
	"settlement blocks", and "Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem" without any 
	acknowledgment of what they mean to Palestinians or what consequences each 
	has in predetermining realities on the ground. For example, "neighborhoods 
	in Jerusalem" to most Americans sounds like an innocent enough term, but to 
	Palestinians it means sprawling massive settlements like the one on Jabal 
	Abul Ghnaim, which was built, over the strenuous objections of the Clinton 
	Administration, on confiscated land in north Bethlehem. Likewise, 
	maintaining "settlement blocks" and accepting "land swaps" means that 
	Palestinians must recognize as a “fait accompli" prior theft of land to 
	build settlements deep in their territory - colonies that were designed and 
	placed with the goal of making the establishment of a future Palestinian 
	state more difficult. And their easy dismissal of the "right to return" 
	(saying without hesitation or qualification that Palestinians would have to 
	forgo this right and accept, at best, a return only to a future Palestinian 
	state) also ignores what for many Palestinians is the sine qua non of any 
	peace agreement. 
  Granted that many of these concepts emerged out of 
	earlier Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (like the unofficial "Geneva 
	Accords" - which I supported), but these compromises resulted from hard 
	fought negotiations and were reached under dramatically different 
	circumstances. Back then, the unofficial negotiators sat as peers and each 
	gave way in good faith. Now, these same compromises that were reached as 
	part of a package deal are viewed merely as a starting point for Israel's 
	insistence on yet further compromises. Add to that the fact that back then, 
	conditions were different and the two sides, themselves, were different. 
	There was no barrier/wall delineating unilaterally the de facto Israeli 
	border. There were one hundred thousand less settlers in the West Bank. And 
	there was no political division of the Palestinian polity and territories.
	
  All this considered, I find it hard to be optimistic and, while 
	wanting to be hopeful, that too requires a bit of a stretch. Nevertheless, 
	here's what I hope for. I hope that Hamas, which has been critical of the 
	talks, maintains its current restraint and does not engage in reckless and 
	dangerous acts of violence (as it did during the 90's in an effort to 
	sabotage talks). I hope that the Israeli government or its settler movement 
	do not engage either in provocations of their own or act to reignite 
	passions by starting new construction or imposing new hardships on the 
	Palestinians. Should either side behave badly, I hope the U.S. is balanced 
	in its application of pressure. And since it is the U.S. President who wants 
	these talks and understands, and has stated, that success is in "the 
	national security interests of the United States", I can only hope that he 
	has prepared a well thought out “Plan B” should these talks (“Plan A”) fail 
	to break the impasse. And finally I might add that I can only hope that this 
	Plan B involves new thinking taking into consideration the just requirements 
	and the concerns not only of the Israelis but of the Palestinian side, as 
	well. This U.S. initiative might not be pretty and most certainly won't be 
	perfect, but it will have to be seen by majorities as fair. Even then it 
	will be a heavy lift requiring the President to sell the necessary 
	compromises to both sides, building a constituency for peace that can 
	reshape the political landscape making an Israeli-Palestinian peace 
	possible. 
  It may be a lot to hope for, but that's where we are. 
	 
       
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