Middle East Is Changing, and Ankara Knows It
By Ramzy Baroud
Al-Jazeerah, CCUN, June 21, 2010
 
"Even despots, gangsters and pirates have specific 
				sensitiveness, (and) follow some specific moral values."
 
				The claim was made by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
				Erdogan in a recent speech, following the deadly commando raid 
				on the humanitarian aid flotilla to Gaza on May 31. According to 
				Erdogan, Israel doesn’t adhere to the code of conduct embraced 
				even by the vilest of criminals.
 
The statement alone 
				indicates the momentous political shift that’s currently 
				underway in the Middle East. While the shift isn’t entirely new, 
				one dares to claim it might now be a lasting one. To borrow from 
				Erdogan’s own assessment of the political fallout that followed 
				Israel’s raid, the damage is “irreparable.”
 
Countless 
				analyses have emerged in the wake of the long-planned and 
				calculated Israeli attack on the Turkish ship, Mavi Marmara, 
				which claimed the lives of nine, mostly Turkish peace activists.
				 
In “Turkey’s Strategic U-Turn, Israel’s Tactical Mistakes,” 
				published in the Israeli daily Haaretz, Ofra Bengio suggested 
				Turkey’s position was purely strategic. But he also chastised 
				Israel for driving Turkey further and faster “toward the Arab 
				and Muslim worlds.”
 
In this week’s Zaman, a Turkish 
				publication, Bulent Kenes wrote: “As a result of the Davos 
				(where the Turkish prime minister stormed out of a televised 
				discussion with Israeli President Shimon Peres, after accusing 
				him and Israel of murder), the myth that Israel is untouchable 
				was destroyed by Erdogan, and because of that Israel nurses a 
				hatred for Turkey.”
 
In fact, the Davos incident is 
				significant not because it demonstrates that Israel can be 
				criticized, but rather because it was Turkey — and not any other 
				easily dismissible party — that dared to voice such criticism.
				 
Writing in the Financial Times under the title, “Erdogan 
				turns to face East in a delicate balancing act,” David Gardner 
				places Turkey’s political turn within a European context. He 
				sums up that thought in a quote uttered by no other than Robert 
				Gates, US defense secretary: “If there is anything to the notion 
				that Turkey is moving Eastward, it is in no small part because 
				it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give 
				Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.” 
				But what many analysts missed was the larger political and 
				historical context, not only as pertaining to Israel and Turkey, 
				but to the whole region and all its players, including the US 
				itself. Only this context can help us understand the logic 
				behind Israel’s seemingly erratic behavior.
 
In 1996, 
				Israeli leaders appeared very confident. A group of 
				neoconservative American politicians had laid out a road map for 
				Israel to ensure complete dominance over the Middle East. In the 
				document entitled, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing 
				the Realm,” Turkey was mentioned four times. Each reference 
				envisaged the country as a tool to “contain, destabilize, and 
				roll back some of .. (the) most dangerous threats” to Israel. 
				That very “vision” in fact served as the backbone of the larger 
				strategy used by the US, as it carried out its heedless military 
				adventures in the Middle East.
 
Frustrated by the 
				American failure to reshape the region and unquestioningly 
				eliminate anything and everything that Israel might perceive as 
				a threat, Israel took matters into its own hands. However, in 
				2006 and between 2008 and 2009, it was up for major surprises. 
				Superior firepower doesn’t guarantee military victory. More, 
				while Israel had once more demonstrated its capacity to inflict 
				untold damage on people and infrastructure, the Israeli weapon 
				was no longer strategically effective. In other words, Israel’s 
				military advantage could no longer translate into political 
				gains, and this was a game-changer.
 
There are many 
				issues the Israeli leadership has had to wrangle with in recent 
				years. The US, Israel’s most faithful benefactor, is now on a 
				crisis management mode in Iraq and Afghanistan, struggling on 
				all fronts, whether political, military or economic. That recoil 
				has further emboldened Israel’s enemies, who are no longer 
				intimidated by the American bogyman. Israel’s desperate attempt 
				at using its own military to achieve its grand objectives has 
				also failed, and miserably so.
 
With options growing even 
				more limited, Israel now understands that Gaza is its last card; 
				ending the siege or ceasing the killings could be understood as 
				another indication of political weakness, a risk that Israel is 
				not ready to take.
 
Turkey, on the other hand, was 
				fighting — and mostly winning — its own battles. Democracy in 
				Turkey has never been as healthy and meaningful as it is today. 
				Turkey has also eased its chase of the proverbial dangling 
				carrot, of EU membership, especially considering the arrogant 
				attitude of some EU members who perceive Turkey as too large and 
				too Muslim to be trusted. Turkey needed new platforms, new 
				options and a more diverse strategy.
 
But that is where 
				many analysts went wrong. Turkey’s popular government has not 
				entered the Middle Eastern political foray to pick fights. On 
				the contrary, the Turkish government has for years been trying 
				to get involved as a peacemaker, a mediator between various 
				parties. So, yes, Turkey’s political shift was largely 
				strategic, but it was not ill-intentioned.
 
The uninvited 
				Turkish involvement, however, is highly irritating to Israel. 
				Turkey’s approach to its new role grew agitating to Israel when 
				the role wasn’t confined to being that of the host — in indirect 
				talks between Syria and Israel, for example. Instead, Turkey 
				began to take increasingly solid and determined political 
				stances. Thus the Davos episode.
 
By participating at 
				such a high capacity in the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, with firm 
				intentions of breaking the siege, Turkey was escalating its 
				involvement well beyond Israel’s comfort zone. Therefore, Israel 
				needed a decisive response that would send a message to Turkey — 
				and any daring other — about crossing the line of what is and is 
				not acceptable. It’s ironic how the neoconservatives’ “A Clean 
				Break” envisaged an Israeli violation of the political and 
				geographic boundaries of its neighbors, with the help of Turkey. 
				Yet, 14 years later, it was Turkey, with representatives from 32 
				other countries, which came with a peaceful armada to breach 
				what Israel perceived as its own political domain.
 
The 
				Israeli response, as bloody as it was, can only be understood 
				within this larger context. Erdogan’s statements and the popular 
				support his government enjoys show that Turkey has decided to 
				take on the Israeli challenge. The US government was exposed as 
				ineffectual and hostage to the failing Israeli agenda in the 
				region, thanks to the lobby. Ironically it is now the 
				neoconservatives who are leading the charge against Turkey, the 
				very country they had hoped would become Israel’s willing ally 
				in its apocalyptic vision.
 
— Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) 
				is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of 
				PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a 
				Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story (Pluto Press, London), now 
				available on Amazon.com.
*****
 
Visit my website:
				www.ramzybaroud.net.
				
 
Press TV: Former Mayor of London Ken Livingstone hosts 
				an exciting discussion on Ramzy Baroud's book: My Father Was a 
				Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story with authors Dr. Ghada 
				Karmi and Ben White. Watch:
				Part I,
				Part II,
				Part III.
				
 
Aljazeera: Also watch a short documentary about the 
				book (published by Pluto Press; Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). The 
				subtitled program is available at YouTube in two parts:
				Part I 
				&
				
				Part II. 
 
Short Film: Then, check out this short 
				promo (in 
				English & Arabic) 
				about the book. 
 
Order Your Copy Today: Through
				
				Amazon,
				
				Amazon UK, Barnes 
				& Nobles and
				
				Pluto Press.


