An Undisciplined Defense: Understanding the $2 Trillion 
	Surge in US Defense Spending 
	 PDA 
	 Al-Jazeerah, ccun.org, April 12, 2010 
	 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
	1. Contours of the surge 
	The rise in US defense spending since 1998 has no precedent in all the 
	years since the Korean war. It most readily compares with two earlier, 
	but lesser spending surges: the 1958-1968 surge of 43% and the 1975-1985 
	surge of 57%. The post-Cold War retrenchment of the US military reached its 
	limit in 1998 with DoD’s budget settling at an ebb point of $361.5 billion 
	(2010 USD). If we treat the 1998 budget level as a “baseline” and project it 
	forward to 2010 (adjusting for inflation), we find that the total amount of 
	funds that have been given to DoD above this level during the years 
	1999-2010 is $2.15 trillion (in 2010 dollars). This figure constitutes what 
	we call the post-1998 spending surge. (All told, DoD budget authority for 
	the period was $6.5 trillion in 2010 dollars). 
	The rebound in annual defense spending reached its recent peak in 2008: 
	$696.5 billion (2010 USD) – which is 92.7% above the 1998 level. The 
	portion unrelated to contingency operations (the so-called “base” budget) 
	was $503 billion that year – which is 41% higher in real terms than in 
	1998. Total DoD budget authority receded slightly in 2009 and 2010. But 
	it now seems likely that 2011 will set a new high – somewhat over $700 
	billion in DoD’s authority to spend. 
	Looking forward, the Obama administration’s 2010 budget plan allocates an 
	average of $545 billion (2010 USD) per year to the DoD base budget for 
	2011-2017. In addition, it set aside a “place keeper” sum of $50 billion per 
	year for military operations, recognizing that actual war costs will vary. 
	(And , indeed, the Pentagon already is expected to request at least $163 
	billion for contingency operations in 2011.) 
	Whether one looks at the total DoD budget, or just that portion not 
	attributable to today’s wars, US defense spending is now stabilizing at 
	levels significantly above Cold War peaks (adjusted for inflation) and far 
	above the Cold War average, in real terms.  
	Measured in 2010 dollars, average DoD budget authority was: 
	2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
	# $423 billion for the period 1954-2001; # $517 billion for the Reagan 
	years; and, # $495 billion for the Vietnam War “high tide” years 
	1966-1970. 
	All told, the Obama administration plans to spend at least $5 trillion 
	(2010 USD) on defense during 2010-2017, which is 5% more in real terms 
	than the Bush administration authorized for 2002-2009. As this is 
	occurring, the United States is also entering a period of economic 
	uncertainty marked by increasing demands and constraints on federal 
	resources. By 2011, gross federal debt will surpass 100% of GDP. And it will 
	remain above that threshold for the foreseeable future. 
	The most ready explanation for the post-1998 spending surge is that it is 
	due largely to post-9/11 military operations. In fact, however, these 
	operations account for just 52% of the surge (and only 17% of total 
	spending during this period). Moreover, the wars have themselves been 
	exceptionally expensive by historical standards. Measured in 2010 
	dollars, the Korean conflict cost $393,000 per person/year invested; the 
	Vietnam conflict cost $256,000; and the Iraq and Afghanistan commitments, 
	$792,000 so far. Rather than adequately explain the post-1998 spending 
	surge, the high cost of recent military operations only adds to the 
	explanatory burden. 
	2. The reallocation of DoD funds Related to the rise in spending, the 
	allocation of DoD funds among appropriation categories also has changed, 
	and this provides some important clues about cost drivers. The four major 
	appropriation categories are Personnel, Procurement, Research and 
	Development (R&D), and Operations and Maintenance (O&M). Looking at spending 
	patterns in the 1990s and during the first decade of the new century we 
	find: Overall spending When divided by the number of full-time 
	military personnel, DoD budget authority appears remarkably stable 
	throughout the 25-year period 1983-1998. It begins to rise in 1998, 
	accelerating sharply with the onset of the Iraq War. For 2007-2010, it 
	averaged $459,000 per full-time person in uniform. This is 78% higher than 
	the Reagan peak, 95% higher than in 1989, and nearly three times the 
	inflation-adjusted peak during the Vietnam era. 
	O&M spending 
	The proportion of defense spending allotted to Operations & Maintenance 
	has risen from 31% in 1989 to 41% today. Calculated on a per person 
	basis, O&M spending began to climb in the early 1990s. It further 
	accelerated in two bursts beginning 1999 
	AN UNDISCIPLINED DEFENSE 3 
	and 2003. In real terms, it is today 2.5 times as much per person as it 
	was at the peak of the Reagan surge. About 85% of DoD’s civilian 
	payroll is counted as an O&M expense. Over the years, the civilian 
	payroll portion of O&M spending has mostly varied between 30% and 50%. 
	Much of the remainder of O&M costs involve DoD purchases of goods and 
	services. Since 1989, the “goods and services” portion has grown 
	significantly, however. Today, it claims around 80% of the O&M budget. 
	And, within this trend, the portion that is contractor services has 
	grown. 
	Military personnel spending 
	During the 20-year period 1981-2000, budget authority for personnel 
	varied by only a few percent around an average of $73,200 (2010 USD) per 
	person. It then rose by 46% between 2000 and 2010. The increase was 
	enough to bring total personnel expenditures back up to Cold War levels – 
	for a military only 69% as large. Modernization spending This category 
	combines R&D and procurement spending. Over the thirty-year period 
	1980-2010, modernization spending has moved in a boom-bust cycle, which is 
	historically typical for this category. Of course, what is atypical about 
	the 1980-2010 period is that it straddles the end of the Cold War. 
	Reviewing the pattern in modernization spending, however, this event 
	seems to register as little more than a routine dip. 
	Total modernization spending was 32% lower in the 1990s than in the 
	1980s. After 1998, however, it began to rebound. For the 2000-2009 
	period, it was near the 1980s level in real terms. In per person terms, 
	however, modernization spending for 2000- 2009 surpassed the 1980s level 
	by 47%. 
	Comparing just the past four years (2007-2010) with the four peak Reagan 
	years (1983-1986) shows current procurement spending to be 40% higher in 
	real per person terms. In similar terms, R&D spending is 135% higher. 
	Shifts in spending priorities Looking at how the four main “accounts” 
	have fared relative to each other shows O&M spending to have advanced 
	most significantly. Its relative importance began to increase in the 
	early 1990s. Research & Development funding followed a similar 
	trajectory. Procurement, by contrast, has become more important relative 
	only to military personnel spending, which has slipped in importance. 
	4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
	The greater emphasis on modernization spending relative to personnel 
	spending does not mean that US military power has become much more 
	capital intensive than it was in 1989, however. This is because the 
	principle budget shift, which has been toward a greater emphasis on O&M 
	spending, actually involves a significant expansion of DoD’s workforce – 
	by means of contract labor. 
	3. Explaining the spending surge 
	Three distinct, but related processes contributed to the exceptional rise 
	in defense spending after 1998 and to its present stabilization above 
	Cold War levels. These processes also shaped the reallocation of funding 
	among appropriation categories. 
	3.1 Peace versus power dividend 
	First, in the wake of Soviet collapse, both Republican and Democratic 
	administrations sought to realize a “dividend” in the currencies of both 
	peace and power. The first entailed military force reductions and DoD 
	budget cuts. The second involved adopting more ambitious security goals 
	and requiring America’s armed forces to sustain a substantial continuous 
	global presence, increase peacetime engagement activities, and prepare to 
	conduct more types of missions, faster, across a broader swath of the earth. 
	While smaller, the US military was to be better supported and more ready, 
	more deployable, and more active. In addition, all the facets of US 
	military power – the many different types of capabilities and the 
	multiple regional commands – were to be retained, if not enhanced. 
	The efforts to achieve a peace dividend and a power dividend pulled the 
	budget in opposite directions. But the two imperatives were supposed to 
	be reconciled by DoD reform and transformation initiatives that would 
	putatively allow the armed forces to do more for less. An additional 
	challenge was that, in becoming smaller, the US military lost some 
	economy of scale in both support and acquisition functions. So the challenge 
	for reformers was considerable. 
	Reform efforts were to focus principally on trimming infrastructure, 
	streamlining support, renovating business practices, and privatizing 
	various activities. A prospective “revolution in military affairs,” 
	driven by new information technology, also was supposed to help the armed 
	forces achieve “new efficiencies”. In implementation, however, both the 
	reform and the transformation agendas fell well short of their promise. 
	In both cases, institutional resistance and bureaucratic inertia proved 
	stronger than the impetus for change. Squeezed between this shortfall and 
	the ambitions of post-Cold War military strategy, the peace dividend soon 
	vanished. 
	AN UNDISCIPLINED DEFENSE 5 
	Effects on the DoD budget and workforce Increased operational tempo, 
	increased support, and the loss of economies of scale were evident in the 
	relative rise in O&M spending beginning in the early 1990s. Among other 
	aims, the prospective reforms were meant to allow a transfer of funds from 
	O&M and infrastructure accounts to procurement. Although some reform 
	efforts – such as base closures – achieved some savings, these have not 
	amounted to more than 4% of the DoD budget. This has not been sufficient 
	to cover the costs of increased operational tempo, much less a rebound in 
	procurement. 
	These developments also have reshaped the DoD workforce. As noted above, 
	the increase in O&M spending correlated with an increased reliance on 
	contract labor, which is generally less expensive than either military or 
	civilian DoD labor. (In 2004, the life-cycle cost of a US military 
	officer amortized over a 20-year career was approximately $88,000 per year; 
	for enlisted personnel, $43,400 per year.) 
	Despite increased operational tempo, DoD has been reluctant to 
	permanently increase military end strength because of all the follow-on 
	costs involved. Thus, most of the recent additions to the Army and Marine 
	Corp have been either temporary positions or have been matched by 
	reductions in the Navy and Air Force. The total number of full-time US 
	military personnel by the end of 2010 will be barely 50,000 more than the 
	post-Cold War low point – and 22,000 of these will be temporaries. 
	Rather than add end strength, DoD has focused on squeezing more effort 
	out of the existing pool of military personnel and migrating more of 
	these personnel from the non- deployable to the deployable portion of the 
	force, and from non-combat to combat positions. Civilian DoD and 
	(especially) contract labor have filled the support gaps left behind. 
	Beyond this, the increased support required by increased operational tempo 
	has been increasingly provided by contract labor. Indeed, the role of 
	contractors now extends to some basic security and intelligence 
	functions. 
	The result is that DoD’s total workforce is probably as large today as it 
	was in 1989 (or even larger), but less of the total is in uniform. This 
	accords with the rise in O&M spending and also with studies by Paul C. 
	Light of the Brookings Institution, which suggest that the contractor 
	workforce may have grown by as much as 40% since 1989. By comparison, the 
	full-time military and DoD civilian workforces are both about 32% smaller 
	today than in 1989. 
	3.2 Discordant modernization 
	The second process contributing to the exceptional surge in defense 
	spending concerns post-Cold War force modernization efforts. The DoD 
	acquisition process has been the subject of frequent criticism by 
	congressional research agencies, the Defense Science 
	6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
	Board, and others for routinely delivering products late, over cost, and 
	not as capable as promised. But these problems cannot fully explain the 
	exceptional circumstance that DoD is facing today. Since reaching a 
	low-point in the late-1990s, procurement spending has rebounded 
	substantially, rising by more than 160% in real terms. Not since the nation 
	undertook crash rearmament for the Korean war has as much been spent in a 
	single year as in 2008, when the procurement account was allotted $170 
	billion (2010 USD). As noted above, recent modernization spending is 
	comparable to Reagan levels. And, in real per person terms, it surpasses 
	them substantially. 
	And yet, while the earlier period is remembered as one of robust 
	modernization, today’s efforts are viewed as “troubled” from all sides. 
	What distinguishes recent practice is a dysfunction that we call 
	“discordant modernization”. Beginning in the early 1990s, acquisition 
	practice has been riven by several, contending trends or visions. More 
	important, DoD has failed to adequately prioritize among them or to 
	compel integration. So these have all lurched forward together, layered 
	one atop the other. 
	Looking at recent practice, we can distinguish three modernization 
	trends: Legacy, Transformational, and Adaptive. 
	# Legacy efforts carry forward and seek to enhance the pivotal platforms 
	and capabilities of the recent past; 
	# Transformational efforts seek to achieve dramatic increases in 
	effectiveness or efficiency by employing new technology, techniques, and 
	forms of organization; 
	# Adaptive efforts correspond to the perceived requirements of new 
	security missions and circumstances – such as stability operations, 
	counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism. 
	Given strong strategic guidance and prioritization from the center, these 
	efforts can be fully integrated. Otherwise, they will proceed in a 
	discordant way, competing for funds – a circumstance that, like 
	inter-service rivalry, exerts unrelenting upward pressure on the budget. 
	The Army’s recent modernization agenda provides a particularly acute 
	example. But the problem is evident as well in, for instance, the Navy’s 
	program which, apart from the decision to retire battleships, has sought 
	to modernize virtually every type of surface, subsurface, and aircraft 
	capability, while adding cruise-missile subs, littoral combatants, 
	remotely piloted vehicles, and tilt-rotor aircraft. And, of course, like 
	every service, the Navy is attempting to build its own encompassing C4I 
	network. 
	When strategic discipline is lax, legacy modernization tends to 
	predominate, due to its institutional momentum. Eventually, external 
	circumstances may compel a rush of ad hoc 
	AN UNDISCIPLINED DEFENSE 7 
	adaptive measures – as is the case today with regard to procurement to 
	meet counter- insurgency needs. These may then come to predominate, 
	prematurely. The only remedy is to strongly discipline force 
	modernization in accord with a sustainable, adaptive, and cost-effective 
	national security strategy. The various scenarios and missions that define 
	military requirements must be strongly prioritized, and these priorities 
	must be enforced from the center. 
	In a broader perspective, discordant modernization risks detaching the 
	nation’s finite defense resources from its actual security needs. In the 
	decade before the 9/11 attacks, the United States spent over $1 trillion 
	on military modernization. But most of this expenditure proved irrelevant 
	to defending against the most serious attack on America in 60 years. 
	Subsequently, three more years of funding added another $450 billion dollars 
	to modernization accounts, but still the nation found itself ill-equipped to 
	execute the new tasks it had undertaken: counter-insurgency in Iraq and 
	Afghanistan. 
	3.3 Going to war (with the military you have) 
	The third process contributing to the post-1998 spending surge was 
	America’s protracted commitment to two wars of a type for which its armed 
	forces were ill-prepared. As noted above, fully 52% of the spending surge 
	(and 17% of total spending since 1998) can be attributed to contingency 
	operations – principally to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Although war 
	costs explain a significant portion of the surge, they also beg the 
	question: Why have these wars proved so much more expensive in real terms 
	than their predecessors? 
	Part of the reason is that the United States found itself inadvertently 
	fighting “Mr. Johnson’s war” using a reduced version of “Mr. Reagan’s 
	military.” Unlike during the Vietnam War era, the United States today 
	employs an all-volunteer (that is, professional) force. The logic of this 
	policy ensures that long, exhausting, labor-intensive wars will drive 
	personnel costs sharply higher, as DoD must bid higher to recruit and retain 
	personnel. And they have: after remaining virtually flat in real terms for 
	22 years, military personnel spending measured on a per person basis rose 
	46% between 2000 and 2010. Slightly more than half of this was 
	war-related. 
	In one obvious respect – size – today’s uniformed military is not Mr. 
	Reagan’s or Mr. Johnson’s. In this respect, too, America’s military was 
	ill-suited to undertake occupation and counter-insurgency tasks in two 
	challenging locales with a combined population of approximately 50 
	million. Principally, DoD sought to compensate by employing a uniquely 
	high proportion of contractors. The Congressional Research Services 
	estimates that 240,000 are employed in the CENTCOM area today – and more 
	are on the way. In budgetary terms, this registers as above-average O&M 
	costs – and the wars are responsible for 73% of the surge in O&M 
	spending. 
	8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
	The wars are also responsible for nearly 43% of the post-1998 surge in 
	modernization spending. The challenge has been not simply to replace the 
	equipment consumed in war, but also to purchase entirely new fleets of 
	equipment suited to these wars (such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
	vehicles) and to significantly adapt existing fleets. As noted above, 
	despite nearly $1.45 trillion in modernization spending during 1991-2004 – 
	including much invested in ground combat vehicles – the United States found 
	itself ill- equipped for the major types of operations it chose to 
	conduct. More than three years of fighting passed before DoD began to 
	seriously re-orient its procurement programs. 
	4. Trillions to burn 
	The three policy paths outlined above have converged to give America a 
	historically unique global edge in military spending. This has not 
	purchased clear and sure progress toward a more secure and stable world, 
	however. Nor has it produced an especially efficient military, closely 
	adapted to the current security environment. 
	The road not taken – at a cost of some trillions of dollars – would have 
	involved some combination of (i) a more forceful and thorough-going 
	approach to Pentagon reform, (ii) an integrated or “joint” approach to 
	force modernization and transformation, tailoring these closely to new 
	era conditions, and (iii) greater restraint in setting post-Cold War 
	military goals and missions. That this has not occurred suggests a lapse in 
	attention to the strategic costs and benefits associated with our chosen 
	defense posture. It is as though the nation has trillions to burn. 
	A permissive spending environment is the precondition for the types of 
	problems identified in this report. It is easy enough to point to the 11 
	September 2001 attacks as the progenitor of this condition. However, as 
	we note, the surge in spending began before 2001. Moreover, Gallup polls 
	show that public support for increased spending was higher in the two 
	years prior to the attacks than in the two years after. And it has receded 
	significantly since then. This points to a more fundamental enabling 
	condition: presently there seems to be little political gain (and much 
	risk) in pressing for the type of tight DoD budget constraints that might 
	prompt through-going reform and transformation. 
	Nonetheless, emerging fiscal realities may soon compel increased 
	attention to how the nation allocates scarce resources among competing 
	national goals -- foreign and domestic, military and non-military. And this 
	might put the nation on the road to a disciplined defense. 
	 PROJECT ON DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES n COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTE 
	CAMBRIDGE MA: 617-547-4474 n WASHINGTON DC: 301-493-8769 
	www.comw.org/pda    
	pda@comw.org  
	
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