Second Interview: The 48 Hours Before and Early Days After the War

Opinion, September 2003, www.aljazeerah.info

Al-Sahaf Talks about the US-UK War on Iraq

Jassem Obaid of Abu Dhabi TV interviewing Muhammed Sa'id Al-Sahaf, the former Iraqi Minister of Information

A Summary Translation By Dr. Hassan El-Najjar

Al-Jazeerah, 9/25/03

Question 1: How did the Iraqi leadership spend the last 48 hours before the war?

Al-Sahaf: Actually, we spent the last three months preparing for war. We knew it was coming. We made sure that there was enough food for people and enough equipment for that period.

Question 2: President Bush offered President Saddam 48 hours to leave the country with his family, including his two sons and their families. Why didn't they leave?

Al-Sahaf: The Americans said that they would attack and invade the country whether Saddam leaves or not. That was why he stayed because his departure would not save Iraq from war.

Question 3: Was there any peace initiatives in the last few hours before the war?

Al-Sahaf: No, there wasn't any. We were resigned that they were coming and we just prepared to defend the country.

Question 4: Was there any feeling or any fear that a leader or a senior official may defect?

Al-Sahaf: Not at all.

Question 5: Was there another person ready to lead if Saddam was killed? Was there a problem of succession?

Al-Sahaf 5: Not at all. Izzat Ibrahim was the first Vice President. He was expected to lead the country in such case.

Question 6: How did you meet as a cabinet during the war?

Al-Sahaf 6: For several years, we practice attending meetings in secret places. We as individual cabinet members would leave our homes in our cars to meet cabinet employees in a certain place. We leave our cars there and take a microbus or several of us leave in one car to where the President is waiting for us. We never knew our destination. That was the job of the security people to drive us there. This was what we did also during the war.

Question 7: Did the cabinet hold meetings outside Baghdad?

Al-Sahaf 7: We did that only for few times before the war. But during the war, all meetings were in Baghdad.

Question 8: On March 18/19, Baghdad was attacked with waves of Cruise missiles that the Americans said they targeted buildings where Saddam was believed to be in together with the Iraqi leadership. Where were you at that time?

Al-Sahaf 8: I was in the Information Ministry. I slept in a small room there. You and other journalists saw it. But President Saddam and the leadership were not in any of these buildings, which were targeted for attacks. Actually, they targeted a lot of facilities that were targeted in the 1991 War, the 1998 air campaign, or buildings that were visited by UN inspectors. This tells you that American intelligence reports were not accurate and outdated.

Question 9: Did you expect the war to be in this size?

Al-Sahaf 9: We expected one of two scenarios: Either an air campaign followed by a pause, then a land invasion, or an air campaign and a land invasion at the same time as happened.

Question 10: How did the Iraqi leadership interpret the air attacks?

Al-Sahaf 10: They said the attacks targeted President Saddam but as I told you they targeted facilities they wanted to destroy in advance and Saddam's presence was not the target. Some of the facilities were attacked three times. We also observed that neither Baghdad's electricity nor the Iraqi TV were targeted at the beginning of the campaign. The TV antenna was attached to the Information Ministry and they couldn't figure it out until after the fall of Baghdad.

Question 11: Are you saying that Saddam was not in the areas they targeted?

Al-Sahaf 11: No, he was not there. They couldn't figure out where he was. For example, Al-Amirat Street was not targeted while President Saddam was there for five days. He also stayed in a villa in Al-Zahra neighborhood. They couldn't find him either. The closest they were in their attacks to him was about a kilometer away. So, their intelligence was not accurate and Iraq was not an open book for them.

Question 12: The first appearance of Saddam was on March 20, that is about 24 hours after the beginning of the air and land attacks. He appeared reading his speech from a notebook. He was wearing glasses (This is the video that US media suspected made by a Saddam's double). So, who wrote that speech for him and wasn't he 24 hours late to deliver it?

Al-Sahaf 12: Saddam wrote it. He has been writing his speeches by himself for the last two decades. During the 1970s and early 1980s, Tariq Aziz wrote his speeches but in the last two decades he did by himself. Actually, he likes to write even long fliers, reports, and statements for the state and for the (Ba'ath) Party.

Question 13: Where was he when he was making that speech?

Al-Sahaf 13: He was in a house close to the Presidential Palace, where he spent the night. Going back to your previous question. I felt that he was late in addressing the Iraqi people. Therefore, I went to the radio station and started addressing the people, encouraging them and lifting their morale. While I was talking, I received a phone call from his Secretary telling me that President Saddam made a speech and it's in its way to the radio station.

Question 14: Was there a lack of communication between Saddam and his cabinet, including you?

Al-Sahaf 14: No. There has always been adequate communication and we held cabinet meetings like the one you saw on video.

Question 15: Did the 24-hour delay of Saddam's speech cause any concerns for you?

Al-Sahaf 15: Yes. I felt that there should be an address to the people from the beginning of hostilities. That was why I went to the radio station to do it by myself.

Question 16: If Saddam was killed, would the Iraqi leadership (Izzat Ibrahim) keep it secret or announce it?

Al-Sahaf 16: Probably it would be kept secret (because of the war).

Question 17: Concerning Um Qasr, it didn't fall to the British and Americans easily as they expected. How do you explain that?

Al-Sahaf 17: Um Qasr did not fall for 17 days during the war. It is a city and a port on the Kuwaiti border. US-UK forces came from sea and occupied only part of the port but they could not enter the city because of the fierce resistance they faced there.

Question 18: Where did you get your information for your daily reporting, particularly about Um Qasr?

Al-Sahaf 18: I had direct contacts with the Defense Ministry, military commanders in Um Qasr, and Information Ministry correspondents in the city.

Question 19: Did the Iraqi leadership anticipate another uprising in the South, like the 1991 Uprising?

Al-Sahaf 19: No, we didn't. Many things changed ever since.

Question 20: Was the appointment of Ali Hassan Al-Majid as governor of the Southern military region in anticipation of any uprising, as he was reputed of his tough ways?

Al-Sahaf 20: No. It had nothing to do with an anticipation of an uprising. He was in the South for many years. He had an experience there and it was logical to appoint him in a leadership position there, during the war.

Question 21: Again, how do you explain the resistance in the South generally and particularly in Um Qasr, which surprised everybody?

Al-Sahaf 21: Saddam asked the military commanders to reinforce the Um Qasr defensive force just a day before the war. The 45th Division was instructed to leave Basra and join the Iraqi forces in Um Qasr. When the war started, the 45th Division units were still positioning themselves in the area. Probably, they were not noticed by the US-UK air surveillance. Because of the fierce fight that they put, the British finally stopped their attempts to enter the city and landed behind the Iraqi forces to the north and the direction of Basra.

Question 22: What about your famous usage of certain terms to describe the US-UK forces (Al-Aulouj, mercenaries), why did you use them and was Saddam aware of that?

Al-Sahaf 22: I had to come up with something unique that would attract people's attention, particularly because we were targeted by 56 hostile radio stations. People were flooded with propaganda from the other side. Even Iraqi cabinet members (such as Mulla Huwaidh) were exposed to psychological warfare. Some of them even received telephone calls from the United States, from Atlanta, Georgia. The caller, Americans speaking weak Arabic, would threaten and curse them. I had to come up with something remarkable to combat that propaganda war.

Question 23: How did Saddam react to daily reports about the war? Was he suspicious or trusting of the reports from the South?

Al-Sahaf 23: Saddam trusted his aids and the cabinet members. He also trusted the reports given to him. However, he would double check with different source, and this is a good characteristic in a leader. In every meeting the Defense Minister, Sultan Hashem Ahmed, would present his report and Saddam would be listening like everybody else. He would not interrupt him. His reaction, and actually ours too, to the remarkable Southern resistance was a big sigh of relief. Iraqis in the South met the invaders with resistance, not with flowers as their propaganda machines lied to people.

Question 24: So, who made the day-to-day decisions during the war?

Al-Sahaf 24: President Saddam Hussain did.

Question 25: Was Saddam really a religious person? We saw him praying in the video.

Al-Sahaf 25: Yes, he is.

Question 26: During the 1990s, he ordered the building of many mosques. Wasn't this on the expense of the poor in Iraq?

Al-Sahaf 26: Building mosques did not cause the hardship and poverty the Iraqis have experienced. The embargo and sanctions were the cause of that hardship and that poverty.

Jassem Obaid: Thank you Mr. Al-Sahaf and see you in the third interview, next Wednesday.

First interview, Background to the War on Iraq.htm

Second Interview, The 48 Hours Before and Early Days After the War.htm

Third Interview Resistance in the South and the Jessica Story.htm

Fourth Interview Fall of southern cities, oil wells, and Israel.htm

Sixth Interview 9th of April, 2003 and live questions from viewers.htm

Seventh Interview: More live questions from viewers

Earth, a planet hungry for peace

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).