Fourth Interview: Fall of southern cities, oil wells, and Israel

Opinion, October 2003, www.aljazeerah.info

Al-Sahaf Talks about the US-UK War on Iraq

Jassem Obaid of Abu Dhabi TV interviewing Muhammed Sa'id Al-Sahaf, the former Iraqi Minister of Information

A Summary Translation By Dr. Hassan El-Najjar

Al-Jazeerah, 10/8/03

Question 1: Events in Southern Iraq indicated that the war would extend to a long time.

(A video is played showing a meeting of President Saddam Hussain and some of his aids, his Secretary Abed Hussain, and his son Qussay. They were talking about downing a plane in the Tigris river, during the fourth day of the war).

What is the truth about that story?

Al-Sahaf: I heard reports about downing two pilots in the Tigress River. I asked the Civil Defense Department about it but they said they had no information about it. Finally, they said it could be an unopened container of flyers the US planes used to drop.

Question 2: Don't you think that there was a missing link in Saddam's information?

Al-Sahaf: No, there wasn't. The President received information from various sources, not just from his secretary. He would also receive information from the military intelligence, which he depended on more.

Question 3: Would he make decisions on basis of meetings like this?

Al-Sahaf: No. There were many sources available to him before he would make a decision.

Question 4: (Video of Al-Sahaf conducting an interview with Abu Dhabi TV). How did bombing affect communication?

Al-Sahaf: The bombing targeted civilian communication and led to the disconnection between neighborhoods, not within neighborhoods. But the military had their own separate communication system.

Question 5: How did bombing An Nassiriya military Communication Center affect operations?

Al-Sahaf: It took about 24 hours to re-establish communication between Baghdad and the Iraqi forces there. The President expected 18 hours. The US intensified bombing of communication centers in the country in order to disconnect the leadership from local commanders everywhere.

Question 6: The black Sunday for the US-UK troops (4th day of the war) made London and Washington think that war could last longer than what was planned. So what happened in An Najaf and An Nassiriya in particular?

Al-Sahaf: In An Nassiriya, these battles took place in its west and south, too for days. They launched a quick attack. Our forces reacted with strong and fast counter attack. US forces established checkpoints to the North of An Nassiriya to give the impression that City had fallen when it did not. The Iraqi strategy was to attack the snake (the long line of US forces) in many places to cut it into parts. The fighting in Basra was a setback to Iraqi forces because of the huge US land-air attack. Adel Ad Douri, the Basra commander, was replaced. The US air power represented 1000% superiority over Iraqi forces.

Question 7: Why were these Iraqi forces moved from a place to another, given the US air superiority, which would make them vulnerable?

Al-Sahaf: Some Iraqi units were moved successfully, others were crushed by the US air attacks. This is a war that required that some units had to move in order to attack or to change places.

Question 8: The Defense Minister, Sultan Hashem Ahmed, predicted the arrival of US forces to Baghdad within 10 days. You never reported the same way, why not?

Al-Sahaf: There was a difference in the nature of our two jobs. His job was military, which required an accurate prediction of development. Mine required elevating the moral of the people. The plan was to fight the US everywhere, but the Defense Minister said the US forces avoided battles with Iraqi forces and were rushing directly to Baghdad.

Question 9: (A video showing Al-Sahaf talking about An Najaf and how the US forces were trying to advance to the Holy places in the City). The Shi'a men stopped them. Why did you mention that development in particular?

Al-Sahaf: To urge people to rise up and protect their Holy places. And they did. The President observed in one meeting that Mezban, the local commander in An Najaf, was confused. This enabled the US forces to advance inside the City. So, he was replaced. Some people in An Najaf revolted (against the government) and the President expressed his sadness for that development, but it was a little incident.

Question 10: How did you know about events in An Najaf?

Al-Sahaf: From many sources: Correspondents of the Iraqi radio stations, TV stations, news agency, and the Civilian Office in the Ministry of Defense. Sometimes, I'd call local commanders myself.

Question 11: What happened to Mezban?

Al-Sahaf : He was sent home, to Baqouba.

Question 12: How did Saddam, Abed Hussain, Qussay, and others (shown meeting in the video) react to the bad news?

Al-Sahaf : To the last minute, there was resistance everywhere. That was a bright side despite the dark news of the US forces advancing to Baghdad.

Question 13: Did Sultan Hashem Ahmed (Minister of Defense) complain?

Al-Sahaf: He complained of intervention in his work by non-military people.

Question 14: During the second week, the British targeted Basra and concentrated their attacks on it for that purpose. Civilians started to runaway. (A video is played showing Al-Sahaf denying that the British took Basra, because there were attacks and counter attacks). Why did you deny that the British took the City?

Al-Sahaf: What I said was true because they were pushed away by Iraqi forces. They attacked the City several times and they were pushed away by Iraqi Division 422.

Question 15: How did you maintain your argument that the British took the City while the news kept coming to the contrary?

Al-Sahaf: I would call local military commanders who would assure me that they pushed them away. That was the strategy, attacks and countrerattacks.

Question 16: That Division 422 was severely attacked and damaged after that, wasn't it?----

Al-Sahaf: Yes it was. The Ministry of Information correspondents, the radio and TV reporters, Civil Defense, and Ministry of Defense Civilian Office, all of them enabled me to double check any news story. The battles in the south, particularly in An Nassiriya and Basra were in the form of US-UK attacks and advancing then Iraqi counter attacks and pushing away invading forces. The British focused on Basra. They did not advance beyond the City to the north. But the US forces moved to the north towards Baghdad without attempting to control southern cities.

Question 17: During the10th day of the war, the Pentagon announced securing more than 600 oil wells. How did this happen? What was the Iraqi strategy?

Al-Sahaf: The Iraqi military commanders argued from the beginning that there was no need to guard the oil wells because they would be destroyed in the open desert and the wells will be on fire. Therefore, there was no battle about oil wells.

Question 18: Some oil wells were on fire, why?

Al-Sahaf: It was not our target to set them on fire. Iraqis set the oil pools and trenches on fire, not the oil wells. There was no battle over the oil wells. The Iraqi strategy was to leave them to the US invaders without a fight. Some wells were burned by minor reasons.

Question 19: The Iraqi losses started to increase and the Iraqi resistance started to decrease. Did this affect the Iraqi plans?

Al-Sahaf: Yes, because of the confusion resulting from the fast advance of the invaders, 30-40 Iraqi tanks were destroyed around Baghdad and some tanks were even found empty of their crews, who left them without fighting.

Question 20: Were there field courts to execute those who fled away?

Al-Sahaf: No.

Question 21: Was there any role for Israel in the war? ( A video is played showing the Israeli Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, saying that the war was in favor of Israel).

Al-Sahaf: Militarily I don't know. However, I knew of two indicators that Israel was involved in the war. First, the debris of some missiles indicated that they were Israeli missiles. Second, we detected jamming Iraqi TV waves from the west (Israel). The Iraqi TV channel started to be jammed on April 2. We thought that it was an Arab Satellite technical problem. The headquarters in Tunis looked at it and found that everything was all right. But we observed that the jamming was coming from the west of Iraq, that is from Israel. We had three TV stations.

Question 22: Why, then, didn't Iraq attack Israel with missiles, like in 1991?

Al-Sahaf: We had no missiles that would reach longer than 150 Kilometers (less than 100 miles).

Question 23: Arab volunteers were a mystery. Iraqi foreign minister, Naji Sabri, said they were 5, 000. They complained of mistreatment. What about them?

Al-Sahaf: They were welcome before the war. They exceeded that figure to reach about 15,000. Their big numbers posed a logistical problem, at the verge of the war. The President suggest that they be absorbed by the armed forces.

Question 24: Were they tricked or misguided to come to Iraq, to be easily killed?

Al-Sahaf: No, these were highly motivated and highly trained Arab young men who wanted to defend Iraq against the US-UK invasion.

Question 25: Couldn't there be some US-UK agents amongst the volunteers?

Al-Sahaf: I don't know, but they would be sent by organizations supportive of Iraq.

Question 26: On April 3, the US forces announced landing in Saddam airport, Al-Sahaf denied that development and invited journalists to accompany him to the airport. Actually, they were not there, where were they?

Al-Sahaf: I don't know, but I found it an opportunity to deny the US allegations in a practical way.

Question 27: As a person, how did you do it?

Al-Sahaf: I knew that they would advance but without total control. Iraqi troops were still in their positions. The US goal was Baghdad. The military assured me of that.

It's time to end here. Next Wednesday we will talk about the attack, you promised journalists, on the airport, but did not happen.

First interview, Background to the War on Iraq.htm

Second Interview, The 48 Hours Before and Early Days After the War.htm

Third Interview Resistance in the South and the Jessica Story.htm

Fourth Interview Fall of southern cities, oil wells, and Israel.htm

Sixth Interview 9th of April, 2003 and live questions from viewers.htm

Seventh Interview: More live questions from viewers

Earth, a planet hungry for peace

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).