Poisonous Rhetoric in Baghdad By Abbas J. Ali

Poisonous Rhetoric in Baghdad

By Abbas J. Ali

Al-Jazeerah, March 5, 2006

The deliberate attack on the Imam al-Hadi Shrine in Samarra and the instantaneous violent protests that followed are a potent reminder that the American enterprise in Iraq is built on a shaky foundation. The events evidence that miscalculations have been the hallmark of the Iraqi venture and that the civilian American leaders, residing in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone, have failed miserably to grasp the depth of the populace’s resentment toward the political calamity that has been imposed on them.

Indeed, the widespread uproars have manifested not only a dismay for the destruction of religious and cultural symbols but also a deep dissatisfaction with the slow progress toward political normalcy and the establishment of a credible and independent central government capable of ensuring the safety and security of the ordinary citizens.

While ordinary Iraqis have long voiced concerns regarding how Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad conducts his business, increasing numbers of Iraqi politicians and civil leaders have questioned the wisdom of his intrusive style and his unusual repeated references to sectarian division within the country. Ambassador Khalilzad shows indifference to these concerns and since early February has accelerated his divisive sectarian message.

Ambassador Khalilzad has an extensive experience in foreign affairs. More importantly, long before the invasion of Iraq he worked closely with the opposition groups and served on the team that was responsible for planning the invasion of 2003. In fact, he was instrumental in coaxing the diverse Iraqi oppositions in their London 2002 conference to adopt a political blueprint in line with the Bush administration’s projection for Iraq.

Since his arrival in Baghdad in early 2005 as Ambassador, Khalilzad has been personally involved in Iraqi politics and has sought to steer political events to closely fit his design for Iraq. To his surprise, he finds that most politicians who accommodated his demands and instructions while living in exile now have their own independent agenda and are reluctant to go along with his agenda as they previously did.

In particular, Khalilzad has publicly shown displeasure with the failure of Ibrahim al-Jafari, the transitional prime minister, to comply with the Embassy guidelines. Jafari is often irritated by Khalilzad’s blunt and forceful intervention in the government affairs. Jafari’s inclusive and transparent manners do not recommend themselves to Khalilzad’s aggressive approaches.

It is possible that in playing hardball in managing Iraqi politics, Khalilzad thinks that he is lending Iraqis a helping hand. Nevertheless, his overemphasis on secrecy and arm twisting and his public warning to government and its representatives to behave in accordance with his instructions infuriate and alarm even ordinary Iraqis.

For example, Reuters reported that when Vice President, Dick Cheney, visited Baghdad in late 2005, Ambassador Khalilzad summoned the Iraqi President and Prime Minister to his office. They were taken by surprise to find that a meeting had been scheduled with Cheney without their prior knowledge. This highhandedness on the part of Khalilzad has seriously challenged Washington’s highly promoted notion of a sovereign Iraq.

Khalilzad prefers to have the final say when it comes to security in Iraq. When the American military announced the transfer of the security control to the Iraqi army in one center in Baghdad, the transfer did not take place, as the Iraqi commander appointed by the Defense Ministry was rejected. The American Embassy insisted that the transfer would be completed only when an Iraqi officer appointed by the Embassy, not the Ministry of Defense, was in control.

Likewise, in matters closely related to Iraqi sovereignty, Ambassador Khlilzad insisted that the selection of the Prime Minister and the program of his government must correspond to his wishes. Otherwise, he warned, "I would not exclude the possibility that if they don't agree on programs and people, there may be a new candidate for prime minister.”

In terms of defense and interior ministries, Khalilzad was in uncompromising mood. He plainly threatened to look for other means to prevent any nominee he deems unacceptable stating, “if they are not run by people who are nonsectarian, not tied to militias, not moderate, not broadly accepted, the forces would not be effective, and, therefore, we are advising them to do the right thing, and if they don't, we will take a look at what we do.”

The events that have occurred since the elections have both frustrated and disappointed Khalilzad. The outcome of the elections gave the United Iraqi Alliance the largest block of seats in the national assembly and the populace Sadrist movement positioned itself as a champion for Iraqi patriotism. Their programs and agenda may set Iraq on a conflict course with Khalilzad’s vision for Iraq.

Subsequently, Ambassador Khalilzad has engaged in a discourse perceived by various Iraqi groups as overtly sectarian and that his public pronouncements show an insensitivity to Iraqi pride and their deep seated aversion to sectarian division. These groups have come to view Khalilzad more often than not as the instigator rather than solver of their problems.

Ambassador Khalilzad seems not to appreciate the fact that some Iraqi political groups who come to power, through open elections, have to answer to their constituencies and that their national programs will not necessarily resemble his own design. So he has proposed the establishment of a non elected council to plan government policies and supervise its activities. Iraqi experts have perceived this proposal as a plot to circumvent the result of the elections and obstruct the democratic process.

Strategically, Khalilzad made a fatal mistake when he treated Iraq as Afghanistan. The latter is essentially a tribal society with no clear national or cultural identity. Whether unintentional or deliberate, he ignored the fact that the Iraqi society was mainly secular with a vibrant tradition of skepticism and a strong inclination to question foreign schemes.

An increasing number of Iraqis question the wisdom of Khalilzad’s repeated sectarian message and believe that Iraq is facing the most painful period in its history. This situation calls for profound rethinking, avoidance of sectarian rhetoric and leaving Iraqis to settle their own national priorities and navigate a road map for a unified democratic Iraq free of terror and foreign domination. The alternative is a continuance of the turmoil that has plagued Iraq since the invasion.

Abbas J. Ali, Professor and Director School of International Management, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, USA.

Earth, a planet hungry for peace

Apartheid Wall


The Israeli Land-Grab Apartheid Wall built inside the Palestinian territories, here separating Abu Dis from occupied East Jerusalem. (IPC, 7/4/04).

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank, like a Python. (Alquds,10/25/03).

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