The Making of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim 

By Abbas J. Ali

Al-Jazeerah, February 23, 2006

Several weeks after the Iraqi general elections on December 15, the United Iraqi Alliance, which had won the majority of seats in parliament, finally nominated Ibrahim Al-Ja'afari to be the prime minister. The selection of Ja'afari represents a major political set back for Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). More importantly, it represents a rare moment in the history of Iraq where grassroots organizations utilize democratic forum to triumph over the power elite.

Zalmay Khalilzad, the US. Ambassador in Baghdad worked closely with al-Hakim and the Kurdish clan leaders to ensure the nomination of Adel Abdul Mahdi to the position of prime minister. In addition, to Ja'afari and Mahdi there were two other candidates: Hussein Shahrastani and Nadim al-Jabri. These two candidates were committed to ending the occupation of Iraq and vehemently denounced any attempt to divide Iraq or to obliterate its Arab identity. Both were rejected by the occupation powers and al-Hakim.

Political commentators seem to have mixed feelings about al-Hakim and occasionally treat him with unjustified harshness. In its editorial (January 12, 2006), the New York Times called him a political incendiary and a threat to Iraq. Whether or not this accurately characterizes al-Hakim’s true nature is an open question. His defenders view him as a shrewd politician who advocates their cause tirelessly. His adversaries regard him as a divisive wheeler and dealer who, more often than not, creates rather than solves problems.

Those who are intimately familiar with Iraqi politics and history argue that al-Hakim is a political actor shaped by events beyond his control. These events have catapulted him onto the center of the political stage. The traumatic years of 1958-1963, the rise and tragic death of his older brothers, and his troubled exile in Iran have all had an impact on al-Hakim‘s personality.

In the 1950s the Iraqi civil society was intellectually vibrant with progressive movements dominating the political scene. After Abdul Karim Qassem came to power on July 14, 1958, the Communist Party, through its supporters in the government, enacted agrarian and other economic reforms along with civil and personal affairs laws which were detrimental to land lords and other established elite interests.

These developments distressed the Iraqi upper classes and were viewed with considerable dismay by the regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both regimes approached Grand Ayatollah Muhesn al-Hakim (the father of Abdul Aziz) and asked him to denounce the new government and its programs. Ayatollah al-Hakim issued a fatwa against the regime and the Communist Party. Influenced by the prevailing “progressive” theology at the time and the depth of the popular support for the regime and the Communist Party, other senior ayatollahs (who constitute Alhawza- the learned community) declined to go along, including the late Mohamed Baqr al-Sadr, uncle of Mugtada al-Sadr.

As a consequence of his action, Ayatollah Muhesn al-Hakim became virtually isolated from the populace, while other influential ayatollahs publicly lent their support to the economic reforms and to the aspirations of the populace for a free and prosperous society. These events profoundly influenced Ayatollah Muhesn al-Hakim and left a scar on his family, including his young son Abdul Aziz. The latter grew up with a deep bitterness toward a progressive popular Hawza.

Al-Hakim’s older brothers Mahdi and Mohamed Baqr were dynamic individuals. Both were talented and gifted leaders. Mahdi sought political change in Iraq through active recruitment of students in the late 1960s and early 1970s into politics. He was subsequently assassinated in Sudan by the Saddam regime. Mohamed, the second brother was a seasoned leader, thoughtful and farsighted. He showed an unwavering commitment to changing Saddam’s regime and after the invasion in March 2003, he sought to dispel foreign forces and build an inclusive democratic government. His message was national and non-sectarian. His assassination in August of that year left Abdul Aziz without a reliable mentor.

His brother, Mohamed Baqr, articulated a vision, leaving to Abdul Aziz responsibility for conveying messages and maneuvering in the political arena. Abdul Aziz then was content with his role and understood that he lacked the charisma and appeal of his brother.

Living in Iran as an exile for many years also reshaped al-Hakim’s outlook and personality. In Iran there were two camps of Iraqis: the refugees and the captives of the Iraqi-Iran war. The latter were generally nationalists and had a vague memory of al-Hakim family. Their identification was mostly with Ayatollah Mohamed Sadiq al-Sadr, the father of Mugtada al-Sadr. The Iraqi refugees who were deported by Saddam for sectarian reasons bitterly resented the regime in Iraq and the way they were treated. It is this group that al-Hakim related to and to whom he offered moral and financial support.

In recent months, al-Hakim’s adversaries have intensified their accusations that he is a tool of Iran and the United States. In Iran, the reformer group appears to support al-Sadr movement not al-Hakim. The ruling conservatives in Iran have their own priorities: ensuring the safety and the survival of the regime and making Qom, rather than Najaf in Iraq, as the intellectual and religious center of Shia Islam. The latter aim may be consistent with al-Hakim’s goals of having a weak Hawza not connected to the daily affairs of ordinary Iraqis. This may allow him to project himself as the only champion of the cause of the people in central and southern Iraq.

Similarly, al-Hakim interest in maintaining the presence of foreign forces and his apparent friendship with American representatives in Baghdad, do not necessary evidence that he is an American instrument. Rather, his interests seem to be consistent with the goal of the neoconservatives; incapacitating Iraqi political and cultural institutions.

In recent months, al-Hakim more than ever has strengthened his relationships with the representatives of the occupation powers. Furthermore, he visited Irabil in Northern Iraq and promised Kurdish separatists to transfer Iraq into semi-independent three regions. This has angered the majority of Iraqis who regards the proposed division as a threat to the democratic order and peace and security in Iraq. Since then, al-Hakim has faced mounting pressures, to espouse patriotic agenda, from two credible rivals: Al-Dawa Party and Sadrist movement.

In fact, al-Hakim's efforts since the assassination of his brother in 2003 have primarily aimed at creating an environment conducive to positioning himself politically. He understands that he has neither the clear vision nor the capability of his late brother to lead Iraq. This may explain his inclination to stress a sectarian message and his insistence on a form of a weak central government and a form of federalism along the sectarian and ethnic lines.

Consequently, his unsuccessful maneuver to select Adel Abdul Mahdi, instead of Ja'afari, to be prime minister constitutes a threat to his leadership position and control of SCIRI. Both Ja'afari and Mahdi lack charisma. Relative to Ja'afari, however, Mahdi does not display ideological discipline and is not known for articulating a national vision. Ja'afari’s intellectual capability and uncorrupt personality may not only recommend themselves to al-Hakim but they certainly endanger his design for Iraq.

After his nomination, Ja'afari announced that he would build a unified democratic Iraq. He outlined priorities for a government that espouses transparency, exposes corruption, and establishes a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Furthermore, he rejected the call for using Iraq as a staging ground to attack or invade neighboring countries. Such an agenda alarms the occupation-supported politicians. The latter have sought to derail his program by preventing him from assuming the position of prime minister.

Iraq is at historical cross roads and is in need of a leader to point the way during difficult times. Leaders who are interested in merely exercising power for its own sake, in sheer political survival and who thrive on sectarian and ethnic division simply won’t be up to this historical challenge. If truth is the daughter of time, time will tell if al-Hakim has the wisdom to enthusiastically carry out a new agenda for Iraq, one that emphasizes the construction of a democratic, unified Iraq or someone who will lead to the break down of Iraq.

Dr. Abbas J. Ali, Professor and Director, School of International Management, Indiana University of Pennsylvania