Rafah Canada Camp Relocation: Prepared for the International Development Research Centre, A Report By Ron Wilkinson

Rafah Canada Camp Relocation: Prepared for the International Development Research Centre

A Report By Ron Wilkinson

May 2001

INITIAL REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 3

1.Introduction 4
2.Chronology of events 7
3.Parties to the Process 9
4.Process of Relocation 11
5.Problems Encountered/Resolved 13
6.Coordination/ “Third Party” Role 20
7.Life in Canada Camp 22
8.After the move: Tel el Sultan 25
9.Involvement of Refugees 28
10.Views on the Process 29
11.Preliminary conclusions/Lessons Learned 31

Annex A: The 1989 Egypt-Israel Agreement on Relocation
Annex B: Map
Annex C: Glossary of Terms
Annex D: Sources

Information in this report was provided by former residents of Canada Camp and individuals with a long involvement in the project. Documents from UNRWA and others also provided input. Additional information was obtained from persons involved in the latter stages of relocation. The writer regularly visited Canada Camp/Tel el Sultan from 1991-98 and again in January 2001.

This report was prepared for the Expert and Advisory Services Fund of the International Development Research Centre.

This report is electronically available at http://www.idrc.ca/sid/middle_e_reports.html

INITIAL REVIEW: CANADA CAMP RELOCATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 18-year-long saga of Palestine refugees stranded in the Sinai ended in December 2000. Under the Camp David Accords, Israel and Egypt had agreed on their return to the Gaza Strip but funding problems, bureaucratic delays, lack of political will and difficult security conditions prolonged the process.

During this period, the Palestinian Authority came on the scene, taking over Israelis’ responsibility to provide serviced land to refugees and Canada entered the picture taking over Egypt’s funding responsibilities, while UNRWA took on a more prominent role as a channel for funds and in monitoring the process. By the end of the relocation, the number of parties involved had grown from two to five, with Israel playing the major role. It took an outside party to help coordinate the process and cut through some of the bureaucratic barriers that were holding up completion of the refugee return.

While the specific case of Canada Camp cannot be applied fully to other such movements of refugees, a number of lessons can be learned on issues such as funding, compensation for refugees, the time frame and a role for an outside party. The provision of housing before all family members moved was important to the initial integration of the refugees and the success of the relocation. It was also crucial for a “third party” to be involved to instill some political will into the process and mitigate the weaknesses of other parties involved.

A larger movement of refugees would require more systematic planning in order to ensure that the receiving community had the absorptive capacity, both economically and socially, to integrate newcomers. Without such capacity, an influx of refugees could further destabilize the region.

This relocation was top down. Egypt and Israel agreed on the return and set up the arrangements for the move. There was little or no consultation with refugees and little planning except for UNRWA’s expansion of its schools, establishment of a small clinic to service returnees and Canada’s initiative in constructing a community centre. As well, the procedures were applied and interpreted by one party with all other parties left in a position of reacting.

UNRWA and the PA made some attempts to keep the process moving and improve coordination among the parties. But it took the determination of an outside party to open up the process. When this was done, Israel took great pains to complete the process quickly, despite the violent revival of the Palestinian Intifada in the autumn of 2000. When the political will existed, the parties took their responsibilities seriously and made it happen.

1. INTRODUCTION

“Don’t forget us! Don’t forget Canada Camp!”

This cry rose from a small group of Palestinians on the Egyptian side of the border as PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat passed on the start of his triumphal return to the Gaza Strip in 1994.

The world sees the Gaza Strip in 60-second, violence-filled TV clips. Most wouldn’t consider a visit let alone pine to live there.

But others such as those watching Chairman Arafat cross into Gaza could see and hear it. They wanted to be there. These were Palestinians, all registered with the United Nations (UNRWA) as refugees from Palestine, left stranded in Egypt when the international border was reestablished and Israeli completed its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982.

For years their main contact with Gaza was at the “shouting fence” along the border. Families made appointments to meet at the fence and shout across the 40-metre-wide border strip patrolled by Egyptian and Israeli soldiers. They often held up children to show the grandparents, or even a parent, on the other side.

They could see plumes of smoke, hear gunshots, ambulance sirens and the ping of stones hitting metal during the Intifada. And they had been promised that they would be reunited with their friends and families in the Gaza Strip soon after the border was reinstated.

A few were able to move back in the 1980s or go through the lengthy process of obtaining a permit to visit Gaza. Thousands of others remained in Egypt near the place where Canadian UNEF soldiers were stationed from 1956-67 following the 1956 Suez crisis. So they called it Canada Camp. (In Rafah, Gaza there is a similar housing project called Brazil Camp after the Brazilian UNEF contingent.)

Homes demolished, refugees moved

Their homes in Rafah, Gaza were demolished in the early 1970s under security measures and road widening by the Israeli forces which then controlled the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. A new housing development was established for them in Rafah, Egypt, just across the international boundary of what was then Occupied Sinai.

UNRWA provided schooling and some medical care with staff who had also been stranded across the border. The Agency considered the refugees as hardship cases since they had no right to work in Egypt and provided them with food rations and minimal amounts of cash aid.

Although the issue had been addressed in the Egypt-Israel peace talks, it was not until 1989, that a mechanism for the return of Canada Camp residents to the Gaza Strip was established. Under this, Egypt was to pay each household $8,000 (later raised to $12,000) and Israel would provide serviced 200 square metre plots of land in the Tel el Sultan area of Rafah, Gaza.

Money runs out

In October 1991, Egypt approached UNRWA saying it had no money to continue the project. It asked the Agency to use the money it spent on providing services in Canada Camp to assist with the relocation process or to ask donors to provide funds: US$ 1 million a year for four years.

The amount UNRWA spent on Canada Camp services wasn’t enough to pay for the process and it didn’t have extra funds for the project. The Agency did contact donors and also arranged for journalists and members of diplomatic missions to visit Canada Camp and Tel el Sultan, the area set aside in Rafah, Gaza for the relocated households. A number of the journalists were Canadian but also included British, American, French and Egyptian reporters, both print and TV.

In 1994, Canada announced a contribution to fund the relocation of 70 families. This was the beginning of Canada’s involvement which continued until the last refugees returned to Gaza in December 2000.

The last 10 households straggled across the border in December 2000 after almost 18 years of waiting to return. Even their crossing was difficult. The border was closed due to the security situation in the Gaza Strip and when they returned to Canada Camp their homes had already been bulldozed by the Egyptian authorities. After a few days of waiting in temporary accommodation, the last refugees crossed on December 27, 2000.

Canada Camp was not forgotten by Chairman Arafat or any of the other parties to the relocation process. Their memories had to be jogged now and then but all of “Canada’s” residents, including hundreds born in Egypt, are now in Gaza and the camp lies empty and in ruins.

Egypt has put forward a proposal to clean up the site and establish a park at a cost of LE 800,000 (four Egyptian pounds are equivalent to about $1 US). Others would prefer a simple cairn.

The following report will look at the relocation process, problems faced in the process, coordination among the various parties involved, life in Canada Camp, life for the returnees in Tel el Sultan and the results of the Canadian initiative.

2. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1967 Israel occupies Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula

1970-71 Unrest in Gaza. Security measures include road widening
and home demolitions in Rafah, Gaza

1972 Canada Camp Housing Project established

1978 Egypt-Israel Camp David Framework for Peace

1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

1982 Israel withdraws from Sinai, international border reestablished
Eight families return to Gaza (without compensation)

1989 Egypt-Israel “Agreed Plan for the Relocation of Canada District Inhabitants to the Region of the Gaza Strip” (September)
Twenty households return with $8,000 per household but no land

1990-91 105 households return with compensation--$12,000 per household

1991 Egypt asks UNRWA for help in raising money for the relocation process

1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (Oslo Agreement)

1994 Israel-PLO Agreement on Gaza/Jericho Area (Cairo Agreement)
Canada contributes to relocate 70 families ($12,000 per household)
Households under Canadian grant begin crossing to Gaza

1995 Second Canadian contribution for relocation plus funds to build a community centre in Tel el Sultan relocation area
Kuwait contributes US$ 1 million for relocation

1996 Likud Government elected in Israel

1997-98 Thirty-nine households relocated
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy visits the region and writes to the
then Israeli Foreign Minister Netanyahu on the process of relocation

1999 Second Kuwaiti US$ 1 million contribution
Canadian initiatives to speed up process

2000 Canada contributes additional funds to finalize relocation and make infrastructure improvements in relocation area

December 2000: Last 10 households cross to Tel el Sultan

3. PARTIES TO THE PROCESS

Until 1994, Israel and Egypt were the main parties involved in the Canada Camp relocation process. UNRWA played a minor role in monitoring the situation of the refugees in Rafah, Egypt and providing some services to them. But by the end of the process in 2000, there were five parties involved.

EGYPT and ISRAEL: The Egypt-Israel peace treaty and Israel’s ensuing withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982 precipitated the isolation of Canada Camp although its residents were told that, under the Camp David Accords, they would all move back to the Gaza Strip within six months. Twenty-eight households moved in the following years but there was no substantial movement until after the September 14, 1989 agreement between Israel and Egypt: Agreed Plan for the Relocation of Canada District Inhabitants to the Region of Gaza (see Annex A). According to a list attached to the Agreement, 496 households were eligible to return.

The Agreement stated in part: “In light of the desire of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel to find an adequate solution to the issue of the inhabitants of the Canada District in Rafah and the issue of the Egyptian nationals in the Region of the Gaza Strip, the authorities of the State of Israel shall allow the inhabitants of the Canada District to move into the Region of Gaza, all subject to the terms and conditions of this agreed plan.”

UNRWA: The Agency’s minor role was gradually enhanced during the early 90s with Egypt’s approach asking for UNRWA help in funding the relocation. The issue was taken up with UNRWA’s Cairo Office and then in a Note Verbale from the Egyptian Embassy in Vienna to Agency headquarters then located in Vienna. The note requested UNRWA to “fund the programme out of its budget or the extra budgetary fund and supply the amount of $US 1 million annually for a period of four years or to request the Agency to take the matter with the donor countries to provide the required sum (sic).” UNRWA expanded assistance to Canada Camp residents, took up the issue with donors and arranged for visits of journalists and diplomats to Canada Camp and the relocation area.

With the Canadian contribution in 1994 to fund the return of 70 families, UNRWA’s role grew in monitoring the situation and administering contributed funds. The Agency did have an advantage in monitoring progress as it had installations and staff both in Canada Camp and the Gaza Strip.

CANADA: Through its initial 1994 contribution and its role as Gavel of the Refugee Working Group, Canada began to play a major role in the process both in funding and acting as a catalyst in speeding up and completing the process.

In a letter to UNRWA’s Commissioner-General on March 9, 1994, Canadian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Vienna, Peter Walker, confirmed Canada’s decision, “as a complement to its efforts in the Refugee Working Group” to provide assistance to 70 families in order for them to relocate to Tel el Sultan, Gaza. The amount allocated was $C 1.2 million. He asked UNRWA to administer the funds provided that serviced lots were available to begin construction of homes and that the families would be responsible for building their own dwellings.

Canada made several additional contributions itself and was responsible for urging Kuwait to make contributions totaling $US 2 million for the relocation. Interventions of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and Mr. Andrew Robinson, Gavel of the Refugee Working Group, assisted in speeding up and finalizing the relocation process by the end of 2000. Canadian representatives, throughout the process from 1994, were involved in planning meetings with the other parties. A number of such meetings took place at the initiative of Canada.

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: In the period of 1993-94, the Palestinian Authority was introduced to the Gaza Strip and began to play a role in the Canada Camp relocation. Responsibilities held by the Israeli authorities gradually devolved to the fledgling authority. The Oslo Agreement of September 13 1994 said: “Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence.” The Cairo Agreement of May 4 1994 said: “The Palestinian Authority shall administer the departments transferred to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, other departments and subordinate administrative units as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.”

Under this authority, the PA set up the Ministry of Housing and other bodies which became involved in the relocation process. This transfer of authority gave the PA responsibility for providing serviced lots to the returnees in Tel el Sultan. When it was unable to provide funds to service the lots of the last returnees in 2000, Canada contributed to complete the water, sewage, road and electrical infrastructure for the area. The contribution was made through UNRWA which in January 2000 was preparing to let tenders for completion of the necessary work. Lack of building materials due to border closings was causing delays, however.

At the time of writing, the PA was in a severely weakened financial and political position as a result of the renewed Intifada and lack of progress in the peace process. UNRWA had been able to attract funds for its emergency relief programme and was looked to by all Gazans as the main source of help in the current desperate economic situation.
4. PROCESS OF RELOCATION

In 1985, a survey conducted in Canada Camp found 488 occupied shelters and this became the basis for identifying the households to be relocated. There had been 496 households but eight of them had moved back to Gaza in 1982.

The pace of the relocation is specified under the 1989 Agreement between Israel and Egypt. The households were to be divided into groups of 35 and when each group was finished building and crossing, the next group would begin the process. It was a precondition to start building a dwelling and finish it to a point where it could be lived in before the crossing of a household to Gaza could be finalized.

The first area of Canada Camp to be emptied was that closest to the border fence. The UNRWA official in charge of Canada Camp would present a list of households and their members to the Egyptian authorities in Rafah, Egypt, the Liaison System of Egypt (LSE) which would then pass on a list of prospective returnees to the Israeli authorities.

When the Israeli authorities agreed to the names, this information was passed through the LSE to UNRWA in Canada Camp. Families then would notify family members outside the area, some working in the Gulf or Libya and students studying abroad to return to the area so that they could cross with their families when their home in Gaza was ready to live in.

The head of a household and one or two sons would cross to Gaza and begin the process of building. They would receive the $12,000 relocation payment, be given title to their plot of land in Tel el Sultan (the land was considered by the authorities - the Israeli Civil Administration and later the Palestinian Authority- as State Land) and begin building their dwellings. They could return to Canada Camp on the weekends to be with the rest of their family. In 1996, the Israeli authorities were concerned about the speed of construction and whether the grant was being used for building purposes. So UNRWA decided to split the grant into two parts of $6,000 each.

Heads of families and their son(s) crossed into the Gaza Strip through a small gate in the centre of Rafah, called the Salahadin gate and continued to use this gate throughout the building process.

UNRWA monitored construction and once it reached a sufficiently advanced stage, the Palestinian Ministry of Housing requested the Israeli authorities to agree with their Egyptian counterparts on a schedule for the return of all family members. When about 50 per cent of the work was completed, UNRWA paid the household the balance of the $12,000 in compensation.

Under the Egypt-Israel Agreement, Israel decided when a home was ready for the rest of the family but this responsibility later devolved to the PA. The Agreement said that a household whose home is being built in Gaza “shall be entitled to enter the Region only after the head of the paternal family has completed constructing a house containing at least basic living conditions and comprised of at least one complete roofed floor”.

After agreement on the level of construction, family members in Canada Camp could move their household effects by hired truck to the Al Ouja/Nizzana crosssing on the Egyptian-Israeli border 40 km. south of Rafah. This was done at the rate of four households a day. Here they crossed and were given new identity documents and then reloaded their goods onto trucks on the other side of the border and travelled the 40-some km. north to Rafah and Tel el Sultan. At this point permission for heads of families and others helping in the construction to commute back and forth across the border lapsed and they became permanent residents of the Gaza Strip.

The following table of relocation dates and building grants (in $ US) was provided by the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Housing:

Year Households Persons Grant Total Cost
1982 8 55 0 $0
1989 20 183 $8,000/household but no land provided* $160,000
1991-92 105 1,079 $12,000/household $1,260,000
1994 70 769 $12,000/household $840,000
1997-98 39 515 $12,000/household $468,000
1999 103 771 $12,000/household $1,236,000
2000 149 1,060 $12,000/household $1,788,000
TOTALS 494** 4,432 $5,752,000

*In 1990, twenty households appealed to the Israeli High Court which ruled that a plot of land should be provided.
**The 1985 survey of Canada Camp found 488 occupied shelters with 4,739 persons. Eight households had moved in 1982 for an original total of 496 shelters in the camp.

The Egypt-Israel Agreement says that 496 households were eligible to return but the final Israeli figures state that 492 households of 4,111 persons were relocated. There is some confusion over several households which took Egyptian or Israeli citizenship and problems of inheritance. UNRWA reported on January 14, 2001 that the totals “resettled” were 491 households made up of 4,388 persons. Note: a household is made up of several nuclear families.

5. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/RESOLVED

Three major problems were faced during the process: inconsistent funding, disagreements over the interpretation of the Egypt-Israel 1989 Agreement and the unstable political/security conditions in the area. Other problems included lack of coordination, the capacity of the Palestinian Authority and the views of Israeli settlers.

A. Funding the Relocation

(i) Availability of funding

The first eight families to cross (1982) received neither money nor land as they moved in with other family members in the Gaza Strip or already had homes there. Funds for the next 20 households were provided through Egypt by the PLO. Cheques given to the refugees were drawn on the Arab Bank’s Cairo Branch. When funds for the PLO dried up after the Gulf War in 1991, so did funds for the relocation of Canada Camp refugees.

As noted above, Egypt approached UNRWA in October 1991 seeking funds to finance the relocation. It was not until 1994 that additional funds were available.

Thirty-five households in Canada Camp were notified in 1992 to prepare to return to Gaza in 1993. However, the transfer was repeatedly postponed as Egypt was unable to provide the $US 420,000 needed for compensation.

Canada, under then Refugee Working Group Gavel Marc Perron, was looking for ways to fund the relocation. As early as January 1994, officials from the Canadian embassies in Cairo and Tel Aviv had told journalists from the Toronto Globe and Mail and the monthly Egypt Today that Canada was willing to fulfill Egypt’s financial obligations.
Official notification of Canada’s intention came in the letter mentioned above from the Canadian ambassador in Vienna to UNRWA’s Commissioner-General in the spring of 1994. The following outlines funding for the relocation from 1994 until the end of 2000 when all refugees had been relocated:
Year Amount Purpose Donor
1994 CDN $1.2 million Relocation grants Canada
1995 CDN $ 600,000 Relocation grants Canada
CDN $ 500,000 Community centre Canada
US $ 1 million Relocation grants Kuwait
1999 US $ 1 million Relocation grants Kuwait
2000 US $ 960,000 Relocation grants Canada
US $ 660,000 Infrastructure Canada
Canadian officials made a number of visits to governments in the Gulf area in order to elicit assistance in funding the return process. Kuwait made its contributions as a result of these efforts. In 1998 Canada with the help of UNRWA organized a letter writing and drawing competition among the children of Canada Camp/Tel el Sultan to help thank the Emir of Kuwait for his country’s assistance. The drawings and letters can be viewed on www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peace process.

According to UNRWA, there were protracted negotiations among Egypt, Israel and the new Palestinian Authority before permission was given for the first group of 35 households under the Canadian contribution to cross and begin building in Tel el Sultan. The heads of the first 10 households accompanied by some family members finally crossed into Gaza on June 30, 1994. Others crossed in July and, as this was taking place, agreement was reached on the relocation of the second group of 35 households under the Canadian donation. Construction took between four and seven months before all households were rehoused in Gaza.

Those crossing on June 30 were met as they crossed through the Salahadin Gate in Rafah by then Canadian Ambassador to Israel Norman Spector. He told the Toronto Star: “We wanted to help partly because Canada is involved in the Mideast refugee talks, because we feel it will help the peace process and because Egypt had no money to help so we stepped in. It may seem a small project but it is a microcosm of what the refugee issue is all about.”

i) Amount of compensation

Throughout the process, refugees complained about the compensation they were receiving. The $8,000 specified in the Agreement was to compensate them for the home they lost in Canada Camp. In 1989, the first group to receive this amount complained that it was not enough so the figure was raised to $12,000.

Said Bayoumi who moved from Canada Camp to Tel el Sultan, the Gaza relocation area, says that “even the cheapest home in Gaza costs $25,000. Everybody has to borrow.” Bayoumi and his 14-member extended family spent $70,000 on their new home. General Yosef Mishlev, Deputy Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories agrees. He says that $50-60,000 should have been provided to each family.

Despite the complaints, most household managed with loans from friends or family or by borrowing from their UNRWA retirement fund to build good homes for their families. A few supplemented the $12,000 with money obtained by selling some of their household effects or bringing over inexpensive Egyptian goods and selling them in Gaza, including cigarettes.

Others have family members working abroad who regularly send money home. Even though they knew that Gaza prices were as high as those in Israel, many were stunned at the cost of building materials and the essentials of daily life when they returned. Some had the foresight to bring window frames or doors and other construction materials from Egypt.

The relocation grant remained at $12,000 and the refugees did cope but it was not based an a realistic view of costs in the Gaza Strip and left many families with debts.

B. Political willingness to implement the Egypt-Israel Agreement

Despite the availability of funds and land, there were various times when the process of relocation was stalled by the lack of political will. This was most evident through the application of the Egypt-Israel Agreement.

As administrator of the Canadian and Kuwait funds for relocation, UNRWA approached the Israeli authorities to prepare for the movement of families under Canada’s contribution in 1995. The Israeli Ministry of Defense (Coordinator of the Occupied Territories Office) made it clear that the next group would only be allowed to start construction after all members of the current group of 70 families (first Canadian contribution) had returned to Gaza and said that the return process should be “strictly in accordance with the letter and spirt of the Agreement”(source: internal UNRWA document).

In a meeting on May 21, 1995, Rafi Sade, Director of the Refugee Rehabilitation Branch of the Israeli Regional Civil Affairs Committee informed UNRWA and a representative of the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv that the procedure under the first Canadian contribution when two groups of 35 households were moving concurrently was an exception and that further movement would be according to the Agreement.

In the same meeting, Mr. Sade did say that Israel would be flexible in respect to family members who were abroad. This meant that eligible family members who could not cross immediately with their family would be allowed to join at a later stage. He also pointed out that now it was up to the PA to satisfy itself that construction had reached the norms prescribed in the Agreement. It was no longer the Israeli Civil Administration’s responsibility, he said.

More flexible interpretation of agreement needed

UNRWA considered that the only way to speed up the return would be by agreeing on a more flexible interpretation of the 1989 Egypt-Israel Agreement. The agreement had been overtaken by events with the establishment of Palestinian autonomy and the rationale for carrying out the process in stages no longer existed. UNRWA considered that a practical solution would be to obtain agreement on dealing with several groups of households in parallel or by enlarging the groups. This had been done under the first Canadian contribution with 70 instead of the usual 35 households.

The PA Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation agreed with this approach and said that Minister Nabil Shaath would try to obtain Israeli agreement on a basis of relocations as funds became available.

For the following period there was no movement.

In June 1996, the parties met to prepare for moving the next 80 households for which Canadian and Kuwaiti funds had been received. The Israelis said that arrangements with the Egyptian side were almost complete but the crossing gate in Rafah had become a matter of contention. This was eventually resolved with refugees going to the Rafah terminal to obtain their new identity documents and carry out other formalities.

At a meeting later in June with Israel, Egypt and UNRWA attending, there was agreement to start moving 40 households. But after the meeting and repeated queries by UNRWA, there was no further meeting and no start date for movement established.

During this time, a new government was elected in Israel under Prime Minister Netanyahu and there were various acts of violence in West Bank and Gaza.

At meetings in Cairo with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Secretary-General of the Arab League in September 1996, UNRWA’s Commissioner-General Peter Hansen brought up the Canada Camp issue. He also noted the delays in a meeting with EU ambassadors to Egypt which was also attended by Canadian Ambassador to Egypt Michael Bell.

However, the process remained stalled.

In November 1997, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy visited the region and met with Canada Camp returnees. In the following spring (1998) he wrote to Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Netanyahu on Canada Camp. The Government of Israel agreed to an accelerated relocation schedule. Later in September 1998, Israel presented a plan to a joint coordination meeting convened by Canada to implement the accelerated schedule, including measures to allow family groups to join household heads sooner following the construction of the houses. Israel also invested in more efficient security equipment to speed up crossing-times of the families with their personal goods.

The issue was raised by the PA at a June 7, 1999 meeting in Tel Aviv between Israel and the PA on security matters. It was the first time the issue had been discussed at a high-level security meeting between the two sides and indicated the PA’s determination to resolve the issue.

The efforts by all parties paid off with 17 heads of household crossing on June 8 and further groups on June 10, 14, 16 and 29, 1999.

At a meeting requested by Mr. Robinson on July 8, 1999, the parties expressed satisfaction with the momentum gained in June and Israel said it would consider a further speedup of the process, proposed by Mr. Robinson, if the Palestinian side could accommodate returnees without problems. The PA said it could be ready for all remaining households in 2000.

Mr. Robinson told the meeting that Canada was making every effort to assure funds were available and pointed out that Kuwait had made another donation of $1 million.

During the year, 103 households returned and by the end of 2000, everyone had returned.

C. Political/security issues

Security conditions throughout the process influenced the relocation.

After 1994 money was available but the process remained stalled. The political/security situation was particularly unstable with several suicide bombings and violence erupted in Gaza and West Bank in September 1998.

Nevertheless, between April 1997 and November 1998, 39 households relocated completely to the Gaza Strip.

Although unrest and violence may have stalled the process earlier, the renewed Intifada in the autumn of 2000 was no barrier to the final relocation of all households from Canada Camp because the Israeli side was determined to meet the deadline and was able to resolve the security concerns.

Canada through Mr. Robinson, the embassy in Tel Aviv and the Representation Office in Ramallah, West Bank, continued to assist with coordination among the parties. The Ramallah office became the focal point of Canadian activities on the ground and its staff continually met with all parties, including security officials of the Palestinian Authority.

D. Capacity of the Palestinian Authority

The newly established PA was taking over responsibilities long held by the Israeli Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip. It had neither the funds nor the expertise to immediately build the capacity to carry out its responsibilities. Municipalities, such as Rafah, did have some expertise but even here additional help has been necessary. In the Rafah case, NGOs and Canada’s CIDA have been assisting in such things as infrastructure improvement. Given the PA’s weakness, the provision of housing before all family members moved was important to the initial integration of the refugees and led to the completion and success of the relocation.

A final problem in the return process was faced in 2000. The agreement stated that serviced lots were to be provided. The PA which now has responsibility for providing services in the area could not install the needed infrastructure in time for the final returning households despite earlier assurances that it could. Minister Nail Shaath told Canadian Mr. Andrew Robinson that money was not available to undertake the work. Canada then came up with the funding for the necessary infrastructure in Tel el Sultan.

E. Other Problems

Early in the process, there were objections to the return by Israeli settlers living in the Gush Qatif block of the Gaza Strip who claimed that security would deteriorate. The head of the Gaza settlers told the Jerusalem Post in December 1989 that since 1982 “training” had been given to people in Canada Camp and that the relocation would allow the entry of “750 terrorists” into Gaza.

When Egypt indicated in 1989 that money was available to start the relocation, Israel was in a dilemma. It faced “attacks from hardliners if it returns the refugees, but will jeopardize its relations with Egypt if it doesn’t”. (Jerusalem Post, May 31, 1989)

Objections by settlers were seemingly ignored by Israel which had signed an agreement with Egypt which it wished to implement. Any objections which may have been made by settlers in the final stages of relocation were definitely ignored as all parties had the political will to complete the process based on an agreed timetable.

Another minor problem was a dispute over which border crossing to use between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The Egyptian Government insisted that the Salahadin gate in downtown Rafah (also known as the “pishpash” gate) be used as it was the only direct crossing between Egypt and Gaza without going through Israeli-controlled areas. This was resolved with heads of households using the Rafah gate for regular crossings during the building process and then using to Rafah Terminal for entry formalities.

At some points in the early 90s, delays were experienced when family members living abroad were denied entrance to Egypt to join their families as they crossed to Gaza. The Egyptian travel document held at the time by Palestinians in Egypt and most Gazans states that the bearer could neither enter nor transit Egypt without a valid visa. Such visas were difficult to obtain even when one part of the Egyptian Government had agreed that an individual could enter the country. UNRWA’s office in Cairo intervened several times with Egypt to resolve such problems. As noted earlier, the Israelis relaxed its insistence on all family members crossing at the same time.

6. COORDINATION/ “THIRD PARTY” ROLE

From the beginning, the Israeli authorities were the lead party in the process.

With the arrival of the PA, there was another party to consider. And UNRWA’s role grew as it became responsible for paying out relocation grants to the refugees. The only strong party to the process remained Israel with the others parties still having to play a reactive role.

The PA was allowed to join planning meetings with the Israeli and Egyptian staff but in 1995, UNRWA was still asking to attend. It was rejected at the time because “UNRWA is not a party to the Egypt-Israel Agreement” but later it was allowed in as was Canada. It was most likely a Canadian initiative which enabled all parties to the process to attend planning meetings just as it was a Canadian initiative to involve the UN in Refugee Working Group meetings.

Coordination needed

There was a need for coordination among the parties involved. This became the role of Canada, an outside party to the process. It did have some leverage in terms of being trusted by all sides, having the political will to continue the process and being a major source of funding.

Although it was not always successful in pushing the process along, Canada could call planning meetings, could point out weaknesses in the process, could go directly to senior officials of the other parties and help strengthen the role of the weaker parties to the process.

An outside, neutral party is particularly useful when the parties to a process are unequal. Israel was, of necessity, dominant party. Egypt’s aim was to move the Canada Camp residents out of Egypt. The Palestinian Authority was and still is weak and in its formative stages. UNRWA monitored events and channeled funds.

The “third party” could be any state or international body but in this case it was Canada.

In interviews, all of the parties and the refugees as well thanked Canada for playing the role it did from 1994 to 2000. In particular, a UN official said he is convinced that the Canadian intervention by Mr. Robinson “got the process unplugged and repatriation moving again. Without his diplomatic exertion of ‘pressure’ on the parties involved, I’m sure we would still have been stuck with only a few dozen families moving every couple of years or so.”

“I think this kind of intervention was particularly useful in a situation where things are not working because of bureaucratic rather than political obstacles. Politically, the Canada Camp repatriation was a nonissue, but as far as implementation was concerned, there were people on the ground who thought they could set their own ground rules. That is what Mr. Robinson managed to break through.”

7. LIFE IN CANADA CAMP

From 1972 to April 25, 1982, Canada Camp was an integral part of Gaza Strip life. The refugees had simply been moved a couple of kilometres to an Israeli Government housing project after their Rafah, Gaza homes were demolished due to road widening and other security measures taken by the Israeli authorities during an upsurge of unrest in the Gaza Strip.

Note: The residents of Canada Camp, in the eyes of the authorities, were no different from refugees moving into other government housing projects in the Gaza Strip. For a more complete description of Israeli housing plans in the Gaza Strip see Refugees unto the Third Generation by Ben Schiff, p. 214-220 noted in Sources at the end of this report.

Breadwinners continued with their work in Gaza or in Israel. Schooling and health care was provided mainly by UNRWA. It was “normal life” as they had experienced under Israeli occupation since 1967.

International border reinstated

The refugees were aware that the international border was going to be reintroduced but they knew that under the Camp David Accords their particular situation had been discussed. They believed that within six months they would be back in Gaza. Former Canada Camp resident Said Bayoumi told the Ottawa Citizen in May 1995: “They promised us in 1982, you’ll come back in six months. From 1982 until now, how many six months (have passed)?”

UNRWA Canada Camp teacher Ali Ibrahim told the Citizen in 1995: “In Canada (camp) the situation is bad…The problem in Canada is that it’s a temporary situation. As long as you think you’re leaving, you put off making decisions…I don’t care about the political situation (in Gaza). I know the economic situation is difficult. But Arabs need family relationships.”

Eight households moved back before the 1989 Egypt-Israel Agreement on relocation. The rest were stranded. Some received permits to continue their work in the Gaza Strip but not nearly as many as expected. In May 1994, 15 persons who worked for the Israeli Civil Administration in Gaza and lived in Canada Camp had their crossing permits revoked. From 1982 to 1994 they had crossed weekly to work in Gaza and returned to Canada Camp on weekends.

The refugees were cut off from work in Gaza or Israel. They were cut of from family and friends and forced to communicate at the “shouting fence” across the border strip. They were prevented from working in Egypt and could only gain access to higher education and proper health care by paying fees which they could not afford.

They had to pay every six months to have their Egyptian visas renewed.

They were under the watchful eye of Egyptian security which would check attendance regularly at the UNRWA school in Canada Camp and keep tabs on visitors to the camp and the comings and goings of refugees themselves. There were some instances of arms smuggling and tunneling under the border and individuals were legitimately detained and tried by the authorities.

However, there were up to 60 young men detained without trial for long periods or deported without cause being given. At one point in the early 1990s, there were 14 young men detained under the Egyptian emergency law which allows continued detention without cause even if a court said they could be released.

The situation for all Palestinians in Egypt worsened after the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. Renewal of residence permits became more difficult even for Palestinians born in Egypt. Students had to pay higher university tuition fees in dollars or sterling and if they were already in university they were denied graduation until they paid the new rates. And thousands of Palestinians lost their jobs in the Gulf area, some of them from Canada Camp.

UNRWA assistance provided

UNRWA treated the residents as hardship cases so they received food rations every two months and small cash grants in cases of extreme poverty. Some supplemented this help with their own vegetable gardens or by raising chickens.

The Agency also provided elementary and junior secondary schooling plus primary health care in a tiny two-room clinic. In the early 1990s, services were expanded with the addition of a women’s centre and a small centre for the handicapped. A dental team visited monthly and sometimes specialist physicians came across from Gaza. Doctors reported high rates of psychosomatic illnesses throughout the period.

For treatment of more serious medical problems, Canada Camp residents would have to pay locally or travel to the Palestine Red Crescent Hospital in Cairo.

UNRWA itself was not allowed to fly the UN flag in Canada Camp nor could it obtain an international telephone line. To talk to the UNRWA field office in Gaza, the officer in charge of Canada Camp would call the UNRWA office in Cairo which would relay the message to Gaza and then Gaza would call Canada Camp.
Although the homes the refugees had moved into in 1972 were of reasonable quality, they were deteriorating badly by the early 1990s. There was no money for repairs and little incentive since they felt they would be going back to Gaza soon. When the homes of returnees in Canada Camp were demolished on their departure, remaining residents would take boards and cement blocks from the rubble and repair their leaky homes as a temporary measure.

They looked forward to going “home” to jobs, better homes, a better life and to the rest of their families.

8. AFTER THE MOVE: LIFE IN TEL EL SULTAN

In January 2001, all lots in Tel el Sultan are filled with either completed homes or homes nearing completion. The community centre in the middle of the area is buzzing with activity, children are going to school, some breadwinners are going to work.

However, over the whole of the Gaza Strip there is a pall of helplessness and hopelessness due to the events of the previous five months and the prospect of indefinite insecurity. Economic activity has almost ground to a halt, work in Israel is uncertain as the border with Israel opens and closes irregularly, crops of oranges and guava are ploughed back into the ground because of border closings and lack of markets and UNRWA is providing extra food rations, small cash grants and an emergency job creation program.

Telephone service and electricity are regularly interrupted, schools are sometimes closed because of the security situation and building materials are in short supply. The IDRC Cairo office reports most development work is on hold.

This insecurity is the background to any comments by Tel el Sultan refugees on their situation today. While most of them longed to cross the border to Gaza, some now look back on their time in Egypt as a time when they were free to travel to El Arish or Cairo and had an orderly, if cloistered, life. Some miss the gardens and trees they planted over their 18 years in Egypt

Travel within the Gaza Strip is even uncertain these days with the Strip cut into three parts by the IDF. Mustafa el Hawi has closed up his home in Tel el Sultan and moved his family to Gaza City where he in an engineer with the Palestinian Authority. Travel to and from the West Bank is almost impossible. Hassan Najjar who attends Bir Zeit in the West Bank left for school in September and his family doesn’t know when he’ll be able to come back to his home in Tel el Sultan. His mother and father are alone in their three-storey $60,000 home as Hassan can’t visit and the rest of his brothers and sisters have married and moved to other parts of Gaza or abroad.

Jamil Kullab is very happy with his life. He returned 16 months ago and says these months have been better than any time in the past 18 years. “We were strangers in Egypt,” he says. “We have a good life here and we all have Palestinian identity cards.” He has sons in Jordan and Libya who work and send money back to him in Gaza to help maintain the family.

Abu Nafez, a retired teacher from the UNRWA school in Canada Camp, starts off bemoaning the political situation but goes on to thank Canada for helping to get his family back to the Gaza Strip. Despite the situation, he and his family are happy to be in Tel el Sultan. His son Nafez was the doctor at the UNRWA clinic in Canada Camp. There he had a tiny office with few drugs and little equipment. Now he is a doctor in the local government hospital “with big responsibilities”, says his father and is earning 2,500 Israeli sheckels a month (IS1=US $4). His other son is a teacher at a government school in Rafah.

Unemployment is high throughout the Gaza Strip but those who were employed by UNRWA in Canada Camp have been absorbed into the Agency’s Gaza workforce. A few other returnees are working with the PA.

About 25 per cent of the returnees hired builders to help with constructing their homes as they had no experience in construction. The remainder built by themselves and with the help of family members. All houses have plumbing and electricity and a few have made a space on the ground floor to open a shop at a later date.

Integration into the Gaza Strip

Very little was done in terms of planning for the integration of the Canada Camp residents. The only attempt at a socio-economic research was a 1991 survey which found 37 unemployed university graduates including a doctor, a social worker and a physiotherapist in the camp. The three were hired by UNRWA to work in Canada Camp under a special job creation programme which the Agency had instituted to combat unemployment in the Gaza Strip.

On return to Gaza, school-age children were immediately absorbed in UNRWA or government schools. UNRWA had added classrooms to its elementary and junior secondary schools in the neighbourhood and build a health subcentre nearby to help deal with the new residents.

A focal point of the “Canada Camp” returnee area is the community centre built with Canadian funds. With its literacy classes, women’s and youth activities and kindergarten plus other activities, it helped to ease the returnees’ absorption into the community. A large mosque is under construction at the north edge of the relocation area.

UNRWA provides rations for six months after their return (three distributions of food) and is investigating families to see what further needs are required. In the current situation, some of the young men have temporary jobs with the Agency under its emergency job creation program.

Another anomaly created by the Canada Camp situation was the high number of unmarried females among the returnees. Many young men left Canada Camp to study, work abroad or in Gaza with the Palestinian Authority or were deported by the Egyptian authorities. This left a large number of women who traditionally are married with children by their early 20s. They hoped the return to Gaza would improve the prospects of marriage for their daughters.

9. INVOLVEMENT OF REFUGEES

From beginning to end, there was very little involvement of the refugees themselves in the process. They were told when and where to move and how much money they would get. With no consultation and little involvement in the process, the refugees were left to wait and dream about a “homeland”. This did not prepare them for the shock of moving.

The main problem for the Canada Camp refugees was that their expectations were too high and they had been living for years in a fairly quiet, uncomplicated atmosphere, despite their problems with the Egyptian authorities. As mentioned earlier, their situation kept them from making decisions about their future. They waited and hoped for better things and idealized their “homeland”.

UNRWA provided some activities in Canada Camp during the early 90s but perhaps more could have been done to prepare the refugees for the move. They were a captive audience. The movement to Gaza was off and on and they were waiting for lengthy periods of time.

Some effort could have been made to give the refugees a realistic picture of the Gaza economy. As 25 per cent had no construction skills, they could have been taught some basic carpentry and bricklaying. Other skills training and assistance could have been provided since the refugees basically had nothing to do while they waited.

A few were under the delusion that they would be moving back to the same situation that came to an abrupt end in April 1982. They thought they would get their jobs back in Israel thinking of a time when tens of thousands of Gazans went daily to farms or building sites in Israel for regular work. They should have been better prepared for the political and economic realities in the Gaza Strip. There was an overabundance of optimism about returning to their “homeland” and the arrival of autonomy and the PA. But who has a right to take away this hope?

No one, however, was prepared for the events of the autumn and winter of 2000-2001, let alone the returning refugees.

10. VIEWS OF THE PARTIES ON THE PROCESS

A. Israeli Housing Policy in Gaza

Originally, Canada Camp residents were seen by the Israelis in the same way they saw all Gaza refugees who were being rehoused in government projects.

In the 1970s and 80s, the Israeli authorities were making efforts to improve refugee living conditions in the Gaza Strip. Some 35,000 were rehoused between 1973 and 1985 including those who moved to the Canada and Brazil housing projects.

The Israelis found that construction of new homes was expensive and that many refugees could build or finance their own homes. The policy was changed to selling building lots at subsidized prices if the refugees would demolish their old shelters and relinquish any claim for relief. Israel provided infrastructure to the new home sites.

In the mid-1980s, there was a plan to move 5,000 families a year at a yearly cost of $150 million but Israel had neither the $1.5 billion needed to undertake such a plan nor was there the necessary land for such a 10-year programme.

In 1986, the Israeli Civil Administration told UNRWA that it appreciated its willingness to provide services to the refugees who were supposed to return to Gaza from Canada Camp. However, it said that the returnees should not have the “stigma of refugee” attached to them.

This view of the Canada Camp refugees seems to have changed in order to speedily complete the process of relocation.

B. Time Frame for Relocation

The relocation was completed but it took 18 years. All of the parties involved in the process commented that it should have been completed earlier.

When the Egypt-Israel Agreement was signed in 1989, the move was to begin by December of that year and continue until completion. When the Egyptians first approached UNRWA in 1991 about providing funds, they asked for $1 million a year over four years. Egypt considered that most of the families could have been moved within that time frame.

During the process, UNRWA was making suggestions for speeding things up and Canada made firm proposals for a time frame to finish the process. This did work finally when all parties had the political will to complete the project and it was completed quickly and efficiently even before the 2001 deadline agreed by the Israeli Government in 1998.

An appropriate time frame is necessary but it takes political will to implement it.

C. General Comments

General Mishlev, Israeli Deputy Coordinator of Government Activities in the Occupied Territories, said that the process took too long; $50-60,000 should have been provided to each household; natural population growth should be calculated into the relocation budget; donors should provide more aid to the returnees after they arrive at their new home and Israel should give preferential treatment to Canada Camp returnees in issuing permits for work in Israel.

He also commented that the relocation mechanism was too complicated but that in the previous three years the various parties had made it work. It was continuously monitored and controlled and there was a firm timetable, he said.

Canada’s Mr. Andrew Robinson says that the recognition of the need for coordination encouraged Canada to play a bigger role in the process. Canada, he says had credibility, determination and money. In addition, under Foreign Minister Axworthy, Canada had the political will to see the project through to completion.

Mr. Robinson said that Mr. Axworthy’s letter to the Israeli Government in 1998 did help to speed things up by helping to galvanize the IDF into more direct action.

The PA’s Director of the Department of Government Lands in the Ministry of Housing, Walid Ayoub saw the July 8, 1999 meeting of all parties in the process as the turning point. All of the parties, he says, looked at the facts and faced their responsibilities seriously.

11. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

It may have taken almost 18 years for all Canada Camp residents to return to the Gaza Strip but they did. In the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September/October 1994, writer Dick Doughty says the relocation was:

“the only instance of an exiled Palestinian community re-entering Israeli-controlled territory since the beginning of the 1967 Israeli occupation”.

The process was long and cumbersome. Some of the following points are self-evident but under ideal conditions, a relocation mechanism would include the following factors.

Consistent funding: Egypt was unable to fulfill its financial obligations under its 1989 Agreement with Israel. The PLO provided funds in the early stages but when PLO funds dried up, Canada and Kuwait came to the rescue. The lack of stable, consistent funding caused real delays and was the excuse at times for other delays.

Equal partners to the process: The number of partners in this process grew from two to five. This often caused some confusion over responsibilities. An agreed set of partners with the political will to carry out the process is necessary. In this process, there was one dominant partner with other parties usually only reacting to its actions. Partners to a process have to be on a more equal basis to play their roles properly and the capacity of the weaker parties has to be bolstered.

Consultation with refugees: The refugees were not part of the process at any time. They were told when to move and how to move without any consideration of their preparedness to move. Some assistance was provided when they were relocated but under the current conditions this was neither long enough nor comprehensive enough.

Planning: There was little planning for the integration of the refugees into their new environment although UNRWA did expand its education and health services and Canada built a community centre. The provision of housing, a precondition for the relocation and an important aspect of it, contributed to the successful completion of the process.

“Third party” coordination: It is clear from this process that it is useful to have an outside, disinterested party, with the political will to coordinate and put pressure where necessary throughout the process. An outside party can assist in resolving disputes over the interpretation of any agreement among the parties involved in the relocation, point out weaknesses in the process, help mitigate weaknesses in the partners themselves and ensure that money earmarked for housing and other elements in the relocation is used for the purpose intended. In this case it was Canada but it could be any nation or an international body which wished to see the project through to a successful conclusion. There is a danger, however, that the parties can come to rely on the outside party to bail them out at the last moment, creating a dependency relationship especially if there is not enough planning and coordination earlier in the process.

Realistic compensation: Under the 1989 Agreement, refugees were to receive $8,000 to help them replace the homes they left in Egypt. This was raised to $12,000 in the early 90s in recognition that the amount was too small for building in the Gaza economic conditions and Israeli pricing structure. As the Israelis discovered in the 1980s, rehousing refugees even in the same neighbourhood is extremely costly. Compensation need not cover all costs of resettlement, but it needs to be based on a more realistic assessment of the new environment and on the ability of a household to find supplementary funds.

Reasonable and agreed time frame: It took 18 years to move 4,500 persons. A manageable, agreed time frame is necessary. When a timetable was finally introduced, it was followed closely and the process was completed. A timetable points up the needs along the way such as the needed funding, necessary infrastructure, how many new students would be entering schools at a certain date and how many persons would need jobs, etc.

Stable political/security conditions: During much of the period from 1989, there have been unstable political/security conditions in the Gaza Strip as well as desperate economic conditions. An orderly process is difficult to implement under such conditions.

In the Canada Camp relocation, several of these ideal conditions were not met and the process was completed to the relative satisfaction of the parties involved, including the refugees themselves despite some of their complaints. However, it could have been wound up much earlier if more of the above conditions had been met.

ANNEX A:
The 1989 Egypt-Israel Agreement on Relocation

Agreed Plan for the Relocation of Canada District Inhabitants to the Region of
the Gaza Strip

A. Agreed Principles

1. In light of the desire of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel to find an adequate solution to the issue of the inhabitants of the Canada District in Rafah and the issue of the Egyptian nationals in the Region of the Gaza Strip, the authorities of the State of Israel shall allow the inhabitants of the Canada District to move into the Region of the Gaza Strip, all subject to the terms and conditions of this agreed plan.

2. It is agreed between the parties that the relocation shall be carried out solely on the basis of the free will of the inhabitants of the Canada District.

3. In order to alleviate any inconvenience which might be caused to the inhabitants of the Canada district and to ensure their suitable absorption, the relocation shall be performed in stages.

4. The relocation of the inhabitants of the Canada District will be carried out as set forth in this agreed plan.

B. Definitions

for the purpose of this document, the following terms shall have the meaning as hereunder set forth;

“The Region” - the Region of the Gaza Strip.

“The District” - the district of Tel Al-Sultan in Rafah in the Region.

“Paternal Family” - any family or families living in a single house in the Canada District.

“Head of a Paternal Family” - any person who is so specified in either of the lists of paternal families annexed to this agreed plan.
“Inhabitant of the Canada District” - any person who is deemed by the parties to be a member of a paternal family.

C. General

1. It is agreed between the parties that any inhabitant of the Canada District who is unwilling to move to and reside in the Region is not obligated to do so, and neither party shall compel such a person, in any way whatsoever, to move into and reside in the Region.

2. The parties will clarify to the inhabitants of the Canada District that except for the specific provisions of this agreed plan, the authorities of the State of Israel shall have no other responsibilities or obligations, neither expressed nor implied, relating to the relocation of the inhabitants of the Canada District, including their housing and maintenance, except those regular responsibilities and obligations towards the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip.

3. Entry check points for the inhabitants of the Canada District shall be situated as agreed between the parties. The opening hours of the entry check points shall be in accordance with the custom of the region.

D. Entry of Families

1. A paternal family specified in appendix A to this agreed plan, which has proven to the satisfaction of the regional authorities that it has at its disposal lawfully obtained permanent housing in the Region, will be permitted to enter the Region, for the purpose of residing in the above mentioned housing.

2. The entry into the Region of the paternal families fulfilling the provisions of subsection 1 above will be at the rate of five paternal families per day and not more than 20 paternal families per month.

E. Entitlement for a Plot in the District

1. A paternal family specified in appendix B to this agreed plan shall be entitled to receive from the regional authorities a plot in the District for the purpose of constructing a house for its dwelling, provided that the head of the paternal family has given the regional authorities prior notification of his wish to receive such a plot.

2. A head of a paternal family fulfilling the conditions of subsection 1 above shall be entitled to enter the Region for the purpose of signing an allocation agreement with the regional authorities and thereafter for the purpose of constructing a house in the District.

3. A head of a paternal family entering the Region according to the provisions of subsection 2 above may be accompanied by up to two of his sons, of ages 16 and above. During the construction period the heads of the paternal families and their sons may either reside temporarily in the Region or travel back and forth across the International Border, as they see fit.

4. The heads of paternal families entitled to enter the Region under this section will be divided into groups, each to comprise of 35 heads of paternal families.

5. A paternal family whose house is being constructed in the District shall be entitled to enter the Region only after the head of the paternal family has completed constructing a house containing at least basic living conditions and comprised of at least one complete roofed floor.

6. The following group of heads of paternal families shall be entitled to enter the Region only after the members of the preceding group have met the requirements for the entrance of their paternal families, as outlined in subsection five above. The provisions of this subsection may be mutually reviewed by both parties after the beginning of the implementation of this agreed plan.

7. At the request of paternal families, the regional authorities will be prepared to render them assistance, by referring them to builders or suppliers, and in addition, by placing at their disposal plans and specifications regarding construction of houses in the District, provided that the regional authorities or the State of Israel will incur no responsibility or obligation in this regard.

F. Transfer of Animals

1. A paternal family will be entitled, upon its entry into the Region, to bring with it all animals in its possession, provided that these animals have been examined by the regional health authorities, and have been found not to be afflicted with or carriers of any contagious disease.

2. In order to ease the entry procedure of animals, the representatives of the regional health authorities will be allowed to carry out their examinations in an entry check point, located within the territory of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and they will be entitled to order that a sick or contaminated animal will not enter the Region.

G. Financial Rights of the Paternal Families

1. The Arab Republic of Egypt will pay each paternal family an amount of 8,000 US dollars.

2. The amount specified in subsection 1 above will be deposited by a representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt in a bank account in the name of the head of the paternal family, which shall be in a bank branch in the Region.

3. The aforementioned amount will be deposited prior to the first entry into the Region of the head of the paternal family or the paternal family itself, as the case may be, and will constitute a pre-requisite to such an entry. Furthermore, for those paternal families specified in appendix B, this amount shall be solely designated for the purpose of constructing a house in the District.

4. Without derogating from the stipulations of this section, the Arab Republic of Egypt will allow each paternal family to:

A) Exchange all amounts of lawfully possessed or acquired Egyptian Pounds into foreign currency;

B) Transfer to the Region, prior to the entry of the head of the paternal family or the paternal family itself, all amounts of lawfully possessed or acquired foreign currency.

H. Public Buildings

1. In addition to the provisions of section G above, the Arab Republic of Egypt shall reimburse the State of Israel for the value of the public buildings constructed by the State of Israel in the Canada District. These public buildings are a school containing 32 classrooms and an infirmary.

2. The value of the above mentioned buildings shall be as set by a group of surveyors jointly appointed by the parties for this task.

3. The rate of payment of the above reimbursement shall be as agreed between the parties.

I. Internal Powers

Entry of an inhabitant of the Canada District into the Regional shall not afford him any immunity, and will not prevent the regional authorities from taking any lawful measures, which are necessary in their opinion for the preservation of the security of the region.

J. Written Declaration

1. Without derogating from any other condition to entry into the Region under this agreed plan, no paternal family specified in appendix A shall be entitled to enter the Region until the head of the paternal family has signed a written declaration, the text of which is annexed as appendix C to this agreed plan.

2. In addition to the provisions of subsection 1 above, in the event that a paternal family specified in appendix A intends to permanently reside in the Region in a house currently occupied by another person or family (hereafter-accepting person or family), the paternal family shall not be entitled to enter the Region until the accepting person or head of the accepting family have signed an acceptance declaration, the text of which is annexed as appendix D to this agreed plan.

3. Without derogating from any other condition to entry into the Region under this agreed plan, no paternal family specified in appendix B shall be entitled to enter the Region until the head of the paternal family has signed a written declaration, the text of which is annexed as appendix E to this agreed plan.

K. Replacements

In the event a head of a paternal family is unable, for any reason whatsoever, to fulfill his obligations under this agreed plan or under any other agreement, the paternal family will appoint another representative to replace him in the fulfillment of these obligations.

L. Schedule

1. The authorities of the State of Israel shall complete all plans and preparations for the implementation of this agreed plan within one month from the date of signature of both parties.
2. A Joint technical team for the implementation of this agreed plan will first meet in the last week of October 1989.

3. Entrance of the first subgroup of 5 of head families out of the 35 families will take place at the first week of December 1989.

M. Legal Status

Upon entry into the Region and thereafter, all inhabitants of the Canada District shall be subject to all laws in force in the Region, concerning any matter not expressly covered by this agreed plan, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip.

Signatures

Done at Cairo on the 14th of September 1989.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Maj. Gen. A. Khairy El-Shamaa, Chief L.S.E.

For the Government of the State of Israel
Brig. Gen. Chaim Yifrach, Chief L.S.I.

Appendix A

List of paternal families with permanent housing in the Region.

Appendix B

List of paternal families intending to construct houses in the Tel-Al-Sultan District.
The list is accurate to the date of July 1988. Any change in the number of persons in each family due to birth or death will be updated and taken into consideration.

Appendix C

Declaration

To the Civil Administration,

I, the undersigned, an inhabitant of the Canada District in Rafah, Sinai, and in light of the arrangements made between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel regarding the inhabitants of the above mentioned district, do hereby declare the following:

1. I request to move, together with my family to the Region of the Gaza Strip and to settle there. We declare that this is our wish and that neither the authorities of the State of Israel nor the authorities of the Arab Republic of Egypt have compelled us to do so.

2. I have notified the authorities of the Region of the Gaza Strip that my family has lawfully obtained a permanent residence in the region.

3. I am aware that the Arab Republic of Egypt will deposit in my name the sum of 8,000 US dollars in a bank branch in the Region prior to our entry into the Region, and that apart from this, neither the authorities of the Arab Republic of Egypt nor the authorities of the State of Israel will grant us any further aid, monetary or otherwise, for the purpose of our subsistence in the Region, and that neither my family or myself will have any right to sue for such benefits from the authorities of the Arab Republic of Egypt or the State of Israel.

4. I am aware that the entry into the region of my family and myself will not afford us any immunity and will not prevent the regional authorities or the authorities of the State of Israel from taking any lawful measures necessary, in their opinion, for the preservation of the security of the region.

5. I hereby undertake to bring the contents of this document to the knowledge of all of my family members.

Name Signature

I hereby authorize that the above signed this document before me.

Name Signature Date

Appendix D

Acceptance Declaration

To the Civil Administration,

I, the undersigned, an inhabitant of the Region of the Gaza Strip, do hereby declare the following:

1. I am the owner/occupier of a house/flat situated at

City District Street no.

2. In light of the arrangements made between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel concerning the inhabitants of the Canada District, I am willing to accept the family of_____________, inhabitants of the Canada District, including __ family members, to reside permanently in my house/flat.

3. I am aware that neither the Arab Republic of Egypt nor the State of Israel will grant me any aid, monetary or otherwise, concerning the inhabitants of the Canada District, and that neither my family nor myself will have the right to sue for such benefits from either the Arab Republic of Egypt or the State of Israel.

Name Signature

I hereby authorize that the above signed this document before me.

Name Signature Date

Appendix E

Declaration

To the Civil Administration,

1. I request to move, together with my family, to the Region of the Gaza Strip, and to settle there. We declare that this is our wish and that neither the authorities of the State of Israel nor the authorities of the Arab Republic of Egypt have compelled us to do so.

2. I have notified the authorities of the Region of the Gaza Strip that my family is interested in constructing a house in the Tel-Al-Sultan district in the Region and am aware that the above mentioned authorities will allocate to me and my family a plot, in the Tel-Al-Sultan District in the region, for this purpose.

3. I am further aware that the Arab Republic of Egypt will deposit in my name the sum of 8,000 US dollars in a bank branch in the Region, prior to our entry into the Region.

4. I am also aware that apart from the provisions of subsections 2 and 3 above, neither the Arab Republic of Egypt nor the State of Israel will grant us any further aid, monetary or otherwise, for the purpose of our subsistence in the Region and that neither my family nor myself will have any right to sue for such benefits from the authorities of the Arab Republic or the State of Israel.

Name Signature

I hereby authorize that the above signed this document before me.

Name Signature Date

ANNEX B:
Map

Source: R. Wilkinson

ANNEX C:
Glossary of Terms

ARE: Arab Republic of Egypt
The Agency: UNRWA (See below)
Civil Administration: Israeli authorities/government in Gaza Strip
IDF: Israeli Defense Forces
IDRC: International Development Research Centre
LSE: Liaison System of Egypt
PA: Palestinian Authority
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

ANNEX D: Sources

Interviews with participants

UNRWA archives

Newspaper and magazine articles:

Cairo and Jerusalem activate treaty—twenty Gaza families to be reunited, Jerusalem Post, 31 May 1989
Canada Day brings joy to Palestinians, Bob Hepburn, Toronto Star, July 1, 1994, Return of the first 10 households under the Canadian contribution
Canada Funding Palestinian Community’s Return to Gaza Strip, Dick Doughty, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Sept./Oct. 1994
Dateline—Canada Camp, Egypt
Canadian ‘Wazir’ Axworthy bears gifts for Palestinians, Martin Regg Cohn, Toronto Star, November 14, 1997
Du Camp Canada a Tell el-Sultan: histoire d’un repatriement, Clarisse Lucas, Agence France Presse, December 19, 1991.
The Forgotten ‘Canadians’, Patrick Martin, Globe and Mail, January 8, 1994
Families reunited as Palestinians cross border in Strip at Rafah, Jerusalem Post, December 14, 1989
Money from Canada is helping families leave their ramshackle homes in Canada Camp, Norma Greenaway, Ottawa Citizen, May 29, 1995
Rafah resettlement, Jerusalem Post, December 10, 1989. (Return continues despite objections of Gush Katif settlers.)
Sitting on the Fence, Angela Stephens, Egypt Today, January 1994
Report on refugees living in Canada Camp

Texts:
Gaza: Legacy of Occupation—A Photographer’s Journey
(Portraits of Canada Camp), D. Doughty, Mohd. El Aydi,
Kumarian Press, West Hartford, Conn. 1995
Refugess unto the Third Generation—UN Aid to Palestinians
Benjamin Schiff, Syracuse University Press 1995
(Israeli housing projects in Gaza p. 214-220)
The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law,
Lex Takkenberg, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998
(Status of Palestinians in Egypt including Canada Camp p. 150-54)

Earth, a planet hungry for peace

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank, like a Python. (Alquds,10/25/03).

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