Opinion, May 2003, Al-Jazeerah.info
Human Price of the Israeli Occupation of Palestine
Israeli daily aggression on the Palestinian people
Mission and meaning of Al-Jazeerah
Cities, localities, and tourist attractions
Pakistanis must learn from US generals,
Husain Haqqani
Gulf News, Islamabad |
General Tommy Franks, credited with planning and
commanding the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has decided to
retire at the end of his tenure as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM).
General Franks was considered for the position of Army Chief of Staff, a
Washington-based job, but he turned it down saying that he found the job
title interesting but "not on my scope".
Having commanded the armed forces of the world's only superpower in an
arena comprising the entire Middle East and Central Asia, including
Pakistan, General Franks decided to end his military career on a high
note. There was, of course, no mention of an "extension" in the
tenure of the C-in-C Centcom.
Compare General Franks' choice of retirement with General Pervez
Musharraf's reluctance to give up a general's uniform in return for
Pakistan's presidency. Musharraf has already extended his own tenure as
army chief, following in the footsteps of several of his military
predecessors.
Political controversy
He is now willing to accept nagging political controversy and the
attending instability while seeking to combine the jobs of head of state
and military chief. He is neither the first nor the only Pakistani general
refusing to bow out at the appointed time. It has become an unfortunately
common practice in Pakistan since General Ayub Khan's extensions of tenure
as army chief during the 1950s leading to Pakistan's first coup d'etat and
Ayub's subsequent decision to appoint himself as Field Marshal.
During a recent meeting with General Franks' predecessor as Centcom
commander, General Anthony Zinni, I was impressed by the clarity of his
vision and his total lack of pretension to greatness. Both generals Zinni
and Frank represent the truly professional soldier, trained to command
armies while yielding to civilian political decisions.
The forces they command, and the resources at their disposal, exceed those
of many countries falling in the Centcom region. The U.S. budget for the
war in Afghanistan, for example, approximates Pakistan's annual Gross
Domestic Product.
But the magnitude of their command still does not infuse American generals
with the sense of indispensability that seems to inflict Pakistan's
military leaders. Few Pakistani generals accept voluntary retirement. Most
of them think they can handle anything from running the country to running
a public sector corporation.
The difference between the choices of General Franks and General Musharraf
is the difference between a society under rule of law and a society run
according to the law of rulers. General Franks is assured of a place in
history in a country where former officials are respected even when out of
office and where the achievement of individuals is admired irrespective of
their political beliefs or views.
General Zinni, for example, continues to enjoy the respect of Americans
even though he opposed the war in Iraq. Americans are able to admire
General Franks for "winning" the war in Iraq while appreciating
General Zinni for opposing it.
Pakistan's inability to create the rule of law has resulted in a political
culture obsessed with those wielding power at any given time. Those out of
office are denied respect and recognition to the extent that sometimes
their names are removed from plaques installed when they wielded power.
I recall the late General Zia-ul-Haq telling me once that it would be
easier for powerful people in Pakistan to relinquish power if they could
be assured of better treatment once they were out of office. Beginning
with Field Marshal Ayub Khan and his populist protégé-turned-nemesis
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistanis have refused to honour former rulers.
Ayub Khan denied the achievements of Pakistan's parliamentary democracy
since independence until his own accession to power in 1958. His denial
was necessitated by the need to justify his "revolution" by
military coup.
Ayub's lack of legitimacy was cited as the reason for editing him out of
history by his successors, notably the elder Bhutto. Similar arguments
have divided the nation about almost everyone who has held office ever
since.
It is possible that Musharraf is unwilling to relinquish his military rank
out of fear that once he does that he would face the same process of
erasure from history. But even if he manages to ride out the current
political crisis, Musharraf cannot rule (or live) forever.
It would be far better for Pakistan if the nation went through a process
of national reconciliation, which allows a more honest appraisal of
Pakistani history, and honours (or at least recognises) all those who have
held high office.
Once the mistakes of civilians and the military have been identified - be
they the alleged corruption of civilian politicians or the
extra-constitutional intrigues of military officers - the nation can get
on with adherence to its constitution and to building rule of law.
Dr. Abdullah Riar, Senator from Sindh, has proposed such national
reconciliation as an alternative to the "so-and-so is the source of
all evil in the country" divisions that have caused strife for the
last four decades.
One hopes that Dr. Riar's call will find greater support. Clinging to
office is not the only sphere in which Pakistan's leaders lack a sense of
proportion. There is also a blind spot in dealing with alleged mistakes
and crimes of the influential and powerful.
The Americans deposed Richard Nixon for violating the constitution but
also accepted his pardon by his successor, President Gerald Ford. The
indignity of impeachment and resignation was considered enough punishment
and most Americans considered it more important to move on than to remain
wrapped up in the Watergate scandal.
When President Clinton was accused of accepting wrongful financial
contributions and of lying in relation to a sexual relationship, he was
subjected to legal process but allowed to carry on in office once the
prosecution failed. The U.S., as a nation, is better off for this
adherence to rule of law as it is for its officials' keenness to step down
from high office on completion of their tenures.
No willingness
In Pakistan, on the other hand, there is no willingness to close a chapter
and start a new one. Take the case of Asif Ali Zardari, who has now been
in prison since 1996 facing relentless prosecution.
The military-intelligence establishment has failed to convict Zardari
despite changes in law and reshuffling of judges. Instead of accepting its
failure and allowing the nation to move on, the establishment continues to
hold Zardari hostage to influence the political decisions of his wife,
Benazir Bhutto.
Musharraf and his colleagues say they are convinced of Zardari's guilt and
will not release him come what may. But their decision has done little to
de-freeze the country's politics, which remains polarised and will remain
so until Benazir is allowed a free hand at a normal political cycle.
Musharraf and his military colleagues have been seeking the revival of
training programmes for Pakistani military officers in the United States.
As they learn the tactics of war from the American military, they should
not ignore the lessons of American politics and history that could be
useful for Pakistan.
The writer is a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington DC. He served as adviser to Prime
Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan's ambassador to
Sri Lanka.
 |
| Earth, a planet hungry for peace |
 |
| The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03). |
 |
| The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03). |