News, May 2003, Al-Jazeerah.info

الجزيرة

News Archives 

Arab Cartoonists

Columnists

Documents

Editorials 

Opinion Editorials

letters to the editor

Human Price of the Israeli Occupation of Palestine

Islam

Israeli daily aggression on the Palestinian people 

Media Watch

Mission and meaning of Al-Jazeerah

News Photos

Peace Activists

Poetry

Book reviews

Public Announcements 

   Public Activities 

Women in News

Cities, localities, and tourist attractions

Iran's predicament,

Rosemary Hollis

Jordan Times, 5/27/03

Pragmatists in Tehran warn against overt criticism of the United States for fear that this will only give their detractors in the Bush administration additional ammunition. Yet, by seeming to bow to US pressure, the reformist trend in the Islamic Republic stands to lose ground to the conservatives, who are already blocking legislation to enhance the powers of the presidency over the predominantly hardline judiciary.

Opinion in Washington is also divided, with the State Department challenging those in the Pentagon who think they can manipulate developments in Tehran to unseat the clerics. The British government, which has acted as intermediary between Washington and Tehran, shares the anxieties of the State Department.

There is only so much that the British can do, however, without feeding the deep-rooted Iranian perception that Britain is the real power behind the scenes. As was put to me by a number of Iranians in both Tehran and Mashhad, when I visited these cities with colleagues last week, since Britain's historical experience in the region predates that of the Americans', London, they believe, has a better understanding of the factors at work.

It cuts little ice in Iran to explain that the current British government would prefer to forget Britain's imperial past and feels no compulsion to shoulder responsibilities on the basis of that legacy. For many Iranians, the fact that British officials and companies played such a significant role in their history must mean that contemporary UK policy makers are similarly motivated and intend every regional development that results from their current policies.

In fact, the British today are primarily driven by a desire to maintain access in Washington and have chosen to be best friends of the Americans as the way to achieve this. They may be able to temper and tailor some of Washington's thinking, but to expect them to go beyond this and actually determine US policies is to accord London more leverage than is realistic.

The alternative assessment, of course, is that Britain ends up facilitating US policies by according them diplomatic cover. But there was no enthusiasm for the Iraq war in Britain and plenty of opposition to it. Had the British had their way, the United Nations would have been in the forefront of postwar reconstruction in Iraq, not in the wings.

The failure to find evidence of weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the invasion has given rise to claims that the British public was misled into going to war without due cause. Now that British companies have been accorded a privileged place in the bidding for reconstruction contracts, the perception will prevail that British imperialism is making a come back alongside the Americans and that Britain's motivation was always to gain a share in the spoils of war.

It seems unlikely that British intercession between Washington and Tehran can reverse this perception. On the one hand, the Iranians see the British role in Iraq as evidence that Britain is instrumental in US regional policy. Consequently, they consider Britain as a potential spokesman on their behalf. On the other hand, however, history tells them not to trust either power.

As the Iranians explain it, the military defeat of Iraq, a country already devastated by years of sanctions and isolation, has left the Islamic Republic as the strongest regional actor by default. With a population of around seventy million, they know they dwarf their Arab neighbours to the west and south.

But they also point out that they have no claims on those neighbours and have long since eschewed the goal of exporting revolution. When challenged by Washington for their support for Hizbollah and Hamas, the Iranians want to know what distinguishes their stance in this respect from that of many Arabs in general and Syria in particular.

When asked what they think of the resurgence of Shiite Islam in Iraq, the Iranians point out that for them, this is a phenomenon in its own right, rather than their doing per se. They depict Shiite Islam as a minority position in the wider Islamic community that has struggled to survive over generations.

Most telling, Iranians say that since their revolution, they have been identified as a security threat — an identity that they do not recognise and yet cannot change. Further, Shiite Islam has been equated with Iran when, they contend, Shiism is actually a decentralised and pluralistic expression of the faith. Now the revitalisation of Shiite consciousness in Iraq is likely to suffer the same fate as the Islamic Republic and be branded a security threat by association.

There is substance to this depiction. Following the disbanding of the Iraqi armed forces, by US decree last week, the Americans informed various Iraqi militias that they must disarm and disband, except for those deemed supportive of the coalition cause, including the Kurdish peshmergas and the security forces of Ahmed Chalabi. The Iranian trained and equipped Badr brigade, made up of Iraqis exiled to Iran until the fall of Saddam Hussein, also sought the downfall of his regime, but are not wanted by the Americans, presumably because of their Iranian connection.

Meanwhile, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld levelled another charge at Tehran last week, claiming that senior members of Al Qaeda are operating out of Iran and could have masterminded the recent bombings in Riyadh. The Iranian government denies that it is harbouring such elements, but the possibility remains that some such operatives have evaded official detection in Iran or been shielded by sympathisers within.

After all, there are many currents of opinion in Iran advocating different responses to American pressure. Some simply see no hope of accommodation with the Bush administration, while others want to use all means available to undermine US predominance. Those preferring some sort of accommodation risk being tainted by association with an American agenda.

While conscious of this, the British, as other Europeans too, are urging the Iranians to abandon their nuclear programme and scale back support for Hamas and Hizbollah. Such moves, they believe, can get the Iranians off the hook in Washington. But if the hawks in the Pentagon keep piling on the pressure for regime change, rather than simply a policy shift, the British, let alone the rest of Europe, cannot ultimately shield Tehran.

If the Iranians are correct and Washington tends to equate Iran with Shiism and both with a threat to its interests, then the only kind of regime change that would satisfy the Americans would be one that turns Iran into a secular US ally. But they have been there before, under the shah, and a replay of that experience would do no one any good.

In sum, the Iranians must be the masters of their own polity, and if the reform movement is moving more slowly than Washington would wish, the Americans would be wise to contain their impatience. Too much overt interference, not to mention some sort of attack, will be received as imperialism and unleash not only a broader Shiite resurgence but an Iranian nationalist backlash as well.

Opinions expressed in various sections are the sole responsibility of their authors and they may not represent Al-Jazeerah's.

editor@aljazeerah.info