The future of the Mujahideen Khalq, Mahan Abedin

Opinion, May 2003 Al-Jazeerah.info

The future of the Mujahideen Khalq,

Mahan Abedin

The Daily Star, 5/20/03

The belated disarmament agreement between the United States and the Mujahideen Khalq Organization (MKO) has surprised many analysts both in Iran and the United States. After all, US forces initially went to great lengths in disarming every entity Iraqi or otherwise associated with the ousted Baathist regime, save the Mujahideen.
The disarmament agreement followed a cease-fire that led to accusations of American hypocrisy and double standards in the “war against terrorism.” Despite American military officials’ allusion to the tactical nature of the cease-fire, there were fears the US might use the MKO as a short-term bargaining chip in the crucial transitional period in Iraq. Although some elements in the Pentagon were keen to preserve the armed status of the Mujahideen for a brief period as a bulwark against Iranian influence it seems the longer-term vision and strategic analysis of the State Department and the CIA prevailed. In the eyes of the American Intelligence community, the MKO is a failed proxy force that is almost universally disliked by Iranians. Therefore whatever short-term gains were to be made by using the it as a tool of American policy in Iraq would have been dwarfed by the damage inflicted on America’s reputation. Moreover the extensive lobbying of Iranian monarchist groups, coupled with the pressure applied by Iraqi forces in particular the Kurdish PUK and the SCIRI swung the argument decisively in favor of disarmament.
Richard Boucher’s announcement on May 9 that the US intends to bring to an end the Mujahideen’s terrorist activities inside Iraq was widely perceived in both internal and exiled Iranian political circles as a fitting end for the armed wing of an organization intimately aligned with the ousted Baathist regime. The decision to disarm the Mujahideen was also more compatible with American military action against the MKO during the Iraq war.
The MKO claimed neutrality in the recent Iraq war, but it in fact took active measures against invading American and British forces. As of March 2003, the Mujahideen maintained 16 bases in the southern, central and north-central areas of Iraq. Virtually all of these came under attack during the war. The first attack took place on March 28, when RAF warplanes attacked the Habib base, situated 82 kilometers north of Basra. The base was also attacked on the following day and subsequently abandoned by the MKO. The Americans bombed the massive Ashraf camp (72 kilometers northeast of Baghdad) more akin to a garrison town serving as the MKO’s global headquarters, on March 29. Ashraf was bombed again on April 4, April 12 and April 14.
The rapid advance of coalition armies forced the MKO to abandon all of its bases outside the northeastern Diyala Province. The advance of US Marines from the east was met by limited MKO resistance resulting in the abandonment of the Faeze base (18 kilometers to the southwest of Kut) and the smaller Homayoon military outpost (32 kilometers north of Faeze in north-central Wasit Province). Additionally the seemingly unassailable US Third Infantry came into direct conflict with MKO forces in the Fallujah base (the southwest of Baghdad, on the main road to Jordan). Limited combat took place between a small number of MKO fighters, who amalgamated their units with Republican Guard divisions and Iraqi militia, and the third infantry. The Fallujah base was swiftly abandoned and subsequently looted by local Iraqis. The MKO’s two main bases to the north of Baghdad, Bagherzadeh and Seemorgh, were both abandoned on April 8, a day before the fall of Baghdad. The US Air Force had bombed both camps repeatedly on the April 4-5. As a result, up to 30 MKO personnel, including the camp commanders, Shaheen Hatami and Mahboobeh Soofaf, were killed.
As Baghdad fell on April 9, the Mujahideen assembled nearly all their forces in Ashraf. The retreat there had been preceded by the abandonment of bases in the extreme east of Iraq. During the course of this retreat MKO forces had been repeatedly ambushed by a collection of PUK, Al-Badr Corps and Iranian IRGC fighters. For their part the Americans stepped up the bombing of the Ashraf headquarters, with a view of exacting a speedy capitulation. This capitulation was secured by April 21, and Vincent Brooks disclosed some of its details in a Central Command briefing on the following day.
The Ashraf commander, Parichehr Bakhshaif, had directed the communications with the Americans. The main MKO communications agent with the Americans was Mehdi Barai, a veteran Mujahideen activist. Indeed it was Barai who signed the cease-fire with the Americans, enabling the MKO to remain fully armed, but nevertheless effectively quarantined inside Ashraf.
The recent disarmament agreement was effectively an imposition buttressed by the US Army V Corps’ encirclement of Ashraf. The MKO held out for two days but was finally coerced into signing an agreement that irreversibly dismantles the armed wing of the organization. The US military negotiator, General Ray Odierno, refused to categorize the agreement as surrender, in order to maintain some dignity for the Mujahideen. The MKO’s representative in the talks was Mozhgan Parsaii, the nominal head of the organization (real power resides with Massoud Rajavi and his wife Maryam). The agreement stipulates the quarantining of the organization inside Ashraf and subordinates it to complete American control. It is highly unlikely the MKO will have any form of presence in Iraq beyond the autumn of 2003.
The future of the MKO seems bleak. A seminar dedicated to assessing the future of the Mujahideen was held in Paris on April 18. The gathering was mainly organized by around 80 ex-MKO leaders, many of whom had been previously imprisoned and mistreated by the organization. Among the speakers was Baroness Emma Nicholson, an MEP (representing the British Liberal Democrats) who passionately argued for the disbandment of the MKO. The seminar concluded with the unanimous consensus that the MKO would disintegrate upon expulsion from Iraq.
Despite these dire predictions the MKO is unlikely to disintegrate in the near future. There is little doubt the loss of its Iraqi base will prove a devastating blow, but the group has the cohesion and resources to survive this crisis. The cohesion of the organization derives from its self-righteous and millenarian ideology critics have argued the MKO is little more than a cult and the absolute authority of its leader, Massoud Rajavi. Hence providing Rajavi can survive the crisis (and it seems that he has), the MKO is unlikely to collapse.
Nevertheless despite the probability of short-term survival, the MKO is unlikely to remain a coherent force for too long. The destruction of its armed wing is likely to undermine the group’s centrality in exiled opposition circles. This “de-centralization” will have an adverse impact on the group, which has prided itself for 22 years on being the only credible alternative to the ruling regime.

Mahan Abedin, a London-based financial consultant and analyst of Iranian politics