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Russia and Iraq
Arab News, 21 January 2003

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Washington certainly will not have been pleased, but this week’s deal between Iraq and Russian oil and gas companies may be as politically significant as it is commercially.

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Behind Sharon's delay tactics

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The peace scheme, the work of the quartet of the US, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, was initially expected to be declared and endorsed well before the Israeli elections.

His Majesty King Abdullah responded swiftly to the statements by insisting during his talks with visiting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Sultanov on Sunday that the roadmap must be announced after the Israeli general elections. No doubt the King's reaction to Sharon's effort to dismiss the internationally-backed roadmap echoes the view of the international community.

It appears that Sharon's other plan depends first and foremost on the conclusion of the expected war on Iraq. His own roadmap for peace with the Palestinians rests on three pillars, namely the removal of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat from power, the crushing of Palestinian armed resistance, and the recognition of a provisional demilitarised Palestinian state with temporary borders. According to this scheme, a final peace deal would be arrived at after a sustained calm and peace.

In many ways Sharon's ideas are the antithesis of the quartet roadmap which calls for an immediate freeze on Jewish settlement activities in the Palestinian territories, a ceasefire to be followed by an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities and towns, and the recognition of a provisional state in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These steps are also expected to be followed by negotiations on the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and borders of an independent Palestinian state.

After accusing the EU of bias in favour of the Palestinians to be able to play a role in the search for peace in the area, Sharon maintained that he sees eye-to-eye with the US on the Palestinian conflict. It is a wonder then, how US President George Bush is going to deal with Sharon's rejection of the much acclaimed roadmap for peace in the articulation of which Washington played a central role.

It is regrettable enough that the international community yielded to Israeli pressure to delay the announcement of the roadmap till after the Israeli elections. Now the Israeli premier, who is projected to win reelection, appears to ask the world to wait till the war with Iraq ends before launching efforts to restart peace talks with the Palestinians. Obviously Sharon calculates that a change of regime in Iraq would create new regional conditions much more favourable for Israel in any future peace talks not only with the Palestinians but also with Syria and Lebanon. That's why a war against Iraq has profound implications and ramifications for the entire region and must be avoided at all costs.

Tuesday, January 21, 2003

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Blair's convictions and the Bush factor

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Undeterred by the Israeli travel ban on Palestinian officials, the British went ahead with their conference on Palestinian reform by video-link. Equally unmoved by Likud Party objections, Prime Minister Tony Blair met with Israeli Labour Party leader Amram Mitzna. Blair also faced down detractors in his own party to explain why he could be prepared to back a US-led war on Iraq.

Blair's meeting with Mitzna will not have made much difference to the latter's electoral prospects. Possibly the only consequence, according to one Israeli analyst, was that Mitzna was out of the country when Ariel Sharon was defending his case against corruption charges on Israeli television. Therefore, Mitzna was not present to capitalise on the debacle that saw Sharon's appearance cut short by intervention from legal authority.

The Blair-Mitzna rendezvous did however signal British support for the Labour leader's stance on dealing with the Palestinians. British defiance of Israeli attempts to scupper the conference on Palestinian reform was galvanised by a public spat between Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu. The event gave a boost, by default, to the Palestinian claim that Israeli government's intransigence represents more of an obstacle to restarting negotiations than their own ineptitude.

Even though Blair achieved no gains on the peace front, by standing up to their Israeli counterparts, he and Straw came out looking as though they were prepared to take some knocks for their beliefs. Their performance also put a little dent in the image of Britain as the poodle of the Americans.

Demonstration of the same courage of his convictions by Blair on the question of Iraq went down less well on the British political scene. According to his own explanation, Blair's position on Iraq is that if left to its own devices, the Iraqi government could develop chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons and these could in turn be acquired by shady terrorist groups prepared to use them in an ideological war with the West.

This line of argument puts Blair in the same camp as Americans prepared to act preemptively against Iraq to prevent its regime from one day rejuvenating weapons programmes currently in abeyance.

To explain his empathy with the Bush administration, Blair says that Britain shares America's values and must not flinch from defending them when they are threatened. If by American values Blair means human rights and democracy, few in the British Labour Party and beyond would question the cause. However, where his critics differ with the prime minister is over his assessment of President George W. Bush as the defender of those values.

Politicians and other commentators in Britain have not forgotten how Bush won the US presidency in a court decision over a disputed vote count in the state of Florida. Never mind that Bush acquired some legitimacy from the success of his Republican Party in last November's midterm elections. Critics still discern a US administration prepared to flout human rights in the treatment of detainees in the “war on terrorism”.

Coverage of Bush's proposals for stimulating the US economy has done him no favours either. By all accounts, the principal beneficiaries of his proposed tax cuts would be the very rich and foreigners who will not put their gains back into America. Critical observers also note that Bush is itching to have his nominees appointed to the US Supreme Court to promote his ideological agenda, which would roll back the achievements of American liberalism dating from the civil rights and pro-choice movements of the 1960s.

The significance of this for British Labour Party members and voters is that Bush comes across as a man of conservative values, guided by his personal brand of Christianity. His rhetorical style, meanwhile, is viewed as that of an uncompromising bully, however sincere he may be in his defence of what he believes to be right.

Consequently, the rank and file of Blair's Labour Party want to know why their leader is so confident that Bush stands for the same freedoms and norms that they do. No one disputes that the Iraqi government is antithetical to human rights and democracy. But to trust that Bush is the man to lead a war to replace it with something more beneficial to world peace and security would be a major gamble, especially since there is a perfectly viable UN system now in place for tackling the problem of Iraqi weapons.

What the critics overlook, however, is the role of the US military buildup in pressuring Iraq to go along with the inspections. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has now said that the threat of war has served the purpose of forcing Iraqi compliance. But for the inspection process to run its course, the US will have to sit on Iraq's borders poised for action for another year or so.

As the heat of summer takes its toll on US battle readiness, the credibility of the threat will diminish, even assuming the US is prepared to play the waiting game for months to come. In this case, it will be up to the members of the UN Security Council to work out how they propose to help the US sustain its presence or offer an alternative. Just to let Iraq off the hook would make not only the United States but also the Security Council look foolish.

Meanwhile, the question of what to do about the sanctions on Iraq would come centre stage again. The present system has helped sustain the Iraqi leadership in place and subjected the population to intolerable and seemingly endless agony. Also, absent the threat of war on Iraq, there will be no excuse not to address the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict once more. While Blair clearly believes the Iraq crisis need not deter progress on this other front, Bush has apparently lost interest. On this issue too, therefore, it will be no good to leave it all to the Americans.

The message here is plain, if unpalatable. If you do not want to trust Bush and his administration to sort things out, better come up with an alternative. Britain's position on the Israeli-Palestinian front may not be decisive, but it is clearly on the side of the Israelis and Palestinians prepared to restart negotiations. This line is in accordance with other members of the quartet, including the US State Department, if not the White House.

On Iraq, there are still some questions to be answered. If the way forward is for inspections to run their course, what is the penalty for Iraqi noncompliance and what is the reward for full cooperation? In either case, who will do the heavy lifting? If it comes to war, what will constitute victory? Can the UN Security Council, please, agree on the future envisaged for Iraq and its role in achieving this.

Tuesday, January 21, 2003

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Washington is making Saddam an offer he can’t accept

An Arab press review, By The Daily Star, 1/21/03

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The latest hints from George W. Bush’s administration that it might “allow” the Iraqi leadership to go into exile make headlines in the Arab papers, as Middle Eastern capitals buzz with diplomatic activity ostensibly aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis.
But press reports and commentaries reflect considerable confusion about what, if anything, the Americans are actually proposing, and deep doubts that they are seriously entertaining any other course than war.
The Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat portrays the US as “tightening the noose” around President Saddam Hussein by “giving him a choice between exile and trial.”
Lebanon’s As-Safir writes that the three top administration officials who suggested that Saddam’s banishment might be an alternative to war evidently had conflicting ideas about the Iraqi leader’s future and even about the “seriousness” of the suggestion that he might be persuaded to relinquish power.
These officials have also been engaged in a “concerted propaganda campaign” ahead of next week’s UN Security Council meeting in which they have been accusing Iraq of concealing banned weapons and rejecting calls to delay any military showdown, As-Safir says.
Pan-Arab Al-Quds al-Arabi observes that Saddam is himself evidently bracing for a military faceoff, and highlights his latest speech vowing to repulse any invading army.
Al-Hayat’s Abdel-Wahhab Badrakhan says that “nothing has changed in the scenario” and US decision-makers are as intent on war as ever. Far from being deterred by the wave of anti-war protests in the US and elsewhere in the West, he writes, they hope the Iraqi president will be emboldened by them to act defiantly “and proceed to make some mistake that could be invoked against him.”
Saddam’s bluster about being ready for war and poised to defeat the American invaders suggests he is playing into their hands, he says. “The US is more confident than ever that it will have its war, having wagered from the outset that the Iraqi regime itself will help it.”
Badrakhan describes the “offer” to refrain from attacking Iraq if Saddam abdicates as a “poisoned gift.” The “abdication scenario” would be a recipe for anarchy “that would inevitably result from a vacuum at the pinnacle of power,” he says, but in any case it was “offered in a manner ensuring its rejection.”
Rather, the US seems confident that the UN arms inspections, which are set to become increasingly aggressive and subject to “American ‘tip-offs’ and guidance,” will enable it to cast doubts on Iraq’s declared weapons of mass destruction-free status and win waverers over to the war camp.
“The spin of war has started to make heads giddy, but that doesn’t mean the Americans are going to alter anything in their preconceived timetable,” according to Badrakhan.
Regional diplomatic moves aimed at averting war meanwhile top the news in many Arab papers, ahead of this week’s planned meeting in Syria of the foreign ministers of five of Iraq’s neighbors ­ Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia ­ plus Egypt. Some papers suggest Turkey’s plans to convene a special summit of the leaders of these states are coming unstuck, and it may host a lower-level meeting instead.
Syrian and Egyptian spokesmen are quoted as denying that the efforts being made by regional players to broker a peaceful settlement to the crisis envisage the resignation or exile of the Iraqi president, and papers also highlight remarks by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Aziz in which he voiced support for the proposed meeting in Turkey “if its purpose is to express collective opposition to war.”
Baghdad’s interest in a peaceful solution was also stressed by Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa after talks in Tehran, where As-Safir notes both he and his hosts stressed the need to avoid war at any cost, and also denied speculation that Syria and Iran are at odds over Iraq.
In Damascus, the government daily Tishreen runs an editorial urging the United States to give regional peace efforts a chance, and blasting administration hawks who are lusting for war.
The paper takes Washington to task for massing forces against Iraq despite its compliance with UN arms inspections “and leaving no scope for any constructive dialogue or reasonable negotiations,” even while opting for restraint and diplomacy “elsewhere” in the world.
“Why doesn’t (Washington) give the countries of the region a chance to find a balanced political solution to the so-called Iraq question rather than massing its forces and fleets, constantly threatening to wage war and heightening tensions in the region and the world?” it wonders.
“The sole purpose of the consultations, contacts, exchanges of messages and meetings between the foreign ministers and leaders of the countries concerned like Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Jordan is to search for an ‘honorable’ way out for all parties, and to foil the hard-liners and Israel who seek to destroy Iraq and create dangerous anarchy in the region by igniting strife and wars,” Tishreen writes.
If the US is serious about wanting Iraq to comply with UN resolutions, it should let the arms inspectors get on with their job, stop raising tensions and making threats, get Israel to comply with UN demands too, and “cooperate seriously with the region’s leaders … in their sincere quest for acceptable solutions, an honorable settlement and appropriate ways out of the current crisis,” it says.
Jordanian commentator and former information minister Saleh Qallab suggests in the Saudi pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat that the regional players do not have the capacity to prevent war, but argues they can and should work together to reduce the negative fallout.
Qallab endorses Turkey’s “belated” call for a regional summit, noting that war on Iraq is bound to adversely affect the security and economies of all the countries invited, “and they will face regional explosions if they do not agree, from now, on what is possible and acceptable and what is not.”
“These countries must coordinate their efforts to prevent war and agree a unified stance over this, but they must also define where they stand, individually and collectively, should they fail to resolve the Iraq crisis peacefully,” he counsels. “But if war breaks out while the regional situation remains as it is now, the circle of danger will expand to engulf them all to varying degrees.”
Qallab says one thing the Arab and Iranian participants in the talks want to prevent is Turkish military intervention in the looming conflict.
He adds that the Arab states do not want to be seen to be meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs, “or to take part in any initiative to persuade the Iraqi president to stand down so as to spare his country the horrors and destruction of this pending war.”
But while they may be wary of “angering or provoking” the Iraqi leader, they should still accept Turkey’s invitation, and work out understandings with each other and the Iranians and Turks “on what can be done should war break out.”
Jordan is meanwhile reported by Al-Hayat to have succeeded in obtaining “Arab and international guarantees” that the losses it sustains from an attack on Iraq will be kept to a minimum. The paper’s sources also say Washington understands the precarious position the Hashemite Kingdom is in, and the only help it wants from it in the event of war is “humanitarian assistance” in coping with a possible refugee influx.
The Amman daily Al-Dustour is meanwhile heartened by the huge anti-war protests held in many US, European and Asian cities over the weekend. The paper writes that the growing anti-war movement is asserting itself as “a new player on the stage of the Iraqi drama,” and public pressure is making Western governments increasingly loathe to go along with the United States.
“If this wave continues and escalates, especially in the United States, the prospects for preventive diplomacy will improve, raising hopes that the disaster may be avoided,” Al-Dustour comments.
In Lebanon, As-Safir publisher Talal Salman laments that while the rest of the world is preoccupied with the prospect of a US war on Iraq, “the Lebanese are busy following the details (insulting to both their intelligence and their dignity) of the latest round in the all-out war between their rulers.”
Elsewhere, people are taking to the streets to demonstrate against war, but Lebanon’s feuding leaders have turned demonstrations into vehicles for pursuing their vendetta against each other, “with each ‘raees’ occupying the street with his supporters for a while before vacating it for the other ‘raees’,” he remarks.
Salman describes Sunday night’s meeting between President Emile Lahoud and Prime Minister Rafik Hariri as the “latest bout” in the four-year-old feud between them, “which is tipped to continue intermittently for another two years.” It has “gone beyond being a farce” and started posing a threat to people’s livelihoods and futures, he warns.
Salman says “perhaps the worst thing about this war” is that “some major Arab countries like Saudi Arabia have been brought into it, albeit only indirectly via the ‘showdown’ that was staged over a TV station, or rather one of that station’s discussion programs.” Prior to that, the president and prime minister had never appeared to be at odds over relations with other Arab states, especially not Saudi Arabia.
Salman adds that the row between the two men is the last thing Syria needs as it tries to rally regional efforts to prevent an American war on Iraq. It is a “deadly political mistake” for either of them to drag Damascus into their war and “try to inundate it once again in an avalanche of Lebanese details.” Their quarrel has also brought talk of Syrian “meddling” in Lebanese affairs back to the fore, thanks to their attempts to involve Syria in their “daily disputes.”
Salman blasts Lahoud and Hariri equally for this state of affairs, accusing both of worrying about their own status while neglecting the country “which is burdened with debt, servicing the debt, and serving those who caused the debt and are incapable of coping with its frightening consequences.”
Al-Quds al-Arabi turns to the resumed “dialogue” being held in Cairo between different Palestinian factions under the auspices of the Egyptian government, which the paper says is trying to achieve two things: a thorough overhaul of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and a one-year suspension of all armed resistance to the Israeli occupation.
The paper rates Cairo’s chances of success as “very slim,” especially while Israel continues its campaign of sowing death and destruction in the Occupied Territories.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon dealt a “fatal blow” to Egypt’s effort when he refused to allow a Palestinian delegation to travel to the recent London conference aimed at discussing PA reform, Al-Quds al-Arabi argues. That made it impossible for Cairo to persuade the Palestinian factions that there are any political gains to be made from suspending resistance to the occupation, which they are in any case loathe to do.
Should the likes of Hamas and Islamic Jihad renounce martyrdom operations “even temporarily, when there are no real alternatives on the ground and no clear political horizon, they would lose their raison d’être and be stripped of their political legitimacy and considerable popularity among Palestinians,” the paper reasons.
What Cairo is offering as a quid pro quo for a unilateral truce by the Palestinian factions is a halt to Israeli assassinations of the leaders and activists of their military wings, Al-Quds al-Arabi explains. Even if Cairo could deliver that, it would be a “paltry price.” Indeed, “it would demonstrate in practice that the Israeli policy of assassinations has succeeded in terrorizing the Palestinians and their leaders, and forcing them to abandon resistance in exchange for their lives being spared,” the paper points out.
“Accordingly, it is not surprising that the military cadres of Hamas and Islamic Jihad made certain to step up martyrdom operations during the London conference and the Cairo dialogue, making clear that political discourse is one thing and happenings on the ground another.”

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Israel’s daily lecture on sly public relations

The Daily Star, 1/21/03

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Israeli leaders never tire of warning all and sundry not to “attack” the Jewish state ­ and with good reason: It makes for unparalleled public relations. By ceaselessly portraying one of the world’s most powerful countries as an underdog continuously surrounded by “existential” threats, successive Israeli governments have bamboozled Washington into providing lavish funding, high-tech armaments, and diplomatic cover for their enterprise of modern-day colonialism. Arab governments would do well to learn the lessons provided free of charge by the Jewish state on a daily basis.
Ariel Sharon provided the latest lecture in this course on Monday. Invoking the usual general theme of “poor little Israel,” his particular focus this time was on the side-effects of an expected war against Iraq led by the United States. Regarding the Palestinians, he had this to say: “I hope they understand (as well as) the Syrians … and Hizbullah, which is equipped by the Iranians, to be very careful. If there will be quiet, nothing will happen to them.”
One could forgive a newcomer to Middle East politics for thinking Israel was the local version of Luxembourg: a benign entity with no history of bullying its neighbors. Obviously, that is not the case. The expression of concern at being attacked is always tacitly conjoined with the intimidation provided by an arsenal that includes all manner of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Israel has proved expert in the science of launching wars and the dark art of provoking them.
The primary consumers of Israeli propaganda are the citizens and leaders of the United States. Americans are not an especially gullible lot, so having convinced them of Israel’s worthiness as an ally has been something of a major feat. One of the key features in this accomplishment has been the endless uttering of lies. Repeat the same untruth over and over again, and eventually people start accepting it as holy writ.
Of course, it helps to have a pliant media on your side, and the Israelis have definitely benefited from biased and/or ignorant journalism. When CNN ventures into the murky past beyond yesterday morning, for instance, it tends overwhelmingly to accept myths to which even most Israelis no longer cling. It produces “factoids” like the one that described the people of the Jewish state as having feared extermination on the eve of the 1967 war. It is difficult to know precisely what a factoid is, but examples like this make it safe to assume that its outward resemblance to the word “fact” is purely coincidental.
As Sharon knows better than most, Arab governments and groups are no threat to coordinate an offensive that would imperil Israel. He also knows that Damascus, Tehran and Hizbullah are no fans of Saddam Hussein and that both America and Britain have received Syrian assurances of stability along the Israeli-Lebanese border. None of that matters, however, to his mission of currying favor with Washington and demonizing the Arabs.
Why have Arab governments failed to emulate this highly effective strategy? It is not as though Arab regimes refuse to lie, only that they don’t do it very credibly. Then they tell the truth for a while before lapsing back into mendacity. The trick, as any marketing guru knows and as Sharon understands with total clarity, is to be consistent ­ even and perhaps especially when your message is self-contradictory.

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Sharon I returns to menace Sharon II

By Joseph Samaha

The Daily Star, 1/21/03

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This month’s Israeli general election looked like a lackluster affair. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon seemed well on his way to an easy victory that would give the Likud a record number of seats in the next 120-member Knesset. Sharon’s main rival, Labor Party leader Amram Mitzna, meanwhile looked like he was about to lead the party that founded the state of Israel to unprecedented defeat.
The right-religious bloc appeared set to win a majority that would enable it to form the next government ­ although Sharon would still enjoy freedom of maneuver to form a government of national unity if he felt so inclined, and if he perceived that the US would like him to do so.
That, at least, was what the picture looked like a few weeks ago, when Sharon trounced his Likud rival Benjamin Netanyahu in the Likud Party primaries ­ although Netanyahu exacted a revenge of sorts by ensuring that his supporters won prominent positions on the Likud’s parliamentary slate. The impression then was that the real political battlefield in Israel was not between right and left, but within the right-wing camp. A long and prosperous future in power for the right seemed assured, with the aging Sharon confident of a new term in office.
Sharon’s strength came from a number of factors:
He succeeded, first of all, in laying the blame for the failure of the peace process squarely on Yasser Arafat’s shoulders. Even though he has been systematically dismantling the Palestinian Authority and its various institutions, he personalized the conflict by demonizing Arafat ­ and the Israeli public went along with him. What made matters even better for Sharon was that the Americans also excluded the Palestinian leader from their calculations, while the Europeans started to see him as an obstacle to their helping the Palestinian people win back their legitimate rights.
It was not difficult for the Israelis to forget ­ or disregard ­ Sharon’s responsibility for igniting the Palestinian intifada by visiting the Al-Aqsa compound in late September 2000 or his unfulfilled promises of peace and security. This was because most Israelis believed Ehud Barak’s story that Arafat’s rejection of the generous offer made to him at Camp David was the true cause of all the subsequent bloodshed. This myth allowed the national unity government to survive for two years during which Sharon managed to assume a unique position. He called the shots, while two Labor ministers ­ Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres ­ explained, justified and carried out his policies.
During those two years, Sharon’s main rival was Netanyahu and the ultra-extremist nationalist camp. This, together with the shift to the right by the bulk of Israeli society, enabled Sharon to portray himself as a wise, moderate, centrist leader who can suppress the Palestinians without breaking with the Americans.
Israeli newspapers of that period spoke of a “new Sharon” who almost managed to erase the reckless, bloodthirsty and lying image that has haunted him since the 1950s. It was very strange indeed to see committed leftists so taken in by Sharon’s alleged rebirth that they began speaking of him as Yitzhak Rabin’s heir, an example of a leader with a security agenda who was nonetheless determined not to close the door on a political settlement.
It was not surprising then that Sharon managed to occupy the middle ground in Israeli politics ­ the ideal position from which to see off the two threats posed by Netanyahu’s rabid far-right and Mitzna’s lily-livered Labor.
Then, quite suddenly, the unexpected happened.
Israeli newspapers trumpeted revelations about fraud in the Likud primaries. Votes, it appeared, had been bought and sold, allowing criminals, fraudsters and convicted felons to win top positions on the Likud slate. The matter was referred to the police, and there were increasing calls for adopting new rules for choosing candidates similar to those espoused by Labor, in which the grassroots had the final say in who gets chosen to represent the party.
This first wave of scandals did not register in the opinion polls. Likud only lost a couple of percentage points, and the party was confident of regaining lost ground. Oddly, Labor’s popularity did not benefit from this affair.
Then came a second wave of scandals ­ exposed by Haaretz ­ which involved Sharon personally as well as his two sons, Omri and Gilad. There was talk of large sums of money borrowed by the Sharons to conceal loans used to buy favors. The Israeli press reported a trail of corruption extending from South Africa, through Greece and on to Israel. It soon transpired that the second wave of scandals was more damaging then the first, since it affected the image Sharon was seeking to portray: that of the man devoid of personal ambition, whose only goal was to end his public life extending yet more services to the state. Leaks from within Likud ranks ­ reported to have been by Netanyahu and his supporters ­ gave rise to an impression of a party in disarray, its leaders at each other’s throats.
Seeing that the latest scandal was having a perceptible effect on public opinion, Sharon reacted angrily. He lost his cool in a televised press conference, and ­ in a break with tradition ­ attacked Labor and Mitzna without succeeding in absolving himself. The head of Israel’s Election Commission was forced to pull the plug on Sharon’s televised press conference, in which he was supposed to refute charges of corruption, because he overstepped the mark and was seen to be trying to score electoral points on his Labor rivals.
These events resulted in a sharp fall in the number of Israelis intending to vote Likud ­ and in a very small increase in those intending to vote Labor. But the real change was taking place somewhere else, on the far right.
Ordinary Israelis began supporting such religious/nationalist parties as Shas and the National Union. These two parties had paid the price for the restoration of the old electoral system in which voters are unable to choose their favorite party and their favorite prime minister separately. That meant many of their supporters were forced to vote for Sharon. The two parties tried to convince Israelis that voting for them had a double benefit: avoiding the possibility of another government of national unity and getting Sharon back as prime minister.
With the rise of Shas and the National Union (especially the former), many right-wing secular Israelis began leaving Likud for Shinui, believing the latter to be more able to stem the fundamentalist tide. That was why Meretz started to worry, and why Arab-Israelis began to express renewed interest in politics ­ particularly after Israel’s Supreme Court overturned the ban on Arab MPs Ahmed Tibi and Azmi Bishara to run for election.
Taken together, these developments resulted in a different picture. There was realignment within the right-wing camp that would limit any Likud leader’s room for maneuver. Moreover, Sharon’s position became shaky. As a result, the election race regained some of the excitement it had lost, with more options open. Is Sharon going to continue? And if so, can he complete a second term? Will the composition of the Knesset allow the formation of a right-wing government? Is it still possible to form a government of national unity? Can Mitzna garner enough votes to prove that Labor is back on its feet? Will the Arab vote make a difference?

Joseph Samaha is the editor in chief of the Beirut daily As-Safir.

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North Sudan is now advocating separatism

By Abdelwahab El-Affendi 

The Daily Star, 1/21/03

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The Arab world appears to have finally woken up to the crisis in Sudan. A unique top-level ministerial meeting was held Jan. 13-14 in Khartoum in a rare high-profile show of solidarity with the country. The object was to discuss proposals for reconstruction in the south in an attempt to encourage southerners to endorse the unity of Sudan in the anticipated referendum.
Arab leaders have been moved to act by the realization that the American-led peace process was accelerating toward a deal that would see the south secede. Egypt, in particular, is very worried by the prospect of a divided Sudan, which it sees as a threat to its vital security interests and to the crucial supply of Nile waters.
The Arab gesture may have come too late, and has yet no substance to warrant a judgment that it is too little as well. On the other hand, the fear that the peace process is forging ahead does not seem to hold water either.
The Khartoum government initially refused to send delegates to a mid-January round of talks agreed last November. The two sides were to discuss the so-called “marginalized areas” that are geographically in the north but are affected by the southern insurgency. They include the Abyei area, a small enclave in southern Kordofan; the Nuba Mountains, a larger enclave in the same region; and the Ingessena Hills in the southern Blue Nile, a region bordering on the south and on Ethiopia. The three areas have in common the characteristic of being inhabited by non-Arab and largely non-Muslim ethnic groups, where an insurgency has erupted and where insurgents had allied themselves with southern rebels. The government refuses to discuss these areas at one level with the south, since being in the north the idea of granting them the right of self-determination was deemed unthinkable.
This issue is not the only one holding the peace talks. The two sides haven’t reached any agreement on the thorny issues holding back the talks since a broad outline of principles was agreed in Nairobi last July. They have been unable to agree on an interim government and institutions, on the modalities of elections and referendum, on the status of the capital or on whom to include in the talks. Furthermore, there is little indication they will any time soon. The positions of the two sides diverge widely on almost every issue, and there is little mutual confidence to inspire daring compromises.
The rebels have already vetoed the objective of the Arab ministerial meeting in Khartoum, which is to provide incentives for unity through funding development projects in the south. In recent statements and direct communications with the Arab League, the leadership of the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) warned against any moves to initiate economic projects in the south before a comprehensive peace deal had been agreed. Even after the deal, the rebels insist that it should be they, and not the Khartoum government, who should receive and dispense the allocated funds, which seems to defeat the whole object of the exercise. For if the rebels, who are feared to harbor separatist intentions, are given control of the funds, then the aim of promoting unity will be lost.
In any case, the naive belief that the south could be “bribed” into accepting unity by generous donations is both misguided and unrealistic. For one thing, the Arab states are unlikely to match a fraction of the funds which will be made available to the south by Western and international donors once peace is achieved, and their contribution is unlikely to be either visible enough or sustained to have influence on hearts and minds in the south. On the other, unless southern opinion is persuaded to commit to unity on political grounds, no amount of material incentives will sway it in that direction. In fact, the more generous and effective aid is, the easier it will become for the south to secede. Indeed, one of the main incentives to unity as the moment appears to be the fear that the underdeveloped south cannot, at the moment, sustain a viable state.
But if peace appears difficult to attain, and unity even more so, northern public opinion is now clearly fed up with the war and would like a quick end to it, even if that means separation. Calls for northern separatism have been growing louder and more frequent of late. In a remarkable recent intervention, a junior minister and former head of national television known to be close to President Omar Hassan al-Bashir published an article advocating a “northern liberation movement.”
For this official and the increasing number of northerners who share his opinion, it is the north rather than the south that has been paying the higher price for the war. For years, the north has had to foot the bill for the civil war while continuing to finance the unproductive south. If the north did not have to bear this dual cost, Sudan’s economy would have taken off long ago. Maybe, they argue, it is time to call it a day and engineer a speedy separation, without even waiting for a referendum.
The article sparked a heated debate, with many supporting the minister in question, and producing new arguments of their own in support of separatism.
In a significant indication that would greatly disturb Egypt, the debate revealed very substantial support for separation from the south. The government moved in quickly to stifle the debate. The whole episode was puzzling, and it is not clear whether the government had hoped to tap into popular opinion fed up with the war or to put pressure on the rebels by indicating that the north is not too keen on unity. But it is very likely that any political movement campaigning for speedy separation will gain strong popular support in both north and south. Ironically, this would transform it into a genuine “national” movement ­ a stature that no existing political movement can boast of.
But whether there is unity or separation will depend ultimately on the outcome of the ongoing talks, which seem to be going nowhere. The government, presumably under intense international pressure, has finally relented and asked its ambassador in Nairobi to represent it at the talks. This looks like a half-hearted measure to appease critics, but is unlikely to achieve results. If one side feels it cannot even discuss the issues, what chance is there for any agreement on them?
The plus side is that if the two parties maintain their intransigence, they may soon be swept into action (or out of it) by a swell of public opinion similar to that currently buffeting Turkish Cyprus and pushing the leaders to find a quick exit from a situation all find intolerable.

Abdelwahab El-Affendi is a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster.

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Whither the Arab world in 2003?

By Muna Shuqair

Tfhe Daily Star, 1/21/03

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Now that the final countdown for a probable US war on Iraq is upon us, the coming days seem heavily loaded with possibilities. Despite the fact that political analysts have been scouring reports and statements coming out of the US administration and trying to predict what is going to happen, the nature of the coming war is still vague.
This is in spite of the fact that the way the Americans plan to conduct the war has become familiar to all. According to all available indications, the war on Iraq is going to be a “space-age,” lightning affair that will begin ­ and quite possibly end ­ in the air. A land war might only come in the final stages. At any rate, the war will be quick and decisive, and will employ the latest in American arms technology. This much is easy to predict.
What is difficult to fathom is how far Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is prepared to go to defend himself, and how the US plans to respond if Saddam decides to use weapons of mass destruction to defend his regime and thus involve the Americans in a much wider conflict than it bargained for.
In contrast to the ambiguity surrounding the possibility of war breaking out, a number of other factors and positions seem very clear indeed. It has become noticeable, for example, that all Arab regimes welcome the demise of Saddam and his regime, and recognize that Iraq must be allowed to start anew ­ even if that was to be on the Afghan model.
There is no doubt at all that the Arab countries of the Gulf ­ including Saudi Arabia  ­ have already given the Americans a green light to wage war on Iraq. The Gulf Arabs have apparently agreed to allow the US to use military bases on their soil to launch attacks on Iraq, and not merely for logistical purposes.
Condemnation of war against Iraq is a hypocritical ploy planned to placate the Arab peoples. Even those who genuinely oppose the war are doing so out of fear for their own interests.
Arab opposition to war on Iraq has nothing to do with the suffering of the Iraqi people and is all to do with the possible ramifications on stability and security.
Despite the fact that the superficial calm that characterizes the Arab street conceals the possibility of violent revolt, it is certain that Arab sympathies will not be with Saddam, who is already being seen as a liability as far as Arab popular opinion is concerned. While it is certain that Arabs will express sympathy for the Iraqi people, they will also come out on the streets to protest against American policies in the Middle East, and to reject US plans to redraw the map of the region to correspond to its idea of fighting terror and protecting its own interests.
It is also certain that the economic effects of war on the countries of the region would be very serious indeed. The US expects the Gulf states to shoulder part of the expenses of the coming war at a time when they are still suffering from the economic fallouts of the 1991 war over Kuwait. This does not mean that the Arab states of the Gulf are going to pay for the war directly, but rather through reduced revenues resulting from the chaos that would certainly engulf the oil market.
In addition, countries that have been dealing with Iraq ­ those that rely on cheap Iraqi oil, such as Jordan and Turkey; or have signed contracts with Baghdad within the framework of the “oil-for-food” arrangement, such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iran; or have been engaging in widespread smuggling of goods, such as Turkey, Iran, and Syria ­ will suffer immense economic damage.
Although no one can say how the war will end, and whether change in Iraq would lead to changes in at least some other Middle East countries, it is nevertheless certain that what will take place in Iraq will not be insignificant, nor will its effects be limited to Iraq alone.
Notwithstanding the degree of change that will take place in Iraq, there is no doubt that the region will not be the same after the war ends. It is already obvious that war on Iraq would not bring prosperity and stability to the region; in fact, it would more likely usher in an era of unprecedented chaos.
Washington has not yet been able to bring order to Afghanistan; Al-Qaeda is still on the loose more then a year after Sept. 11. Terrorism has not been defeated. In fact, mounting hostility toward the US will result in new forms of terrorism. Instead of confronting one Al-Qaeda, the Americans will find themselves having to deal with several different organizations using different tactics. Even though Washington might succeed in ruling Iraq directly, it will fail to control the region.
American involvement in Iraq would lead to its becoming caught up in other regional countries, since the Middle East is seen as the primary source of terror. America would thus find itself entangled in an immensely complex region, making it very difficult for it to extricate itself from a quagmire of its own making. Washington will pay a very heavy price for this involvement ­ like it did for similar involvements in the past.
All this has to be seen against a backdrop of increasing suffering by the Palestinian people at the hands of the Israelis. In the absence of any prospect for a political solution and of any sincere will for finding a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a new intervention in the region would only make a breakthrough more difficult to achieve.
By pursuing policies tailored to its own needs (war on Iraq), and not to those of the peoples of the region (the Palestine question), the US will guarantee the hostility of the peoples of the Middle East.
It is absurd to believe that the US can promote democracy through war. In fact, this argument is deeply flawed, both morally and logically. Peoples might go to war to achieve democracy, but you cannot wage war against them in order to impose it. Democracy cannot be imposed by dictatorial means that deprive people of their right to life. Waging war to depose a dictator only to replace him with a regime protected by the Central Intelligence Agency would make democracy part of American domination. Democracy has to spring from the people. It can be influenced by outside developments, but it cannot be imposed by force ­ especially by a power that is seen to be hostile.
For these reasons, the Arab region will be open to unforeseeable ­ and uncontrollable ­ developments, which beggars the question: wither the Arab world in 2003?

Muna Shuqair is a Jordanian political analyst.

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High-flying 'top guns' take a collateral toll
By Linda S. Heard, Gulf News, 21-01-2003
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The expression "flying high" takes on a whole new meaning when viewed in the light of the admission by the U.S. Air Force that its combat pilots regularly consume uppers and downers with its blessing. In fact, American bomber pilots are encouraged to take amphetamines, and upon return to base are sometimes offered tranquilizers to help them sleep.

This shocking announcement – apparently a longtime open secret in the military – came to the notice of the public during an investigation of two U.S. F16 pilots responsible for dropping a laser-guided, 500lb bomb on a Canadian unit in Afghanistan. Four Canadian servicemen lost their lives as a result.

Canada was outraged and demanded that the two American airmen face a military court. As part of the enquiry emerged the disturbing news that combat pilots in the U.S. military are encouraged by their own commanders to regularly pop amphetamine tablets. Once nicknamed "uppers" or "speed", amphetamines are now known as "go-pills" in the U.S. Air Force.

An Air Force surgeon, a guest on CNN's Q&A programme, had no hesitation in extolling the virtues of the innocuous sounding "go-pills" during combat missions. He explained that they often save the lives of exhausted pilots, and that fatigue kills. He also admitted that pilots are allowed to self-medicate and that reluctance by airmen to take such stimulants could mean that they would be excluded from a particular mission.

But do they increase the risk of "collateral damage" (a callous expression) at the hands of hyped up young men with their fingers on the button?

According to the makers of Dexedrine GlaxoSmithKline, they certainly do. It warns that the product may impair the patient's ability to engage in potentially hazardous activity such as operating machines and vehicles.

The common side effects of Dexedrine may include, nervousness, insomnia, hostility, and addiction as well as feelings of suspicion and paranoia. The worst is known as "amphetamine psychosis", which causes hallucinations and delusion.

One of the pilots under current investigation took 5mgs two hours before the mission, while the other popped 10mgs just one hour prior to take-off. Could the pilots have been hallucinating or paranoid when they believed that the Canadians were firing at them? The pilots sat through the first session of an official hearing last Thursday so, presumably, we will shortly find out.

But the taking of amphetamines isn't just limited to pilots in Afghanistan. The surgeon said that combat pilots in the U.S. military have been popping pills for the past 60 years. This, according to my reckoning, takes us way back to World War II.

It is common knowledge that the British issued stimulants to their pilots during the Second World War and, according to some reports may have offered sedatives to airmen during the conflict in the Falklands.

British back off

However, the British today take a very different view. The British Ministry of Defense said that the RAF does not give amphetamines to its pilots, while former pilot and assistant chief of defense staff Air Marshal Sir Tim Garden told The Guardian that the practice of taking amphetamines by the U.S. Air Force was "very odd".

The head honchos in the U.S. military don't agree. Although psycho-stimulants have been in common use in the military for six decades, it wasn't until 1960 that they were officially sanctioned. The first widespread, although undocumented, use probably occurred during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

During the Vietnam War, the drugs of choice for members of the U.S. military were opiates.

A 1971 study undertaken by Professor Lee N. Robins, PhD, showed that almost half of those serving had been using either opium or heroin. While military commanders did in no way sanction the practice, they obviously chose to turn a blind eye. Immediately following the Gulf War, U.S. pilots were given questionnaires in an attempt to quantify the use of Dexedrine.

Analysis showed that 65 per cent of pilots used amphetamines during combat. So, two-thirds of American bomber pilots routinely fly while under the influence of a potentially dangerous drug. A drug, which if ingested by a civilian pilot or even a driver would inevitably lead to a term of imprisonment.

Could these worrying statistics account for the fact that almost one quarter of American and allied fatalities during the Gulf War were caused by incidents of "friendly fire"? Surely those countries, which are contemplating joining hands with the U.S. in any upcoming campaign, should be concerned.

There were also reports of pilots becoming addicted to amphetamines subsequent to the Gulf War. A former White House Drug Czar Dr. Robert DuPont said that he was amazed to learn about such widespread use of Dexedrine in the U.S. Air Force, adding, "This is speed. This is where we got the phrase, speed kills."

Apart from "blue on blue" incidents, the war in Afghanistan witnessed a disproportionate loss of civilian lives at the hands of American bomber crews. Entire villages have been wiped from the face of the earth.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai – himself hurt by the explosion of a bomb dropped by a B-52 bomber – has officially complained on several occasions about the deaths of his own people cause by alleged American pilot error. Thus far, no U.S. pilots have been threatened with court martial and in many instances, the Pentagon has refused to admit liability.

However, when Canada complains about its losses, the Pentagon jumps to attention, launches an investigation and institutes legal proceedings against the errant pilots.

What does all this mean for this region where an American force of more than 250,000 is likely to be stationed in readiness for a probable war with Iraq?

There has also been a revelation that the use of "go-pills" is common among the members of other branches of the U.S. military too, which could translate into tens of thousands of "America's finest" wandering around the towns and cities of their host countries in a heightened and volatile state.

Perhaps more importantly what could this mean for the Iraqi people who still recall with enormous sadness Al-Amiriya bunker in Baghdad being struck by an American bomb which killed more than 300 civilians, mostly women and children?

This may have been due to faulty instructions from their command and control centre but even so, how can we be confident that crews "up high" in more ways than one won't mistake Iraqi civilian targets for military ones the next time around?

We will probably never know the truth about the convoy of Kosovo refugees, which came under fire by an American F16 pilot, even though an RAF colleague had warned him that it was a civilian convoy. The bombing of the Chinese Embassy during that conflict remains another perplexing mystery. Few bought the 'out-of-date-plans' explanation, least of all the Chinese.

Other incidents

We are also left to speculate on whether drugs contributed to the alleged rape by members of the U.S. military of a 12-year-old girl on Okinawa in 1995, a gang rape on the same Japanese island earlier this year, as well as the crushing of two schoolgirls in South Korea by a 50-tonne U.S. military vehicle.

The perpetrators may not have been using amphetamines, or suffering withdrawal symptoms from their use, but, then again, we cannot rule this out.

Ironically, the very country, which is leading the charge in the worldwide war against drugs, supports their use by members of its own military. Doesn't this erode the credibility and sincerity of America's narcotics agencies and pull away the carpet from any claim the U.S. may have to a moral high ground on the subject?

The philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr said: "We (Americans) have been so deluded by the concept of our innocence that we are ill prepared to deal with the temptations of power which now assail us."

We all know that power may corrupt, but power mixed with chemically induced false bravado is nothing short of a deadly and frightening cocktail.


The writer is a specialist writer on Middle East affairs.

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