Jan 16, 2003 Op Eds

Jan 16, 2003 Opinion Editorials http://www.aljazeerah.info

If the Arab summit held in Beirut last year attracted global headlines by launching a Middle East peace plan, the one taking place in March this year in Manama is likely to be remembered for an even more bold initiative.

It was in Beirut summit the Arab leaders declared, for the first time, their willingness to embrace Israel as a Mideast nation with full rights including normal diplomatic relations if the Jewish state relinquished control of all Arab territories it occupied in 1967. The plan was proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah.

It will be again the crown prince who will set the agenda for the Manama summit, this time with a plan for putting the Arab house in order.

The new initiative, titled “A Charter to Reform the Arab Condition,” seeks the regulation of inter-Arab ties and the Arab countries’ relations with the wider world outside.

What Crown Prince Abdullah has offered is more a bold vision than a concrete plan with a specified time frame. No society can improve its condition unless and until it realizes the malaise afflicting it. In that sense the crown prince’s initiative is an admission that things can’t go the way it has been for years. The initiative gives a new direction to the political and social life of Arabs.

Now in the hands of an Arab follow-up committee comprising a number of foreign ministers, the initiative rejects external aggression against any Arab state. More important, it urges self-reform in each country and greater political participation. Nobody will deny these are the two essential conditions for fully utilizing the enormous Arab potential leading to comprehensive developments in all sectors. Arab leaders would also pledge to deal objectively with international changes, notably globalization and the rise of mega economic blocs.

It calls on Arabs to forbid the use of force against each other and stand united against any Arab country attacking another.

Saudi Arabia wants the Arab leaders to adopt the initiative in the form of a declaration binding on all Arab states. Those refusing the new principles should not be accepted into the pan-Arab nation.

Arab leaders would pledge in the declaration to work to “safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Arab countries, upgrade their defense capabilities and decisively back the Palestinians.”

In this context, the initiative makes it clear that the Arab Middle East peace plan, endorsed by the Beirut summit in March last year, remains the minimum acceptable condition to establish normal relations with Israel.

The initiative contemplates a greater Arab free trade zone. Arabs are to work earnestly toward the full implementation of the zone by the end of 2005. This will be the forerunner of an Arab customs union to be established within 10 years.

Although the charter reiterates the well-known Arab position on Iraq, one will be missing the woods for the tree if one sees it in the context of the war cries emanating from Washington. In one sense, the Iraqi crisis can be viewed as the symptom of the disease affecting the Arab politic. One should also resist the temptation to see the initiative in the broader context of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the smear campaign in the US and West against certain Arab countries and Muslims in general.

For us in Saudi Arabia, there is another, a more important perspective, through which the whole exercise should be viewed. It is after all Crown Prince Abdullah who is the architect of this plan. Maybe, this is the vision he has for the future of his country.

Blair on the rack
Gulf News, 16-01-2003
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British Prime Minister Tony Blair is paying the penalty of being the head of a government with a parliamentary system and is having to handle growing unease within his own Labour Party on whether there should be a war in Iraq. This is in contrast to American President George Bush, who does not have to deal with doubters from within his own administration.

The debate in Britain is forcing Blair to justify going to war and to make clear any plans for involving the United Nations, which is actually supposed to have authority over any such action. Despite this, Blair speaks as though he is committed to fighting in Iraq and he appears to expect Iraq to fail the inspection by the UN weapons search team. He said this week that the UN does not have a veto on military action and he is well aware that Resolution 1441 only got the backing of Russia or France because it was clear that the U.S., backed by the UK, was going to go ahead with action with or without a UN resolution.

This is the same unilateralist thinking that Bush showed in his extraordinary speech to the UN, when he invited it to stop making itself irrelevant by simply backing U.S. intentions. However, what emerged was UN Resolution 1441 which asked the parties to come back the UN to get further approval, and this is what they must do in the next few months.

In addition, both Britain and the U.S. have said that they have knowledge of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. They should share this knowledge, in full, with the UN weapons inspectors so that their work is as effective as possible.

Beyond getting specific UN approval for any fighting, Blair and Bush should make a much more substantial effort to explain publicly exactly what weapons they know Iraq to have, and to make clear how much of a danger they think he is. This has still not been made clear, so it is all too possible that the war will start without UN approval, and without public backing. There is no doubt that the U.S. will win in the end, but the political fallout of such unsupported action will be a disaster in the longer term.

Israel's occupation of Arab land must end
By Yasser Abed Rabbo, Gulf News, 16-01-2003
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Israel's most recent excuse for why it cannot negotiate peace with the Palestinians is that the Palestinians have been unable to develop a fully democratic society while living under Israeli occupation. This excuse is better known as "reform."

And yet, when Palestinians are invited to go to London to further the reform process, the government of Israel prevents us from doing so.

Yes, Palestinians are expected to reform, but no, we're not supposed to succeed at it. The truth is that Israel's purported interest in reform is merely an attempt to divert the world's attention from the crux of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Israel's 35-year occupation of Palestinian territory and the denial of Palestinian freedom.

Never mind the occupation. Never mind the assassinations, the home demolitions, the continuing theft of Palestinian land and water resources and the "curfews" under which entire populations are held hostage in their homes by the threat of a bullet should they go in search of food or medicine.

Never mind the sadistic Israeli soldiers ordering civilians at gunpoint to strip naked or to beat their friends or to pick their fate from a "lottery" with tickets labelled "broken arm" or "broken leg." None of this is relevant to Middle East peace, goes the new Israeli narrative. All that's relevant is that the Palestinians reform their political institutions.

Reform is indeed needed and has been underway for some time. Reform is also popular among the Palestinian population - 85 per cent of Palestini-ans support fundamental political reform - and Palestinian support for it predates the sudden interest in the matter by Israel and the United States. Despite Israel's effort to use it as a diversion, reform is nevertheless good for the Palestinians. Remarkably, progress has been made.

Drafting of the Palestinian constitution has continued. The draft constitution would establish basic human rights and strive to achieve the delicate balance of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

In the area of financial accountability, the new Palestinian Finance Minister, Salam Fayyad, has earned the praise and trust of Palestinians, Europeans and even Israelis for his new transparent budgets and measures to ensure greater accountability for the use of public funds.

But there are limits to how much Palestinians can reform while living under Israeli occupation, and Israel has done its best to simultaneously make reform the issue du jour while systematically undermining Pal-estinian reform efforts.

A major Israeli obstacle to Palestinian reform is Israel's collective punishment policy of closures, checkpoints and curfews that restrict the movement of more than 3 million Palestinians under Israel's occupation. Visitors to the occupied Palestinian territories routinely witness elderly couples climbing over muddy hills to reach their homes or buy food.

Palestinians in need of medical assistance are prevented from reaching hospitals - to date 18 infants have died as a result of being born at home or at Israeli checkpoints, and 76 Palestini-ans have died from lack of medical access. Whether to go to the corner store for milk has for some Palestinians become a life-or-death decision.

Israel's closure policy also limits Palestinian reform efforts. An inability to travel prevents effective meetings of the elected members of the Palestinian Legislative Council - thwarting any meaningful democratic process with respect to debate and the adoption of reform laws or the annual budget. Palestinian elections, originally planned to be held this month, were postponed.

How does a candidate campaign for election if she cannot leave her home? How does a voter vote if the polling stations are behind Israeli tanks and trigger-happy occupation forces?

Another obstacle to Palestini-an reform is Israel's self-declared right to withhold tax revenue owed to the Palestini-ans - nearly $600 million. The withholding of Palestinian funds not only deprives the Palestinian National Authority of the critical financial resources needed to implement reform, it also destroys the Authority's ability to pay its civil servants. This ultimately leads to impoverishment and financial desperation - two factors that foster corruption.

Successful Palestinian reform needs Israeli cooperation. First, Israel must end its system of closures and curfews, illegal under international law. Second, Israel must finally transfer all Pal-estinian tax revenue to the Palestinian National Authority.

Many Palestinians are sceptical of reform, justifiably asking, "What good are democratic reforms while Palestinians have no freedom? What good are elections when Israel has demonstrated that it will not respect democratically elected leaders or even allow democratically elected parliaments to convene?" That is why, for reform to truly succeed, Pal-estinians must know they will eventually be free. Stated simply, Israel must end its occupation.

Yes, the Palestinian National Authority is committed to reform. But no, Palestinian reform won't bring peace to the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. The problem in the Middle East is, and has been for the past 35 years, Israel's occupation of Palestinian land. No Palestinian budget, no Palestinian law and no Palestinian constitution is going to change that fact.

The writer is the Palestinian National Authority's Minister of Culture and Information. He was to have headed the Palestinian delegation to the London talks.

Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service

Time to tap the deja vu in Korea, return to 1994
By Jimmy Carter, Gulf News, 16-01-2003
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There is an eerie case of deja vu in Korea. Nearly nine years ago, President Kim Il Sung expelled international inspectors and threatened to process plutonium from spent fuel at an old graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.

The Clinton administration had rejected negotiations with North Korea, was contemplating a military strike to destroy the nuclear facility and was seeking UN Security Council economic sanctions. The North Koreans announced that such sanctions would be considered an act of war. It was clear the United States and South Korean militaries could prevail, but there would be massive casualties from the formidable ground forces of North Korea.

As now, the isolated and economically troubled nation was focused on resolving basic differences with the United States. Deeply suspicious and perhaps paranoid, the North Koreans were demanding assurances against a nuclear attack and opportunities for normal bilateral relations.

At the invitation of Kim Il Sung, and with the approval of the White House, I went to Pyongyang and negotiated directly with the man known as the "Great Leader." He agreed to freeze the nuclear situation at Yongbyon and permit international inspectors to monitor the agreement.

In return, the United States was to pledge that nuclear weapons would not be used against North Korea and that two modern light-water reactors would be built to replace the Yongbyon facility. In the meantime, a monthly supply of fuel oil would help provide electrical power.

The subsequent death of Kim Il Sung, who was replaced by his son, Kim Jong Il, interfered with the more rapid timetable that we envisioned, but these nuclear proposals were accepted officially in the Agreed Framework, also involving South Korea and Japan.

Kim Il Sung wanted to discuss long-term issues, with the goal of achieving normal relations between the Koreas and with America. He agreed to an immediate summit meeting with South Korea's president to discuss cross-border visitation among Korean families and the implementation of general principles adopted in 1992 regarding reunification.

His suggestions for future talks with the United States included cooperation in recovering the remains of U.S. soldiers, a step-by-step reduction of Korean armed forces to 100,000 men on each side, with U.S. troops to be reduced in the same proportion, withdrawal of long-range artillery and other aggressive military forces from near the demilitarised zone, and mutual inspections to ensure the de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

Although the promised light-water reactors were not built, substantial progress was made between North Korea and the United States, illustrated by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's successful discussions in Pyongyang.

The Bush administration brought a change in relationship with both Koreas.

Rejection of the "sunshine policy," which had earned the Nobel Peace Prize for South Korean President Kim Dae-jung; announcements that North Korea, like Iraq and Iran, was part of an "axis of evil"; public statements that the new "Great Leader" was loathed as a "pygmy" who deliberately starved his own people, that America was prepared to fight two wars at the same time, and that our missile defence system was a shield against North Korea - all this helped cause many in that country to assume that they were next on America's hit list after Iraq.

With evidence that Pyongyang was acquiring enriched uranium, in direct violation of the Agreed Framework, President Bush announced that there would be no discussions with North Korea until after its complete rejection of a nuclear explosives program, and the monthly shipments of fuel oil were terminated.

Now, once again, international inspectors have been expelled, and the North Koreans have announced they will no longer be bound by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or an agreement to forgo testing of ballistic missiles. This is a serious threat to regional and world peace.

North Korea has offered inspectors from the United States access to its nuclear sites to confirm that they are not developing weapons, but only complete international monitoring can determine whether they have decided to develop a nuclear arsenal or are using threats as a ploy to promote bilateral agreements with the United States.

It is clear that the world community cannot permit the North Koreans to develop a nuclear arsenal. They must be convinced that they will be more secure without nuclear weapons, and that normal diplomatic and economic relations with the United States are possible.

The announced nuclear policies of North Korea and the American rejection of direct talks are both contrary to regional and global interests. Unfortunately, both sides must save face, even as the situation deteriorates dangerously.

To resolve this impasse, some forum - perhaps convened by Russia or China - must be found within which these troubling differences can be resolved. The principles of the Agreed Framework of 1994 can be reconfirmed, combined with North Korea's full and verifiable compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a firm U.S. declaration of nonaggression against North Korea, so long as all agreements are honoured.

Then perhaps the more far-reaching proposals discussed with Kim Il Sung can be implemented and a permanent peace can come to the reconciled Koreas.

Former president Carter is the latest winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service

Khatami’s next move after friend’s sentencing

By Ali Nourizadeh, The Daily Star, 1/16/03

Abbas Abdi (the spokesperson for the Iranian “Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam,” who stormed the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, thus precipitating the 444-day hostage crisis) was arrested last Nov. 4 while thousands of Basij and Revolutionary Guards were marching on the embassy to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the occupation of the “Nest of Spies” a term coined by Abdi and his comrades at the time.
Abdi’s arrest came as no surprise. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami had already informed supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his close allies of his affection for those he described as the pillars of the reform movement. Khatami said their harassment by any quarter would be an affront to the presidency and cause him to resign.
The president only learned of the arrest when Abdi’s wife told one of his aides that intelligence men from the judiciary branch had stormed their home in the small hours and taken away her husband and confiscated his private papers.
Khatami, who had only agreed to run for president in 1997 because of the insistence of such people as Abdi, Saeed Hajarian, Abdollah Nouri and Mohammad Musavi-Khoeiniha, was at that time working as director of the national library. There is no doubt that the five-hour meeting Hajarian, Abdi and Musavi-Khoeiniha had with Khatami in March 1997 (just a few days before the deadline for candidacies) was the main reason why he decided to re-enter politics after years of isolation. Khatami had resigned his last government post at the Culture Ministry in protest at Khamenei’s meddling in cultural and
media affairs.
It is no secret either that since the 1999 arrest of former Vice-President and Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri (followed by his conviction for religious dissent, imprisonment and subsequent pardon); the trial of Musavi-Khoeiniha, (spiritual father of the Muslim left in Iran and publisher of Salam, who was accused of divulging state secrets and slandering Khamenei in 1999 and banned from working as an editor or journalist for five years); and the March 2000 attempt on Hajarian’s life (which left him a cripple), Khatami has been unduly concerned for the welfare of his few remaining loyalists such as Abdi.
Abdi’s arrest transgressed the supposed red line respected for years by Khamenei and his partisans. Even Musavi-Khoeiniha’s jail term was changed to a suspended sentence. Whenever this red line was breached such as when Nouri was arrested and Hajarian shot Khatami responded decisively and thus succeeded in overturning these transgressions.
Khatami was expected to act even more decisively when Abdi was arrested, especially since he was accused of selling state secrets to the Americans, plotting against the regime, fostering relations with counter-revolutionary forces and slandering the supreme leader. After all, Abdi was one of his most trusted confidantes, as well as being the most popular Khatami supporter among students and the younger generation.
Yet many reformists were surprised at Khatami’s weak reaction. The president did nothing more than mildly rebuke the judiciary and pro-Khamenei newspapers (especially Kayhan) for “fabricating unrealistic accusations against honest people and trying to distort their image in the public’s mind.”
What made Khatami’s position even more mysterious was the fact that Abdi declared in court that he “apologizes for his mistakes, and will try not to repeat them in future.”
I asked one of Abdi’s friends in the Islamic Iran Participation Front about what was really taking place in Abdi’s trial, and about the reasons behind Khatami’s silence.
This is what Abdi’s friend said:
“Abbas Abdi opposed nominating Khatami for a second term in the last (June 2001) presidential election. He made his views known in an emotional meeting he held with the president. In that meeting, Abdi told Khatami the conservatives had mobilized all their big guns for this election, fielding nine candidates, including Defense Minister Ali Shamkh-ani. ‘What will happen is that you (Khatami) will defeat all the conservative generals decisively. The conservatives will barely win a fifth of the vote between them. This will lead the conservatives to use devices other than those of elections to get rid of you,’ Abdi told the president.
“‘They will also strive to make your second term as unruly as possible in order to destroy the Khatami myth and shake public confidence in the reformists. They will use diabolical schemes to isolate you (Khatami) from your supporters, destroy them, and finally turn on you.’
“‘This being the case, you have only two options. You either confront them or surrender. If you choose the first path, you will have to pay a very heavy price, and there is even the possibility that you might be assassinated. If, however, you choose the second, the price to pay will be less: you will lose the support of the people without gaining real power.’”
Except for Abdi, all Khatami’s men encouraged the president to run for a second term. As Abdi predicted, Khatami won in a landslide. But the taste of victory soon turned sour when he came to form his second Cabinet. He was forced to make many changes because Khamenei objected to a number of his nominations.
Needless to say, one by one, Abdi’s predictions started to come true. The conservatives launched vicious campaigns against the press, students, pro-Khatami religious activists and reformists. They obstructed Parliament by rejecting its decisions through the Constitutional Council.
Last September, Abdi called on Khatami to make his position clear: “Either lay down conditions for remaining in office, or else step down holding your head high.” Abdi stressed the anti-reform forces’ belief that the United States needed Iran in its war on Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and would consequently turn a blind eye to what happened on Iran’s home front. Therefore, the conservatives would never allow Parliament to ratify the two bills (for election reform and presidential authorities) proposed by Khatami.
“They will arrest your followers,” Abdi told the president, “and tighten their grip on you personally, so that you would be forced to either resign in defeat or surrender.”
Khatami took Abdi’s warnings seriously. But, before he could make his final decision, Abdi was arrested. Khatami is now waiting for the judiciary to sentence him.
What Abdi said in court, however, was just what Khatami wanted him to say. The president hopes his friend will only get a symbolic sentence, and not be condemned for treason.
Only then will we know whether Khatami will pack his bags and go home, surrender and remain in office, or resist.

Ali Nourizadeh, one-time political editor of the Tehran daily Ettelaat, is an Iranian researcher at the London-based Center for Arab-Iranian Studies and the editor of its Arabic-language newsletter Al-Mujes an-Iran.

Syrian diplomacy stalls as Assad calls off Tehran visit

An Arab press review, By The Daily Star, 1/16/03

Unaware that President Bashar Assad was intending to call off a planned visit to Iran at the last minute, the Arab press highlights Syria’s role in the regional melee of Iraq-related diplomacy as Vice-President Abdulhalim Khaddam holds talks in Russia, following Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa’s bridge-building trip to Turkey.
While newspapers concur that the question of Iraq tops the Syrian agenda, the Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat leads with a report that Damascus may be poised to conclude important nuclear power and arms deals with Moscow.
The paper reports that an “agreement in principle” to negotiate the supply of a Russian-built nuclear power station and a reactor-powered desalination plant to Syria was unveiled just hours before Khaddam’s arrival in Moscow.
The Syrian vice-president is also due to discuss “military cooperation and the possible sale of anti-aircraft and anti-armor weapons” with his Russian hosts. These might include C-300 missile systems, which the Russians had earlier refused to sell Syria because of US objections that their radars would make Israeli air space “vulnerable.” Al-Hayat quotes the head of the Russian Duma’s defense committee, General Nikolai Bezborodov, as saying Syria has bought $800 million worth of Russian weaponry over the past five years, and “negotiated” the purchase of anti-tank and other arms worth a further $2 billion.
Khaddam will also be discussing Damascus’s accumulated debts to Moscow, which according to a Russian economist Syria is offering to repay in the form of commodities, raw materials and investments, while Russia “insists” that a proportion be settled in hard currency. The two sides have, however, agreed to “separate the debt issue from the development of their relations, especially in the military domain.”
But Al-Hayat says the main focus of Khaddam’s talks with President Vladimir Putin and Russian officials will be Iraq. It quotes a Moscow-based Arab diplomat as saying Russia “might support joint Arab efforts to resolve the Iraq crisis.”
President Assad’s now-aborted visit to Tehran for consultations with the top Iranian leadership had been billed by the Beirut daily As-Safir as part of Syria’s endeavors to prevent an American war on Iraq, complementing Khaddam’s efforts in Moscow and Sharaa’s in Ankara.
The Iranian Arabic-language daily Al-Vefagh had used the planned visit, which was stopped in extremis, to stress that Tehran has become the focal point of “intensive diplomatic moves to exchange views between the countries of the region and the world in order to resolve the Iraq crisis peacefully and prevent the outbreak of war in the region.”
It notes that among the Iranian capital’s visitors in the past fortnight have been the prime minister of Turkey and acting premier of Kuwait, various European, Arab and Asian envoys, the leaders of Iraq’s two rival Kurdish parties and the head of the opposition Iraqi National Congress.
Al-Vefagh adds that a planned visit by Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri whose reported “cancellation” the paper had earlier portrayed as a sign of growing hostility in Tehran to the current regime in Baghdad has been “decided” but “no date has yet been set” for it.
In Damascus, the Syrian government daily Tishrin stresses the importance of mobilizing Arab, regional and international opposition to a war on Iraq. “The American military buildup against Iraq forebodes only evils and calamities for the region,” the paper warns, and a war, “which could begin at any moment,” would have unpredictable consequences that could be extremely grave “not only for Iraq and the region but for world peace.”
The paper goes on to argue that the Arab states can “do much to reverse the direction in which developments are moving,” provided they close ranks and support each other. The notion that the Arabs share a “common destiny” is “not a theory but a firm fact confirmed by current developments,” it remarks.
Tishrin also stresses the importance attached by Syria to consultations with Iran, Turkey, Russia and the various European countries about regional affairs, in its efforts both to counter Israel’s “racist expansionism,” and to “work unrelentingly to prevent American military action against Iraq.”
As-Safir columnist Mustafa Husseini takes a skeptical view of the current flurry of regional diplomacy billed as being aimed at avoiding war.
He writes that much of what is going on around Iraq appears to defy rational analysis, including the repeatedly changing position of the US, which is now massing forces for an Iraq invasion while declaring that it will give the arms inspectors time to complete their job.
Equally perplexing is the attitude of Hans Blix, who sometimes appears to be “honestly” doing an impartial job, and at others to be “colluding” in Washington’s war plans, or feigning “naivety” about them.
London too blows hot and cold, at times appearing as though it were trying to restrain the US and at others behaving even more belligerently, such as vowing that Britain and America won’t let the UN prevent them from going to war if they choose, Husseini writes.
Baghdad, in turn, while appearing to be acquiescing to the harsh new arms inspections regime, “looks as though it is considering other ideas,” Husseini says. It has been complaining increasingly loudly that the inspectors have overstepped their mandate, and accusing them of spying. And it has been playing up talk of “preparations to resist the invasion.”
“It’s as though Baghdad has been encouraged by what is happening in the comparable and concurrent crisis between the US and North Korea, and concluded from it that the best way of turning the crisis to its advantage is via ‘confrontation’ rather than ‘submission,’” Husseini says.
As for the “regional powers” Turkey, Iran and some Arab states “they look as though they were alerted by developments in the Korean crisis to the possibility of injecting a regional element into the Iraq crisis, while some countries in the region perform the function of springboards and operations centers for the pending invasion,” he writes.
The moves of all concerned are probably best explained in terms of “ulterior motives and undeclared and unseen long-term objectives,” Husseini suggests.
Saudi Arabia’s opposition to war on Iraq is emphasized by Al-Hayat’s Saudi columnist Daoud al-Shiryan, after Riyadh unveiled ill-defined plans to propose a major pan-Arab “initiative” aimed at preventing war and promoting reform in the Arab world.
Shiryan writes that the Saudi proposal for “reforming the Arab order” was given conflicting interpretations. “Some said it was a response to American pressure, because it called for political participation to be expanded within the Arab states as one of the most important conditions for overall progress,” he observes. And others saw it as a “means of building an Arab front to oppose war on Iraq in order to ease the pressure on Saudi Arabia over this issue.”
He explains that what has been reported in the press about the Saudi document relates to its attempt to forge a unified Arab position on four key issues: the Arab-Israeli peace plan; war on Iraq; domestic reforms and the development of political participation; and enhancing economic cooperation between the Arab states.
Shiryan says this does not imply any change in the Saudi position on Iraq. It simply reformulates and reaffirms Riyadh’s opposition to war. This has been its view “since day one” and remains so, but it has sometimes been misrepresented in the media. “That is why the Saudi document was interpreted as a Saudi attempt to rally collective opposition to war so as to spare Riyadh embarrassment. The reality is that the document is a bid to unite the Arabs around the Saudi position, which believes war is not the solution and questions the legitimacy of any prospective war on Iraq,” he writes.
Sarkis Naoum, of the Beirut daily An-Nahar, argues that there are many reasons why Saudi Arabia might prefer to see the current Iraqi regime remain in power in its weakened condition, rather than overthrown by US military force.
For one thing, the advent of a more “reasonable, acceptable and attractive” regime in Baghdad might focus the public’s attention in every other Arab and Gulf country on its “internal problems” and fuel uncontrollable demands for change, he writes.
Nor would the domestic situation in Saudi Arabia “remain as calm and stable as usual,” he says. The “many differences” between the twin pillars of the regime, the royal family and the Salafi (Wahhabi) religious establishment, were containable and reconcilable in the past. But since Sept. 11, 2001, America’s decision to wage “military and intelligence war” against Islamist fundamentalism has set the Saudi Wahhabis on a collision course with America for the first time. And they could “in the not distant future” be headed for a clash with the royal family itself, which is under US pressure to crack down on the Salafi current sympathetic to the likes of Osama bin Laden, as well as to allow US warplanes to use Saudi territory to attack “Muslim Iraq.”
If Riyadh were to “introduce certain internal changes with repercussions on the social and religious structure,” that would also upset tribal balances, which remain crucial in Saudi society, Naoum warns. And it could in addition fuel differences within the royal family, which might exacerbate all the country’s other problems and lead to instability.
Naoum writes that US administration insiders who support maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia argue that the kingdom should not feel “terrorized” by the prospect of regime change in Iraq, but acknowledge that its concerns about the matter are not unwarranted. They state that with a pro-American government in Baghdad, Saudi Arabia could gradually lose importance to Washington as the latter turns increasingly to Iraq for both oil and military bases.
Moreover, if the US were to succeed in establishing a democratic regime in Iraq, it could become a “model” whose application dissidents in other Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, might demand at home.
Naoum’s American sources add that if democracy were to take hold in their country, the Iraqis who while religious, are less extreme and more open to the outside world than the Saudis could nurture “Islamic reform movements” that could spread to the rest of the Muslim world, or at least the Arab countries. Given that both the Sunni and Shiite traditions have many adherents in Iraq, a “reformist democratic Islamic Iraq” could thus pose a “threat” both to Saudi Arabia and Iran, they reason.
Accordingly, “Saudi Arabia has to deal with the unfolding situation intelligently and wisely to avoid its negative repercussions,” Naoum says.
Abdelbari Atwan, publisher and editor of pan-Arab Al-Quds al-Arabi, suspects that Iraq-related considerations prompted the Arab invitees (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Egypt) to dutifully show up at the London conference on reform of the Palestinian Authority, even though Israel prevented the PA’s own delegates from going.
Atwan suggests the gathering was an exercise in tokenism by the British government, and objects to the way it “reduced” the Palestine question to the single issue of “reforming” the PA while requiring the Palestinians to abandon the bulk of their rights and settle for the promise of a “mini-state tailored to Israeli specifications.”
He says the conference was called in order to “fill the vacuum” in the region after the Israeli government foiled successive peace plans, including Mitchell, Tenet and the “road map” of the “Quartet.”
“Tony Blair’s government wanted to send a false message to the Arab street, saying: we haven’t forgotten the main issue and we’re trying to find a solution for it but you Arabs must allow us to occupy Iraq, kill hundreds of thousands of its people, and seize its oil, and after that we’ll resolve the Palestine question,” he writes.
“One is at a loss to understand how Tony Blair intends to persuade the Arabs and Palestinians of his good intentions towards them when he’s sending aircraft carriers to attack Iraq,” he says. And how can he be expected to convince Israel to sue for peace when he failed to even obtain its permission for the PA delegates to attend the London gathering?
Sharon’s snub was a “public insult” to Blair, all the more humiliating because the Bush administration did not intervene in his favor, despite the “many services” he has rendered it in the Middle East, whether in the “war on terror” or the planned invasion of Iraq, Atwan says.

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