Jan 14, 2003 Op Eds

Jan 14, 2003 Opinion Editorials http://www.aljazeerah.info

Politics in Israel these days is a fierce battle between the generals of terrorism and the falcons of extremist policies which drives us to believe that a change in the governing structure of the Jewish state is at hand.

The need for change has become more pressing in light of the recession afflicting the Israeli economy. There is a rise in unemployment which in turn is spreading deviance among the working force and young people inside Israel.

The downturn in Israel began with the explosive Aqsa intifada more than two years ago — triggered by the butcher Ariel Sharon who later became the elected prime minister.

It is certain that the continuation of the intifada has pushed Sharon into excessive monstrosity. To squash the uprising he is using the army with the result that Israeli society is suffering economically and psychologically.

This is a reality and not an assumption. There are enough warning signals.

On the economic front, the Yedihot Ahronot newspaper says: The deteriorating situation has hit the Israeli tourism and leisure sector. A number of hotels and restaurants and cafes are deserted and an Israeli study has revealed that in the last two years one thousand cafes and restaurants have been closed due to the Palestinian suicide bombings.

According to the president of the Union of Israeli Chambers of Commerce Glizman, the Israeli economy will need a number of years to get back into shape and all this is due to the wrong policies of the government.

The number of tourists has dropped by 50 percent which has led to the closure of 25 hotels while 28,000 workers in the tourist sector have lost their jobs.

Under the heading “Israeli society is prisoner of fear”, the newspaper “Haaretz” described the effect that the intifada has had on Israel: It is possible to describe it as a balance of fears. On the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians do not go out on the streets for fear of being hit by tanks, a shell or rocket being launched by an Israeli warplane. Israelis are afraid of going out on the streets for fear of another suicide mission that may be attempted by a Palestinian.

The result of this fear and unemployment is that drugs, especially Ecstasy, have become the recourse of a great number of young people, conscripts and the unemployed. This is an attempt to escape the reality and pressures of the current state of insecurity. This drug brings momentary happiness but drives the addict to crime and violence.

Lately a new type of addiction has spread in Israel — addiction to laughing gas. Not an event or party goes by without the use of this gas that destroys the cells of the nervous system. Dr. Hayeem Sernat, dean of the dental school at Tel Aviv University, says the use of this gas paralyzes the body.

The soldiers of the Israeli Army are no different from civilians.

They too have fallen victim to this type of addiction. There is growing demand for drugs in general due to the soldiers’ unstable and insecure military situation.

Dr. Galser, president of the rehabilitation unit in the Israeli Health Ministry, says: The demand for alcohol has risen in Israel, especially after the start of Palestinian resistance operations. There has also been an increase in the number of Israelis visiting psychiatric clinics in the last two years.

Thus we find that the policies of Sharon have done great harm to Israeli society aside from the fact that he has not fulfilled any of the promises he made in his election campaign: That he will bring peace and security for Israelis and break the will of the Palestinians.

Now Sharon and his sons are involved in a corruption scandal. The case is currently under investigation. The police are investigating another scandal involving Sharon.

Now it is widely expected that this is the beginning of the political end of Ariel Sharon. It seems that the Israeli political strategists are convinced of the need for a change in government.

Does Sharon’s departure mean that the peace process will be back on course? No. Whoever takes Sharon’s place will not be any better than him. Everyone is committed to the same ideas, principles and aims.

US Schlieffen plan
Arab News, 14 January 2003

The twentieth century, which was to prove the bloodiest in history, began with a timetable. The Schlieffen plan called for the mustering of one and a half million German troops on the Belgian and French frontiers. This vast deployment in 1914 at the start of World War I, was made possible by precise railway timetabling. When, in the hours before this most pointless of wars actually began, the German Kaiser had second thoughts, he was told it was too late to stop the vast synchronized movement of men and materiel. In the next four years, 10 million people were to die, 20 million wounded and the seeds sown for further conflict which would cost many millions more dead.

Is the United States operating its own Schlieffen plan at the start of the 21st century ? The military build-up against Iraq continues steadily but the reasons for a war do not. Everything depends upon the findings of the UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq. Now a senior official at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with whom the UNMOVIC inspectors are working, has said that neither his organization nor UNMOVIC believes that comprehensive inspections will be completed within a year.

If this is true, it seems unthinkable that the United States and its unquestioning British ally will be prepared to keep a large attack force in the region for such a period, let alone maintain that force at a level of preparedness which will enable it to act at a moment’s notice. On top of this, US diplomats would need to make prodigious efforts to maintain the reluctant acquiescence of other countries, which have been persuaded to support an Iraq attack in certain circumstances. Even if Washington had agreed unequivocally that no conflict would begin without the express approval of the United Nations, it is hard to see how the current military build-up could be sustained for a full year.

As ever, we come back to the half-hearted US support for the weapons inspectors. Having insisted that they be allowed to return to Iraq with a tougher and far wider-ranging mandate than before, now they are back on those terms, Washington appears to see them as an obstacle to its real plan. It seems highly probable that the Bush White House was calculating on an outright Iraqi refusal to accept UNMOVIC’s return. When Saddam gave in, the Americans lost their first excuse to attack.

Then the US administration grumbled over the details in the Iraqi weapons declaration made under Resolution 1441. UNMOVIC was not happy either, but decided that it was a document from which it could work and so continued with its inspection program. Now the Washington line is that UNMOVIC is never going to find anything and unless Saddam stops playing games and voluntarily hands over the weaponry which the US insists that he has, the attack goes in. An added refinement to this aggressive bullhorn diplomacy is the often repeated statement that Washington wants anyway to see an end to Saddam. Yet if Saddam does indeed have any weapons of mass destruction, these are his last protection from political oblivion or worse. Even now prosecutors in The Hague are probably preparing the evidence against him and his henchmen. If Saddam surrenders his supposed weaponry, he is also surrendering his regime.

His only possible avenue of escape is to keep the UNMOVIC teams at work. While that is happening, US aggression may falter and world opinion against war harden.

All this however may be valueless if the US is embarked upon its own carefully choreographed Schlieffen-style plan of attack, which may soon become too far advanced to stop.

Trembling before the gods of war
By Laurie King-Irani

Arab News, 1/14/03

President George W. Bush, like the vast majority of the American public, knows war primarily through the cinematic lens.

"Rambo," "Delta Force," and a host of other movies oozing self-righteous machismo present war as a football match pitting good guys against bad. The daily misery of war as lived experience does not make the final editing cut in Hollywood.

On screen, the decisive battle comes and goes in a flash, the hero emerges triumphant, no innocents are scarred or damaged, and everyone goes home happy and proud. This is war as fought and won by gods, which most Americans, especially our leaders, consider themselves to be, particularly after the collapse of the USSR. Since 1991, we have been the main attraction: The Superpower, The Sole Leader of the World, The Strongest People on the Planet. What we say, goes.

After living in the Middle East for most of the last six years, I am continually taken aback by this characteristically American hubris. Sadly, even those earnest war protesters waving placards and shouting slogans before the White House seem supremely self-confident to my eyes, eyes that have seen war. I envy the protesters' easy assumption that the values, beliefs, and principles that they hold dear can possibly halt the gears of war--and war's commerce--already set in motion, now virtually unstoppable.

Two years ago, while living in Lebanon, I had my first taste of war. It is a metallic taste, a bitter taste of repressed sorrow, rage, and fear that can neither be swallowed nor vomited. These corrosive emotions stick in your throat day after endless day. And I only saw 16 days of war: the Israeli assault on Lebanon code-named "Grapes of Wrath." That was enough time for me to learn how war disrupts your digestion, your schedule, and your relationships. Tempers flare, sleep evaporates, and concentration disintegrates.

War also upsets your assumptions and expectations. I learned what it meant to be powerless, at the mercy of the merciless. I saw that innocents could be slaughtered with impunity while the outside world yawned with indifference. I learned how cheap was the life of anyone within range of the Israeli Air Force, whose jets, like maddened hornets, shrieked and whined angrily over our heads threatening death and destruction every moment of every day. My brief experience of war left me awed by the strength of people in Lebanon, who had survived 16 years of unrelenting terror, helplessness, and chaos with their sense of humor and joie de vivre intact.

When I first moved to Lebanon in 1993, I mistakenly assumed I wouldn't be seeing any military action. Feeling safely distant from the war that had destroyed Beirut, but curious about how it started, I often talked with a friend about how she had experienced the Lebanese war as a child. Hanady, a journalist and the daughter of a respected Beiruti newspaper editor, was only seven years old when the war began. At its end, she was 24, but looked older.

"Was there a moment when you knew, as a small child, that the war had begun?" I asked her one evening as we watched the sun set over the Mediterranean. "Yes," she answered quietly, with a pensive look in her green eyes. I expected a dramatic tale to pour forth: soldiers fighting in the streets, tanks at her window, bombs falling in her garden.

But instead, Hanady said "I knew that something awful was happening when I came home one afternoon and found my father standing in the middle of the street talking to some men, and he was wearing his bathrobe and bedroom slippers." This small disruption of normality--her fashionable father allowing himself to be seen in terrycloth on Hamra Street--initiated her awareness of war. Hearing this, I had to stifle a laugh. It seemed so surreal.

My most enduring memory of "Grapes of Wrath" is not the day I sat typing at my computer in West Beirut, and wondered why my teeth and feet were vibrating, only to find myself suddenly shouting as the earth-splitting rumble of an explosion a mile and a half away shook my body.

Nor was it the knowing look in the eyes of my Palestinian colleague as she lit a cigarette with trembling hands and said, with a bitter smile that informed me I was now an initiate into the mysteries of modern warfare, "Shayfee...mitl al-infijaar byitla' min batnik, mush haik?" ("You see? It's like the explosion is coming from within your stomach, isn't it?").

It wasn't scene after scene of carnage on the evening news: decapitated schoolgirls, crushed babies, burnt refugees, and wailing mothers. Nor was it the maggots which started to turn up in our fruits and vegetables, the natural result of a dramatic increase in Lebanon's fly population due to the many carcasses of sheep, goats, horses, donkeys, and even people, which lay rotting in the fertile fields of south Lebanon.

It wasn't even my father's voice over the telephone, shaking with fear and rage as he begged my husband and me to come back to America, because he had just seen footage on CNN of the massacre at the UNIFIL base in Qana: "Sweet Jesus! There are burnt babies in the arms of dead mothers! The Israelis have gone insane; they might throw everything they have at you, maybe even their nukes! Please come home now!"

And it wasn't the Israeli mirage Jet which suddenly streaked past my kitchen window, with a violent roar like a bullet tearing through steel, so close I could see the pilot as I dove onto the floor and screamed. And later cried, as I realized that the jet had been on its way to bomb people into smithereens in Baalbek, and there was nothing I could possibly do to stop this or any of the other daily murders.

No, my most vivid memory of the short war I witnessed in Lebanon is as surreal as Hanady's memory of the earlier, much longer, war. There was a song that was popular on the radio that April, a haunting song by Joan Osborne entitled "What if God was One of Us?". It first caught my attention the day my husband and I were trapped in a massive traffic jam as everyone tried to escape Beirut after the first Israeli air assault on the city in fourteen years.

It was a hot day for early April, and the song wafted from one car radio to the next through countless open windows, like the sardonic background music of our predicament, a mocking indictment of how very un-godlike we all were at that moment, scurrying like cockroaches fearful of being crushed by a large foot coming down from the sky.

Three days later, we opened the windows at my office because of the unusually warm weather, even though we knew that the roar of the circling Israeli jets would only be that much more aggravating. As we did so, a student in a nearby dorm room blasted music out of her window, filling the eerily empty streets with that theme song again: "If God had a face/what would it look like? And would you want to see/ If seeing meant/that you would have to believe?"

And it occurred to me that the problem was that some of us did indeed think that God was one of us, or, more precisely, that some of us were gods: God's Chosen People were smashing the Party of God in a very godless manner.

Today I played my Joan Osborne tape and listened to that song again. As music so mysteriously does, it brought back memories and feelings with surprising intensity. I began to tremble and cry as the lyrics asked their plaintive question about our likeness to God, or lack thereof. I cried not from sorrow, but because I am helpless before what may be coming, not only in Iraq, but also throughout the entire Middle East. I trembled because so many people may die while George and Saddam play God with others' lives, and because it seems that none of us can stop it: The gods of war have decided.

Laurie originally wrote this piece in 1998. With her permission we substituted the words George W. Bush for Bill Clinton and could see no signs that it was written over four years ago. This article was originally published in the National Catholic Reporter.

Dreams or nightmares
By Wahib Binzagr CBE

Arab News, 1/13/02

In an interview published in the Financial Times a few days ago, the European Union Minister of Foreign Affairs stated his fears that the White House was under the religious influence of those who view people who do not agree with them as enemies. It may not be a coincidence for the top US trade official in WTO to say on 10th January that he was ready to launch a WTO challenge against the European Union over its refusal to lift the moratorium on the approval of new genetically modified crops. He considers it such a total violation of the WTO that it requires them to bring a case. This comes after years of indecision during which two previous US administrations weighed the options and favored diplomacy to resolve it.

The Financial Times of last Saturday considered the challenge to the European restrictions on genetically modified products to be among the most contentious issues yet to confront the WTO’s dispute settlement process.

This might be so. The US, for whatever reason, now looks likely to fight it all the way. The opposition to GM is not restricted to Europe but extends to Africa and Asia. Apparently both the US and the European Union are fighting and each believe the other is wrong. Somehow the US seems to be losing the support of certain African countries who have rejected US food and shipments containing GM. Mr. Zoellkk went on record to charge that some European countries had pressed Africa to reject US aid. The European Union also believes that many developing countries have been pressured by US officials to accept GM food. Apparently a few might have cooperated but most resented the rough handling and ignored the pressure. All this is detrimental to international trade and adds to the confusion in developing countries.

The European commission claims that it favors the removal of the moratorium on GM which has been in force for over four years. However, it is maintained in response to consumer and pressure groups. The EU commission states that it developed a new system for tracing and labeling GM foods but the US team totally rejected it.

The two “wise leaders” better grow up and settle their differences outside the organization. WTO cannot get on with the issues to liberate trade when war between “them” is the order of the day. The Financial Times reports that unless the Europeans take concrete steps to end the moratorium on GM, a decision by the full US cabinet is likely this month. This will undoubtedly muddy the issues even more, but it will not achieve much. Just for the record, the US won a similar case in 1997 but the EU has so far failed to implement the ruling.

No doubt about it. The two big brothers are playing cat and mouse. Each one is blaming the other without really caring for the outcome. Could this be intentional to stall the Doha negotiations? For certain it will be a long drawn battle but without reference to world trade issues. Whoever wins might not be able to enforce the decision. WTO today has “two cooks” that definitely intend to spoil the broth for good!

Between history and expectations: Israel continues to destroy and Iraq continues to distract

By Octavius Pinkard

Jordan Times, 1/14/03

WHILE ISRAEL continues to destroy and Iraq continues to distract, nothing substantive is being done to ensure the creation of a Palestinian state. Perhaps this is all part of a script drafted by the Bush administration to delay what the international community views as both inevitable and long overdue. It is quite possible that the administration — and, to be sure, Israel — is thinking of the future in the past tense, and considers it a foregone conclusion that there will be no independent state for the Palestinians.

As injurious to peace as it is devoid of reason, such an approach demonstrates, yet again, an unwillingness on the part of this administration to grant any serious consideration to Palestinian concerns.

In June 2002, President George W. Bush unveiled his long-awaited but nonetheless short-sighted vision of a Middle East peace. Six months later, Ariel Sharon offered a strikingly similar and equally sophomoric plan. Most are still wondering what it means for a state to be “provisional”. A state lacking clearly defined borders and the ability to control those borders and the resources within it is simply not a state. Both Bush and Sharon know that. Apparently, though, for both men, provisional becomes permanent only when Yasser Arafat becomes irrelevant.

This is not an acceptable policy; even more, it is wholly inconsistent with the realities of the Palestinian dilemma. At present, Arafat matters far more than he did at Oslo, far more than he did at Wye, and far more than he ever did at Camp David. If democracy is as democracy does, then Bush should recognise that Arafat is the spokesperson and representative of the Palestinian people, and it is with this man that he must deal.

Having met with Ariel Sharon on several occasions, Bush has yet to meet with Arafat, choosing instead to make use of intermediaries and tacit diplomacy to communicate with him. It is unacceptable that the president of the United States should refuse to have an audience with an individual so indispensable to any attempted realisation of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Even Bill Clinton, whose foreign policy was more reactionary than forward looking, had the wherewithal to meet with all of the involved parties.

Arafat will not be around as long as he has been around — neither will Sharon, for that matter — and it would be in the best interest of the United States to work with him to bring about the kind of change desired within the Palestinian National Authority. It is imperative that the US work with Arafat now on developing a framework for political reform and independent governance.

As the rest of the world can discern, Arafat is much more willing to cooperate than the US is willing to assist. What kind of signal does this send to the PNA and to a Palestinian population scattered across the region? It affirms that the US stands not by their side, but in their way. It confirms for some — whether rightly or wrongly — that US policy has become inextricably mixed with Israeli demands.

The suicide bombings witnessed in recent days are reprehensible and run counter to what Arafat and the Palestinians hope to achieve. To imply that these acts either originate within the PNA or can be controlled by it is no less inane than incredulous. Arafat exercises no control over the militant groups responsible for these atrocities, and to condition any future negotiations with Arafat on his ability to stop these groups is grounded in naivetب. Of course, this is a fact of which Sharon and his foreign minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, are well aware, but to pretend otherwise provides them with a convenient justification for further marginalising Arafat. For some odd reason, but certainly not surprisingly, the US seems to buy into Israeli logic. This does not bode well for future negotiations or any attempted multinational mediation of the conflict.

In addressing the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the Bush administration has conveniently learned the grammar of silence. Without question, the spread of settlements and the infrastructure to support them makes it ever more difficult for a viable Palestinian state to be created. Sharon knows this, which is why these activities are not being halted. As well, settlement activity is a widely recognised guise on the part of Israel to justify an armed presence within the occupied areas, further enabling Israel to infringe upon the basic rights of the Palestinian people.

While the president has had quite a bit to say about the need for economic and political reforms by the PNA, he has been noticeably quiet on whether, how and when Israel should begin dismantling the settlements that currently exist. Of course, as the recent past has shown us in the relationship between Bush and Sharon, things left unsaid are usually things left undone. For the Palestinians, this must be painfully disconcerting.

What the international community would like to see is a transformation such that Palestinian interests may shift from independence to prosperity, and the Israeli focus from security to peaceful coexistence with its Arab neighbours. A peace is attainable, but unfortunately the Bush administration is making the possible less probable by undermining Arafat's ability to lead those who fall under his mandate. Moreover, the US also signals to Israel, intentionally or not, that Washington condones its indiscriminate use of force.

In December, the US vetoed a UN resolution that condemned Israel for its continued and reckless use of force in the occupied territories. That resolution, brought about as a result of Israel's destruction of a UN World Food Programme warehouse, was supported even by Britain, ever quick to follow the US lead on matters relevant to the region. The US has yet to offer a public denouncement of Israeli actions, but such a rebuke is no more expected than the lack of one is surprising. Again, the grammar of silence.

One cannot help but wonder if Bush has read a history of the Middle East or, more appropriately, if the right advisers are reading it to him. What the US wants is not necessarily consistent with what the region needs, particularly given Washington's penchant for focusing predominantly on oil interests and Israeli appeasement, while paying only lip service to the needs and plight of the Palestinians. And while it might be advisable for the Bush administration to simply promise less and deliver more, for the Palestinians it is a sad truth that Bush has promised little and delivered nothing.

Continuing in the same vein will do little to stem the tide of Palestinian suffering and Israeli insecurity. As a first step, the Bush administration should consult the recommendations offered by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in July 2002. Far more realistic than Bush's pedestrian treatment of the conflict, the proposals are by far the most comprehensive and workable of any put forth in over a decade. The administration's defence and foreign policy team would do well to read it.

The writer is a PhD candidate in the Graduate Programmes in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia (US), and teaches comparative politics and international relations at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. His research focuses on economic and political development in the Middle East and North Africa.

Preventing war in the Gulf: an exercise in diplomatic futility?

An Arab press review, By The Daily Star, 1/14/03

While Washington may be playing up the threat of war on Iraq despite the inconclusive findings of UN arms inspectors, Arab newspapers track a flurry of regional diplomacy ostensibly aimed at preventing US military action. With Turkish Premier Abdullah Gul reportedly having sounded out Arab leaders, during his tour of Arab capitals, about a proposed initiative to resolve the Iraq-US standoff peacefully, the optimistic forecast offered by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah over the weekend attracts much media attention.
Arab newspapers headline Abdullah’s remark that he has a “strong feeling that there won’t be a war” despite the ongoing US military buildup in the Gulf in seeming preparation for hostilities and his appeal that “if the United Nations, God forbid, takes the decision to declare war,” the Arab states be “given a chance to talk with Iraq about a solution capable of preventing” armed conflict.
Some papers link the crown prince’s comments to the “ideas” Gul has been discussing on his travels, and which Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak earlier indicated he would be prepared to support if they were passed on to the Iraqi leadership, provided they were also acceptable to the Americans. It is noted, meanwhile, that Turkish Minister of State Kursat Tuzmen has been in Baghdad, from where he announced he was taking home with him an “important verbal message” from President Saddam Hussein.
The Saudis are also reported to be promoting a broader initiative, apparently only indirectly related to the Iraq situation, aimed at enabling the Arab world to confront “the external and internal challenges and threats” it faces and act more effectively on the world stage.
Following several days of speculation about the subject, the leading Saudi pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat says that Riyadh is formally proposing that all the Arab governments subscribe to a new “charter” under which they would commit themselves to a range of common objectives and unified foreign, domestic and economic policies. Billed as a blueprint for “reforming the Arab condition,” the charter’s declared purpose is to enable the Arab world to defend its interests and rights, strengthen collective Arab action, and regulate relations both between individual Arab states and with the outside world, the paper reports.
The draft text of the document published by Asharq al-Awsat acknowledges the Arab states’ past failures to live up to their collective commitments and declarations, and resolves to turn a new leaf. Henceforth, they pledge to “guarantee the sovereignty, safety and territorial unity” of every Arab country, support the Palestinians, and renew their quest for a just peace with Israel based on last year’s Arab Peace Initiative.
The charter also recognizes the need for the Arab states to introduce domestic reforms and “develop political participation” as part of the “comprehensive development” needed to keep pace with global changes in all fields: economics, education, technology etc. This includes working “seriously” toward the establishment of an Arab free trade area by the end of 2005 and a customs union within a decade, as a prelude to forming a full-fledged Arab common market.
The Saudi proposal would also make it incumbent on Arab countries to “categorically reject any illegitimate external aggression against any Arab state,” resolve any inter-Arab dispute by peaceful means, “and take a united stand against any Arab state that attacks any other Arab state under any pretext or circumstance.”
Asharq al-Awsat says the Saudi “initiative” has been presented to the Arab League committee that is supposed to follow up implementation of Arab summit resolutions and will be debated by Arab leaders at their next annual gathering in Bahrain in March.
A more modest suggestion is made to the Arab states by Egyptian Islamist commentator Fahmi Howeidi in his weekly article for Asharq al-Awsat: He strongly urges them to embrace and reciprocate the friendly overtures Turkey has been making under the newly elected pro-Islamist government formed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Howeidi writes that when Gul was in Cairo as part of his bid to promote a peaceful end to the Iraq crisis, he also expressed eagerness to cement Turkey’s relations with the Arab world. He is even said to have suggested that Turkey be admitted to the Arab League as an “observer,” though Secretary-General Amr Moussa said there was no provision for such a status in the league’s rules, and instead suggested a number of specific areas in which the two sides could cooperate more closely.
Howeidi argues that the Arabs should welcome Turkey’s stated desire for closer ties with open arms, and stop treating the country as a “hopeless case” because of its traditional, ideologically driven hostility to all things “Eastern” and its eager embrace of the US and Israel.
That was indeed the stance maintained for decades by the Kemalist political elite. But it was trounced comprehensively at the November elections by the AKP, which is more representative of Turkish society and is eager to rebuild bridges with the Arab world, he writes. The Kemalist establishment remains resistant to that, and it is “no secret” that the Turkish Foreign Ministry tried to dissuade Gul from proceeding with his Arab tour on grounds that it might complicate ties with Washington.
Howeidi notes that although Moussa welcomed Turkey’s quest for a closer relationship with the Arab League, individual Arab governments had nothing to say about the matter other than an Iraqi official who ridiculed the idea while denouncing what he said were Turkey’s territorial designs on his country. This attitude is wrongheaded, Howeidi argues. It fails to appreciate the changes Turkey is going through. The Kemalists may have “torn Turkey out of the heart of the Arab and Muslim worlds” back in the 1920s, but the Arabs are partly to blame for the resultant estrangement because they “surrendered” to that state of affairs rather than trying to rectify it. As a consequence, “everyone in the world” sought to woo Turkey because of its strategic importance, other than the Arabs who, having shared their lives with the Turks for 400 years ought to have tried hardest to regain their friendship.
Howeidi also makes the point that at the present juncture “the Arabs need Turkey more than it needs the Arabs,” if only because it can lead a secure existence without them, whereas its goodwill is essential to their safety especially with Israel trying to make more inroads into the country.
In the Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat, Abdelwahhab Badrakhan suggests that it is not only the elected Turkish government that is balking at the prospect of a war on Iraq, but also the traditionally dominant military establishment that usually toes the US line.
For “the first time” in decades, Turkish Army generals seem as worried as elected politicians about the direction in which the US is trying to pull their country, and are also having to think seriously about Turkey’s “Oriental dimension,” which they long disregarded in their eagerness to play up its Western credentials, he remarks. As a result, Turkey is “also for the first time” trying to give the impression that it will not automatically follow the American lead over Iraq, even though the US badly needs its support both for logistical reasons and in order to provide its war with “regional cover,” Badrakhan says.
But he complains that in trying to distance itself from US policy, Ankara has failed to break loose of its “post-World War I mentality.” It seems to be searching for a strategy geared not so much to region-wide reconciliation as to maximizing its own gains. Accordingly, Turkey’s newly elected leaders have been claiming “historic rights” in Iraq in the same tone as “the dinosaurs who long dominated the Turkish political stage,” while invoking the “Kurdish complex” in the same manner.
Nevertheless, Badrakhan writes, Gul’s Arab tour was striking, particularly the Saudi leg where he and his hosts jointly stressed their opposition to a war on Iraq and signalled to the Americans that their regional allies do not share their “suspected eagerness for war.”
Turkey may be eyeing “spoils” in Iraq, but their value is more than offset by the scale of the future problems which war would cause for the country and Iraq’s other neighbors, “regardless of whether the Americans remain in the region, or deal their blow and inflict their damage before turning elsewhere in search of another enemy,” he says.
In the Jordanian daily Ad-Dustour, Uraib al-Rantawi writes that while Turkey is “engrossed in its futile effort to prevent war,” Iran appears to be busy “making arrangements for post-Saddam Iraq.”
One would have expected the roles to be reversed, with revolutionary Iran more eager to prevent a US-led war than pro-American NATO member Turkey, he says. But ideology and principle in this case take a back seat to the two countries’ perceptions of their self-interest and their respective regional roles.
Turkey fears a war on Iraq will further hurt its ailing economy and jeopardize its territorial integrity by encouraging Kurdish nationalism and separatism. It also fears that if there is a forcible takeover of Iraq, the invading troops will have to go through its territory, and Ankara does not trust Washington’s intentions in northern Iraq and will therefore want its own forces deployed alongside them.
Iran does not share those fears but aspires to an enhanced regional role in post-Saddam Iraq, regardless of whether the country remains intact under the rule of its Shiite majority, or is dismembered and a separate Shiite state is established “on the threshold of the Gulf oilfields.” With scores to settle against Baghdad, but no direct means of influencing the “Great Satan,” Tehran has been keeping itself busy hosting Iraqi opposition figures and the acting leader of Kuwait, “rather than wasting time on sterile diplomatic efforts that will neither prevent war nor bring peace,” Rantawi writes.
“Post-Saddam Iraq arouses different fears among both of its neighbors,” he remarks. Ankara fears a fragmented Iraq that paves the way for an independent Kurdish state. Tehran, recalling the role Iraq used to play as America’s “bastion” against the Islamist tide, fears post-Saddam Iraq will be used to subvert its Islamic revolution while US forces surround it on all sides. Consequently, Rantawi remarks, “Turkey believes its role begins today, while Iran thinks its role begins tomorrow.”
Commenting on the visit to Iran by Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad, Kuwait’s “de facto head of government,” Saad bin Tafla al-Ajmi remarks that while both countries want to see the Iraqi regime changed, the Iranians can influence the process while the Kuwaitis can only hope for the best.
Writing in the UAE daily Al-Ittihad, Ajmi notes that both sides tried to play down suggestions that Sheikh Sabah went to Tehran to discuss Iraq. Instead, officials claimed his talks there would be about the joint exploitation of the disputed continental shelf separating the two countries, or about plans to supply Kuwait with drinking water from Iran.
But observers concur that Iraq is the overriding concern, and the Iranians confirmed that by rejecting a request by Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri to visit Iran a move seen as a signal that Tehran is refusing to deal with the current regime in Baghdad in the anticipation that a new one will soon be in place.
Ajmi remarks that Iran shares Kuwait’s “boundless enmity” for the regime in Baghdad. Both countries support Iraqi dissidents, attended the recent Iraqi opposition conference in London and have an interest in seeing the current regime terminated.
“But they differ over how things ought to be after Saddam’s departure, or, to be precise, over how one of them envisages tomorrow’s Iraq and how the other hopes Iraq’s future will be.” Iran has “religious ideas” about, and a “sectarian project” for, post-Saddam Iraq, while Kuwait has “hopes that fall short of aspirations,” he says. “It does not want a dismembered Iraq as that would create internal tensions in Kuwait; it does not want a sectarian Iraq because that could ignite sectarian strife in Kuwait; it does not want an anarchic Iraq as the sparks of chaos could fly over Kuwait’s borders; and it does not want a highly strung militarist Iraq that exports its problems beyond its frontiers and revives previous Iraqi designs on Kuwait.”

Israel's strategy to take over Palestine
By Mustapha Karkouti , Gulf News, 14-01-2003
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The South Africa "money scandal" bogging Israel's premier Ariel Sharon has slightly diverted the pre-election debate among Israelis away from the idea of "What to do with the Palestinians next", or ethnic cleansing, or "transfer".

In fact, the "transfer" of Palestinians has been the main topic of discussion within the Israeli society, particularly among right-wing circles, for sometime now, long before the election was called for last November.

Politicians have been talking about "transfer" openly and writers have been filling newspapers columns without hardly any serious challenge. One fears that those who vehemently deny that Israel is encouraging "transfer" are likely to support such a crime.

A highly respected and rare Israeli writer, Ran HaCohen recently put forward an extensive analytical survey of the current thinking in Israel about the future of Israeli Palestinians, and other Palestinians in large parts of the occupied West Bank, particularly the areas which the Israelis consider "sensitive" to the country's security, or "holy" to the belief of few Brooklyn-originated settlers.

Writing in the electronic magazine Anti-war.com, HaCohen says the idea of "transfer", the common euphemism for ethnic cleansing or mass deportation, "is discussed openly in Israel with several political parties supporting it, and one of them is in Sharon's cabinet."

Many politicians speak of what they describe as "voluntary transfer", but others, such as Minister Benny Elon have been quite explicit about what they mean by "voluntary".

"It's like a man who refuses to give his wife a divorce," Elon said. According to Jewish law, the defiant husband can be jailed and slashed until he "voluntarily" complies.

"Gamla", a group founded by former Israeli military officers and settlers, offers a detailed plan for forcibly expelling all Palestinians, both from the Occupied Territories and the Palestinians in 1946 areas, within a three- to five-year period.

This may be too long for some who are eager to finish the process sooner. There are persistent reports that Sharon has ordered his forces to prepare to drive hundreds of thousands of Palestinians over the border into Jordan, possibly on the day the United States conflict starts against Iraq.

Despite many pleas by American and British officials acting on behalf of Jordan's monarch, King Abdullah, Israel has repeatedly rejected an official Jordanian request that Israel issue a public declaration opposing the "transfer" of Palestinians.

Former Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres, when he was still in government promised to look into the request favourably but he was curtailed by Sharon and former minister of defence and other military and intelligence officers.

Now with the likelihood that Sharon would form the next government, albeit with slimmer Likud majority, the "transfer" policy is expected to gather momentum and move full speed taking advantage of the full and unconditional American support of Israel.

What makes this policy more likely than not, is the right-wing and hawkish company Israel's premier keeps from the military brass who have demonstrated in the recent past their willingness to carry on shamelessly with the most inhumane actions against the Palestinians.

Sharon has surrounded himself with security, military and intelligence leaders who are as hawkish and uncompromising as he is. The Chief of Staff, General Moshe Ya'alon, the Mossad chief, General Meir Dagan, the Defence Minister, General Shaul Mofaz, the head of Military Intelligence, General Aharon Zeevi, and the National Security Adviser, General Efraim Halevy, are all cut from the same military cloth.

In a poll conducted last April 44 per cent of Jewish Israelis, a people that suffered both deportation and extermination, support similar measures against the Palestinians. This is a bit perplexing for HaCohen to find his people "approving" this kind of suffering.

"Why?" he asked. One possible answer is that people do not learn from history, or learn the wrong lessons. "I don't think it is the answer in this case. The fact is that Israelis and Israel-supporters do not refuse to learn from history: they deny history, the denied historical pattern keeps duplicating itself, and won't stop until its denial is stopped."

"What people fail to recognise," Ran HaCohen suggests, "is that Israel owes its very existence as a Jewish State to massive ethnic cleansing." He adds: "The overall picture is undisputed: In 1948, there were about 600,000 Jews in Palestine. The number of Palestinians driven out from the territory taken by Israel in 1947-1949 is estimated at 600,000 to 720,000 according to the nationalistic Israeli historian Benny Morris in his authoritative, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem; about 100,000 Palestinians (Palestinians in 1946 areas) remained."

"Without driving most of the Arabs out then, or without prohibiting their return after the war, no Jewish majority - and hence the Jewish state - could have been established."

Fifty-five years on, unfortunately this information is not part of the Israeli majority's collective conscious and they confront the issue either by dismissing it, by denying it, or simply saying it was "the Arab's fault, they left by their own accord."

Meanwhile, older people still remember how Arab villages here and there were completely destroyed and erased once their inhabitants had left. An Israeli academic has recently been threatened to lose his job at the Hebrew University because he had supervised an MA field-study dissertation on one of the very early acts of mass human cleansing in the Palestinian village of Tantoura, in 1947.

When it comes to the present situation, continuation of the last two years, the unprecedented, and most brutal of the 35-year Israeli occupation, is speedily fomenting the process of "transfer".

Ta'ayush, the Arabic for co-existence, is an Arab-Jewish Jerusalem-based NGO who chronicles movements in the demographic scene in historic Palestine, say ethnic cleansing in the Occupied Territories is taking place "slowly, but steadily."

Two of Ta'ayush's writers, Gadi Algazi and Azmi Bdeir, explain that "transfer isn't necessarily a dramatic moment when people are expelled and flee their towns or villages. It is not necessarily a planned and well-organised move with buses and trucks loaded with people, such as happened in Qalqilyah in 1967."

"Transfer is a deeper and creeping process that is hidden from view. ... The main component of the process is the gradual undermining of the civilian Palestinian population's lives and infrastructure in the territories; their continuing strangulation under closures and sieges that prevent people from getting to work or school, from receiving medical services, and from allowing the passage of water trucks and ambulances, which sends the Palestinians back to the age of the donkey and cart. Taken together, these measures undermine the hold of the Palestinian population on its land."

The writer is the former president, Foreign Press Association in London.

A 'smoking gun' may be the excuse for war
By Linda S. Heard , Gulf News, 14-01-2003
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A recent political cartoon in a British tabloid depicted Saddam Hussain at his desk, newspaper in hand. He tells an aide that he would hate to be in the shoes of George W. Bush. Wouldn't we all?

Just when the self-styled leader of the free world thought he had the "attack Iraq" scenario all worked out, and had positioned most of his troops, weaponry, planes and warships in theatre, North Korea pops up from relative obscurity to ruin the best laid plans of the president's men.

After all, wouldn't it be absurd for someone to wave aside a powerful and bellicose enemy at the front door (in this case North Korea), while cleaning his shotgun to finish off a poorer, weaker neighbour, who doesn't want to fight – Iraq?

Let's face it, the North Korean leader's timing couldn't be worse from Bush's point of view. How inconsiderate of President Kim Jong-il to announce that not only does he have a secret nuclear programme. He also has the nerve to expel IAEA inspectors, pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and now we learn that he intends to resume the testing of his long-range missiles.

Some U.S. detractors might be tempted to lay the blame for the North Korean action at the feet of Washington. Not only did the U.S. renege on its 1994 agreement with North Korea to build two light water reactors, Bush derided the South Korean president's "Sunshine Policy" soon after taking office before labelling North Korea "evil".

America's confiscation, albeit temporary, of a North Korean vessel carrying a legitimate missile shipment to Yemen was construed by Pyongyang as a hostile act too, as was Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's boast that the U.S. was capable of waging war on two fronts simultaneously.

Since the North Korean admission, the White House has refused dialogue with Pyongyang and stopped much-needed fuel shipments. Such is North Korea's mistrust of the Bush administration it resorted to sending a delegation to meet with Bill Richardson, a veteran of the Clinton administration, who is now New Mexico's governor, to discuss the worsening North Korean/U.S. relationship.

Richardson holds no portfolio for such discussions and isn't a member of the Bush team but North Korea has dealt with him before and has now asked for his help to avert a looming global disaster. Richardson said the talks were positive and he had been assured that the North Koreans have no intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Richardson's statement doesn't exactly gel with the rhetoric from various North Korean leaders talking to an anti-American rally of more than one million on Saturday. They said that if any country violated the sovereignty of North Korea, the North would seek "revenge with blood".

Earlier the North Koreans had said that if the UN were to impose sanctions on their country they would consider this action a "declaration of war". North Korea's neighbours Japan and the South are not amused.

Head of the United Nation's team of weapons inspectors Dr. Hans Blix and his colleague Mohamed El Baradei of the IAEA would no doubt be perceived by Bush as having let down the White House side too. Their band of seekers and peepers have visited more than 200 sensitive sites – many of which were designated sure certes to harbour weapons of mass destruction by the American and British intelligence communities. What did they find? Nothing at all.

To be fair, an unusually beaming Blix did say that while Iraq was co-operating in all respects with UN Resolution 1441, it wasn't being proactive enough. In other words, Saddam Hussain hasn't said: "Sorry guys. You were right after all. Just dig under that palm tree where you will find my secret stock of plutonium, uranium, smallpox and anthrax."

Such a statement would, of course, be milk and honey to the ears of the Potamac hawks, then able to validate their singular stance vis-à-vis Iraq in the eyes of the world community.

As it is, the world is becoming increasing sceptical as to the American president's claims, sounding more and more spurious as the weeks progress. Some say that the warmongers in the administration are at risk of missing their window of opportunity. If they don't find a pretext to start the action in the next few months, the scorching summer heat will be on the horizon.

Even though Donald Rumsfeld has signed orders sending yet more American troops to the Gulf, the voices of his critics are becoming increasingly vociferous in their opposition to war. The Arab world opposes any attack on Baghdad almost to a man with Arab League Head Amr Moussa's warning that such would open the gates of hell ringing in their ears.

Germany makes the right diplomatic noises but in truth wants nothing to do with a war, while France and Russia are more than reluctant to sanction an attack. China stands ominously on the sidelines with regard to both Iraq and North Korea.

The European Union, with Greece holding the rotating presidency, is all set to send a delegation around the Arab world next month in an attempt to avert conflict. When the American Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte was asked to comment on this European initiative, he refused to do so but the dismissive expression on his face spoke volumes.

Turkey, a long time ally of the U.S., is still prevaricating as to its role in the potential upcoming conflict. There are divisions within its armed forces as to their level of involvement as well as disagreements between the generals and the politicians. Turkey's Prime Minister Abdullah Gul is currently touring the Arab world attempting to drum up a unified anti-war coalition.

Never mind! George Bush can still count on his good friends British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Ariel Sharon, the Israeli leader, right? They will stand by him through thick and thin.

Or will they? Blair appears to be trying to gently extricate himself from any adventurism in the Gulf given the negative climate among his people and throughout his own political party. Following the recent UN meeting on the subject of Iraq, addressed by Blix and El Baradei, Blair said that the weapons inspectors need more time and space and there were reports that he has asked the U.S. to push back any thoughts of war until next autumn.

Blair is also not happy with Washington's lack of support when it was asked to put pressure on the Israeli government to allow the Palestinian leadership to attend pre-arranged discussions in London.

Bush's buddy Ariel Sharon may not be in office for much longer to lend support to America's war. The televised vision of a red-faced, blustering Sharon trying to defend himself and his sons from accusations of receiving illegal foreign loans did not inspire voter-confidence.

The ranting went on for so long and was so critical of the Labor Party's new leader Amram Mitzna that the network pulled the plug on their Prime Minister at the behest of a Supreme Court judge, who termed the broadcast electoral propaganda. The following day saw support for the Likud Party sink to a low of 42 per cent, while politicians jumped on the bandwagon in some cases labeling Sharon "a mafia leader".

Israel's television got in on the act with a skit showing Israel's prime minister as a kind of Pied Piper, leaping ahead of a flock of sheep, each sheep with a human face, curiously resembling other scandal tainted political figures. Often referred to as Teflon Man in Israel, Sharon has now become a figure of fun.

If Amram Mitzna succeeds in ousting Sharon, he is unlikely to willingly support Bush and his call to war. Mitzna is committed to dismantling the settlements and returning to the peace table. Unlike Sharon, he has no plans to use the cover of a war with Iraq to attack Syria and Lebanon or to drive the West Bank Palestinians across the Jordan River. Mitzna, wants a peaceful resolution and amicable dialogue with the leaders of the Arab world, an ambition, which regional hostilities would thwart.

The feeling of being thwarted must be prevalent in the halls of the White House and the Pentagon these days. The impetus for an invasion of Iraq is being eroded both within the United States and without.

American politicians and the general public are showing reluctance to being fobbed off with jingoistic rhetoric and are instead, demanding answers. They want to know what is the real reason for targeting Iraq when the most vocal enemy at the door is North Korea. Don't we all.

The danger is that Washington's determined warmongers, faced with a glaring lack of evidence with which to back up their accusations, could be tempted to manufacture a smoking gun where none exists.

If Iraqi nuclear scientists are taken with their families to Cyprus for interrogation, as planned, they may have an ideal opportunity to do so. We can only hope that the world's leaders will not be easily taken in.

The writer is a specialist writer on Middle East affairs

Pakistan's foreign policy: The 'soft power' potential

By Mushahid Hussain

Khaleej Times, 1/14/03

IN THE last week, as Pakistan was preoccupied with fending off new pressures from the United States, India launched a new Pakistan-specific offensive following conclusion of a year of coercive diplomacy.

Two speeches by key Indian ministers are instructive. Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha talked of the 'soft power' of culture and intellectuals as an instrument of promoting India's foreign policy through a better image. He urged the need to factor in 'soft power' as compared to the 'hard power' of military might, the nuclear bomb, missiles and a large standing army. Concurrently, the deputy prime minister, L.K. Advani, urged Western businessmen and investors to put pressure on their governments to treat Pakistan as a 'purveyor of terrorism', in a bid to isolate Pakistan in the comity of nations.

Interestingly, in a write-up in The New York Times (reprinted as "Propaganda injurious to US interests" in Khaleej Times of January 12), Harvard University's Professor Joseph Nye Jr also focused on the need to use 'soft power' as an instrument of American foreign policy in the US-led war on terror.

He defined 'soft power' as "the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will".

He then linked it to the pursuit of American foreign policy goals: "Soft power grows out of both US culture and US policies. From Hollywood to higher education, civil society does far more to present the United States to other peoples than the government does. Hollywood promotes values of individualism, upward mobility and freedom (including for women). These values make America attractive to many people overseas."

Perhaps more than any other Third World country, India has been effective in deploying 'soft power' as a force multiplier in support of foreign-policy goals. The components of Indian culture that promote foreign policy interests include Bollywood films, music, academics and non-resident Indians, the latter particularly effective in the US.

For instance, in Russia, Central Asia, the Arab World and parts of Africa, the Indian image in the popular imagination emerged out of Bollywood films. And, in Europe and North America, Indian cuisine is extremely popular. During the 1990s, India's growing success in Information Technology has helped place young Indian IT professionals in key countries like Germany and the US. And together with Indian businessmen and other professionals, academics are a key component of the increasingly influential Indian lobby in the US, which now has developed a degree of political clout in the Congress and the White House.

Even the Islamic Republic of Iran, for all its 'fundamentalist' image and clerical leadership, has discovered the importance and impact of 'soft power'. Iranian films routinely win awards at prestigious film festivals in Europe and the US, and many of these films have women directors. Iran is now also a popular destination for Western tourists, notwithstanding dress and culinary restrictions.

Why can't Pakistan promote 'soft power' as an instrument to improve its international image and foreign-policy interests, as India and Iran are doing? The ingredients, including human resources, talent and a growing infrastructure in culture, are all there, ready and waiting to be tapped, provided the Pakistani Establishment has the will and vision to act. It requires a bit of an imagination, to think and act in an offbeat, unconventional manner, with an approach that is definitely non-bureaucratic. And equally important is the courage and boldness to discard obsolete notions that view foreign policy as simply an instrument of national security, which, in turn, is defined almost entirely in military terms. Other key factors like education, culture, economy or overseas Pakistanis are hardly factored in to promote the national interest. In sports, Pakistan has excelled in hockey, cricket and squash, having been world champion in each of these. In most of the 1990s, the biggest impact on Indian music was that of Pakistan's Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, who was also popular in such diverse countries as Japan and France. Pakistani television dramas had a tremendous impact in South Asian countries like India, Bangladesh and Nepal, helping to promote cultural creativity as a national asset. Pakistan can still do more. There is a substantial population of Pakistanis and people of Pakistani origin resident in the Middle East, Europe and North America. Pakistani cricketers are charismatic with a large fan following.

Pakistan's national language, Urdu, has a wide base among the billion plus people of South Asia. And the national poet Mohammed Iqbal's revolutionary poetry has been a source of inspiration to Muslims all over the world, including Iran, Turkey and Malaysia. Pakistani designers have even had an impact on fashion in Europe.

In effect, while facts on the ground have changed, the opinions and world-view of the Pakistani establishment have not.

It is not just the challenge from India that Pakistan has to face up to. In 2002, India used the 'hard power' of coercive diplomacy to push Pakistan into a corner, with the international community acquiescing to its massive troop deployment and the threat of an imposed war.

India has begun 2003 with the announcement of a fresh Pakistan-specific offensive, this time deploying the 'soft power' of culture, economy and education.

The Pakistani Establishment should make no mistake: the US too is enamoured of India's 'soft power' and the US will push for policy changes by Pakistan with respect to India. Influential Americans have started voicing the need for a "strategic course correction" by Pakistan. Shorn of the verbiage, this is a call to review, reassess and revamp Pakistan's policy towards India. Britain and France remain influential players on the global stage, not because of their military power but because they are using their education, and particularly their language, culture and economy to promote their foreign-policy goals.

Instead of routine, hackneyed statements, or working through outdated files, it is time for Pakistan's policymakers to inject a creative approach into issues that can help ward off pressures and defend the genuine national interest.

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