Jan 10, 2003 Op Eds

Jan , 2003 Opinion Editorials http://www.aljazeerah.info

A petard was an explosive device placed by attackers against a castle gate. The luckless individuals ordered to do this had to then light a fuse and try and run away. If they did not escape in time, they were blown up along with the gate. Hence the expression “being hoist on your own petard”.

The Germans are currently experiencing just such a disaster. It was they who insisted that the Stability and Growth Pact rules, which underpin the European Single currency penalize anyone who missed strict monetary targets, including a deficit within three percent of economic output. This year the Germans face a 3.8 percent deficit. Brussels warns that unless they sort it out by May, they will be fined.

Germany has been and no doubt will be again the economic powerhouse of the EU but, at the moment, its economy is a mess. Its social welfare benefits have long been every bit as high as its legendary productivity. When the economy was booming, such generosity was sustainable. Reunification changed this. Helmut Kohl’s decision to accept the worthless old East German currency at parity with the mighty deutsche mark was politically expedient in the short term, but economically disastrous in the long.

Since reunification, almost $650 billion has been pumped into the depressed east of the country. However, with the exception of 2001, when the economy seemed to recover, the leaden economic weight of the east plus the German insistence on paying themselves too much to work, to retire, to be sick or to be unemployed has piled up the economic troubles.

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder seems to have few answers to the growing problems. Already highly taxed, with a prospect of yet higher taxes to come, the majority of Germans are angry. By no means, all the country’s troubles can be laid at the door of the Schroeder and Kohl governments. The global economic downturn has played its part. However, in past postwar recessions, German goods have continued to find ready world markets because of their quality rather than their price. And Germany prospered from its world trade, even though the perennially strong deutsche mark ought to have made goods which were already expensive for the high-paid Germans to produce too expensive for anyone else to buy.

Unfortunately, those magic sums no longer add up. If Schroeder does actually keep the latest promise he has made — to haul back on government spending — his troubles are still unlikely to be at an end. With private industry sitting on its check books, the German state and federal governments are the only large source of contracts and investment money. Sharply reduce that economic activity, as analysts believe is necessary, cut back on welfare payments and the pain already being felt will be markedly increased. Germany was the key architect of the euro, which it wanted to be protected from the indiscipline of weaker euroland economies. How ironic, therefore, that it itself should be the first member state to fall foul of the tough rules upon which it insisted. More importantly, what does this spectacular failure by Germany mean for the international credibility of the euro?

To China: But looking for what?
By Amir Taheri, Arab News, 1/10/03
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A “Hadith” (saying) attributed to the Prophet, peace be upon him, encourages Muslims to seek knowledge “even if it is in China”. Fourteen centuries later, China has become a favorite destination for Muslim political leaders and businessmen. During the past five years or so Beijing has been the only major capital to be visited by leaders form almost all Muslim countries.

These Muslim visitors, however, are not coming to China in search of science. They know that China, for all its recent technological achievements, including the launching of a manned spaceship, is far behind the United States, the European Union and Japan as far as science is concerned. The chief goal of Muslim visitors is to find out whether or not China could emerge as a political and economic counterweight to the United States, a power with which most Muslim states maintain at best ambiguous and at worst tense relations.

Seen from the Muslim world, the US appears to be too powerful, and at times too arrogant, to want, or even need, allies. The idea is that you can be an ally and partner of someone of more or less your own size in terms of economic and military power.

China is also regarded as a more attractive partner than other potential candidates such a Japan, India and Brazil. Japan seems to be stuck in an endless economic freeze and is, in any case, reluctant to develop a political profile. India is plagued by its dispute with Muslim Pakistan over Kashmir and the constant threat of sectarian riots involving Hindus and Muslims. Brazil, which enjoyed special attention in the Muslim world in the 1980s, is now regarded as a sick giant that is unlikely to become a fully developed industrial power anytime soon.

What about Russia? Well, the days of the Soviet Union when Moscow was the automatic alternative to Washington have long elapsed. Seen from the Muslim world, Russia appears as a rudderless ship caught in an endless storm with no destination in sight.

The only certainty is that Chechens continue to be killed aboard that ship. And Chechens are Muslims.

That leaves China with its claim of having the world’s highest rates of economic growth for the past decade.

Some Muslim rulers are also impressed by the Chinese political system. They, too, run regimes that are, in effect, one-party systems of one form or another.

The Chinese model, in which unbridled capitalism is combined with an iron grip on the political process, is particularly attractive to many Muslim regimes. (In Iran, for example, supporters of the Chinese model grouped around former President Hashemi Rafsanjani present themselves as the only “realistic alternative” to what they see as President Muhammad Khatami’s emulation of Mikhail Gorbachev’s experience in the now defunct USSR.)

Muslim leaders also appreciate the fact that when dealing with China they can focus on the ruling elite and not bother about the media, human rights groups, political parties, trade unions and other similar “ troublemakers”. The fact that private lawsuits could be filed against them in the US, that their assets could be frozen, that they could be denied visas, searched when arriving at an American airport, and receive a visit from the FBI in their hotel rooms, has persuaded some Muslim political leaders that the American system is simply too complicated and subject to too many pressures to permit the shaping and application of a normal foreign policy by any administration in Washington.

China is of special interest to oil-exporting Arab states, anxious to diversify their markets and thus reduce dependence on the United States and the European Union.

On paper at least the Arab attention seems justified. If official statistics and projections are to be trusted, China is slated to replace the United States as the world’s largest importer of crude oil by the time Beijing hosts the 2002 summer Olympics. With a population heading for the staggering 1.3 billion mark by the end of the decade, China’s potential as a market cannot be overestimated. Visitors to China’s eastern and southern provinces, where the economic boom is concentrated, are certain to be impressed. Shanghai is the largest building site the world has ever seen. Canton and Beijing have been transformed into almost prosperous cities, at least by Asian standards.

There is no doubt that China has a good story to tell. But how much of it is true? No one has the answer.

Some businessmen and economic experts in Beijing regard the official claims about high growth rates as “rather fanciful”. But even if such claims were justified China would still have a long way to go before it achieves the status of a major economic power. Assuming that China maintains annual growth rates of 10 percent or higher, it could rise to account for some three percent of the global GDP within the next decade or so. It would then have to wait until the year 2020 to see its economy rise to the size of Japan’s today.

China’s thirst for oil is real. But even then the Arab exporters must guard against exaggerated hopes. Beijing is looking to Kazakhstan and the Caspian Basin as is prime source of imported crude over the next three decades. An 8000-miles pipeline linking Kazakh field to China is already under construction. China also hopes to tap its own domestic resources the size of which remains a state secret.

There are other points that should be taken into account by the Muslims when evolving a policy based on strategic alliance with China. For all its apparent solidity the Chinese political system remains highly fragile. The new middle class that is spearheading the economic “miracle” is unlikely to remain as docile as it is today. The supposedly “new leadership”, really not new at all, does not seem to have any strategy apart from a forlorn hope to maintain the monopoly of power for a Communist Party that is beginning to splinter.

The need to create modern jobs for over 700 million peasants, likely to be uprooted within the next three decades, also casts some gloom on Chinese prospects. There are also ethnic tensions, seething beneath the surface. The Muslims who once formed a majority in Xinjiang (East Turkestan) remain restive, and the problem of Tibet will not simply go away. There are also tensions in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia while the Taiwan issue could still lead to a war with incalculable consequences.

Many Muslim societies today are more open, freer, and culturally more dynamic than China in this period of transition. Adopting the so-called “Chinese model”, even if this were possible, would be a step backward for many Muslim countries.

Muslim societies should learn to compete with more open and freer societies rather than looking to societies where authoritarianism can produce transient successes but is bound to lead to disaster. From the 1950s to the 1970s, many Muslim intellectuals, obsessed with that illusory “historic shortcut”, looked to the Soviet Union as a model. We know what happened to them and their “ model”. The idea of a Chinese “shortcut” could prove to be as disastrous.

The idea of having a look at China as a potential partner is a sound one. But it should not be used as the basis for political pipe dreams that thicken ignorance rather than then “ knowledge” that the Prophet was talking about.

Vote-buying scandal clouds upcoming Israeli election
By Paul Adams

Arab News, 1/10/03

TEL AVIV — What do a 27-year-old waitress, a former chauffeur and a convicted murderer have in common?

They are leading candidates to enter the Knesset after a scandal-plagued process to choose members from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s Likud party.

When the party’s central committee recently selected them, pushing some of the party’s leading figures to the bottom of the list, it seemed merely a political embarrassment to Sharon. But it has since become more damaging.

The accusation is that many Likud candidates acquired their nominations by buying them. According to reports from candidates and party officials, Likud’s nomination process was dominated by a small group of vote contractors who exploited some of the peculiar features of Israel’s election process.

Israeli news reports say police are recommending corruption charges be filed against half a dozen Likud party activists, including sitting member of the Knesset Naomi Blumenthal, who invoked her right to silence when interrogated by police this week.

Although Sharon remains the most popular politician in Israel, his party has lost as much as a quarter of its support in the past three weeks, largely as a result of the scandal.

The drop threatens what had seemed an easy and inevitable election victory.

"The best thing that could happen (for Sharon) is for the US strike on Iraq to begin Sunday," was the sardonic comment of a columnist in Israel’s leading daily, Yedioth Ahronoth.

Israeli voters cast ballots for parties rather than individual candidates. Each party assembles a list of candidates, and the more votes it wins in the general election, the more of them enter the Knesset.

In Likud’s case, the candidates and their rankings were determined by the 2,940 members of the party’s central committee, many of them controlled by the vote contractors who horse-traded their votes, and, if the allegations are true, sold them as well.

The most surprising winner to emerge was Inbal Gavrieli, 27, a waitress with no known qualification for public office other than the enthusiastic support of her father’s family. The family is involved in gambling and has been the frequent target of police investigations. Gavrieli’s father, Shoni, gave elaborate dinners on her behalf during the nomination campaign, attended by many of Likud’s most prominent members, including the minister and deputy minister responsible for police.

In the end, Gavrieli obtained a higher place on the Likud list than Ehud Olmert, the mayor of Jerusalem, who had been tipped for a senior post in Sharon’s next government.

Other unexpected successes: Michael Gorlovsky, formerly a driver for extreme right-wing politician Avigdor Lieberman, and Ehud Yatom, a one-time security officer who was convicted of bludgeoning two Palestinian captives to death in 1984.

Soon after the central committee met Dec. 8 to choose the Likud list, accusations surfaced from defeated candidates, and even some successful ones, that they had been approached by vote contractors to pay for support.

The going rate was alleged to be about $200 a vote. That sparked the police investigation, and led to the resignations of several central-committee members and the prospect of indictments — though not, perhaps, until after the election, scheduled for Jan. 28. Sharon has done his best to distance himself from the affair. He has dumped Blumenthal from the Likud list because of her refusal to cooperate with the police investigation.

But his efforts have been blunted because his son Omri, also a candidate for the Knesset, was a prominent wheeler-dealer during the candidate-selection process, allegedly working with two ex-cons who are now political organizers.

"My son, Omri, had nothing to do with criminal elements who managed to get into the central committee," says Sharon.

When Sharon called the election in November, polls predicted that Likud would win more than 40 seats in the 120-member Knesset, and more than double its total.

Recent polls suggest the party has sagged to 31 or 32 seats, with no guarantee that the slide has stopped.

If there is any solace for Sharon, it is that the support Likud is losing is not being picked up by its traditional rivals on the left, such as the once-dominant Labor Party. Instead, it is going to smaller parties on the center and right that might be enticed into a coalition after the election.

Moreover, Sharon remains much more popular than his party or the other party leaders. (SHNS)

America's interest in Islam after Sept. 11 — what sort?

By Ahmad Y. Majdoubeh

Jordan Times, 1/10/03

AMERICA'S preoccupation with Islam dates as far back as the days of the early explorers of the New World in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, the early settlers of Virginia and New England in the seventeenth century, the Founding Fathers in the eighteenth century, the Romantics and Realists in the nineteenth century, the Modernists in the first half of the twentieth century, and — more recently — the so-called Postmodernists of the past four decades. Indeed, America's “interest” in or “relation” to Islam — at the sheer historical and political levels, not to mention the ideological, theological, strategic, economic, commercial, cultural, anthropological, sociological, scholarly, intellectual — is more intricate and complex than many think.

However, much of what is said about the matter today emanates from the developments leading to and following the tragic “events” of what came to be known as Sept. 11, with repeated references to the rise of so-called Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab and Muslim worlds, beginning with the 1970s in particular. It is to this latter phase of US heightened or “urgent” interest in Islam and Muslims that my comments are directed.

The question, a series of interconnected questions, rather, that I wish to shed light on, in particular, is: Should we, Arabs and Muslims, first, and advocates of global understanding, second, rejoice that both America and many of its Western allies are showing “heightened” interest in wanting to “know” more about Islam? Could such heightened interest, in the foreseeable future, bring about a significant change in the way Islam is — has been — perceived in much of the Western world? Will America in specific, which has been talking about Islam since the days of Christopher Columbus, be able to finally grasp and view Islam in a less prejudicial and distorted and in a more realistic and “correct” way? The answer is no — we should not rejoice, that is. We will have to wait and see.

On the one hand, we are encouraged that many in America and the Western world wish to “know” more about Islam, because we Arabs and Muslims believe that Islam is a good religion and that a better understanding of it is good for us in this part of the world (at least we will stop being stereotyped and distorted in movies, the press and the media, and we will stop being the target of hostile stands and policies taken against us because we are not perceived correctly), for Muslims who live in America and Western countries (so that they will feel safer, less vulnerable and less harassed), and for humanity all over the globe (who could benefit from a less factionalised, less tense world).

Additionally, we are encouraged by statements coming out of America itself and the Western world that the extremism of “fundamentalist” Islam, “politicised” Islam or “Islamism” (as it is called) is not representative of the religion or faith of Islam, a faith which is moderate, tolerant and human.

The urge to “know” and the insistence to separate between Islamism and Islam have been, and are being, expressed by American and Western heads of states, high-ranking officials and politicians, public opinion leaders, parliamentarians, media personalities, businessmen, scholars, students, tourists and ordinary people. This is encouraging.

On the other hand, our encouragement is highly curtailed by some worrying factors — aside, of course, from the flagrant stereotyping and distortion which we continue to witness.

First of all, look at what triggers or motivates this desire to “know.” It is the events of Sept. 11 and their presumed perpetrators — horrible events and horrible personalities. Think about the argument here, which goes essentially like this: We are horrified by what happened on Sept. 11.

Who could commit such atrocities? What kind of mindset, what kind of ideology stands behind such horrific deeds? The perpetrators are Arab and Muslim. So, let's study the Arab world and Islam. Who is this Osama Ben Laden? Where does he come from? He is an Arab and a Muslim. So, let's study the Arab and Islamic worlds.

The questions I wish to pose are: What are we really saying here? What are the implications of such logic? Are we not, in effect, saying, unlike what we claim or say, that the perpetrators did what they did because they are Muslim? Are we not implying (and very strongly so) that the Islamic faith itself has motivated these individuals (“presumed”, I keep saying) to commit acts of violence? Connecting the act and the actors to Islam (which runs head-on against the distinction we keep saying we are making between Islam and the Islamists) is truly worrisome. Is it not much like connecting the violence (burglary, murder, rape) that goes on in big American cities like New York, Detroit, Los Angeles and Chicago to the “social” conditions that lead to such violence?

This desire and urge to study Islam is, it seems to me, an attempt to try to understand, rationalise and explain an irrational and incomprehensible act such as the heartless smashing of aeroplanes packed with people into buildings packed with people by placing it in the context of Islam. This is unfair to Islam, to say the least.

Second, one cannot but fear that this “urgency” to understand Islam, this present enthusiasm, will wear off the minute American interest in the so-called Islamic or Islamist “terror” wears off and the minute America's war on terror erodes and vanishes into thin air (as seems to be already happening). How interested is America now in understanding the Vietnamese or the peoples of the former Soviet Union? When so-called Islamic or Islamist terrorists fade away (as they must) like the communists of Vietnam and the former Soviet Union, will America be still, urgently or otherwise, concerned with and interested in Islam?

Third, assuming that America and the West are well-meaning and serious about their endeavour to know and understand Islam, who is going to enable them to do so? The Arab and Islamic worlds? I doubt, for reasons related to the Arab and Islamic worlds' ability (inability, I should say) to explain themselves and to the American and Western attitudes towards the Arab and Islamic worlds.

What about American and Western “experts” on the Arab and Islamic worlds? There are two main problems here (among others). What do we mean by “experts”? If we mean politicians, political think tanks, members of political parties or professional press and media analysts, then forget it. These individuals have their own agendas and “theories” which they are trying to impose by hook or crook, with little or no respect for “objectivity” or “truth”. What about the academics, scholars and teaching and research centres? There are two problems with these. One, neither in America (and the West) nor in the Arab world does anybody listen to or consult academics. This is a sad but true fact.

Academia and politics (or policies) are, despite some coincidental or marginal meeting points, oceans apart. A delegation from the University of Oklahoma that visited Amman a couple of months ago and distributed to the participants in a seminar on Arab-American relations a book on America's 21st century foreign policy stressed its dismay at the fact that the think tanks of America's foreign policy regarding the Middle East never bother to even familiarise themselves with what Middle Eastern departments at many American universities are saying about America's relation to the Middle East.

Two, even if a miracle happens and the Middle Eastern experts in the academic world are consulted, a large number of these “scholars” are (still) traditional Orientalists (see Edward Said's works on this point) whose theories about Islam and the Arab world are largely reductive and distortive. Though some (especially the more Postmodernist) are enlightened and reliable, many are not.

For these reasons, and others, all we supporters of world security and peace, as well as cultural understanding and global harmony, can do is wait and see. There is indeed a need for a better understanding of Islam in America and the Western world, but efforts to this effect need to be done seriously and in a sustainable manner — rather than sporadically, whenever something tragic happens.

The Life and Times of An inspector calls

By Sigmund Siignatuur

Jordan Times, 1/10/03

I HAVE just returned from Europe and the general consensus there is that it is not a question of whether there is a war with Iraq but when. Here the pundits are predicting the middle of February. This is a general view.

What baffles many Arabs I have spoken to are the motives behind this probable conflagration and the “entity” that has amassed enough evidence to make the Iraqi regime the most dangerous regime on the planet that must be neutered come what may.

The probability of war. The number of US personnel involved in this operation is in excess of 100,000; their weaponry is almost complete. Having such a number standing around not being militarily active almost beggars belief.

I have seen a report that suggests that the inspection team would need almost one year to complete the weapons inspections of Iraq. I cannot see the Pentagon/White House/Downing Street/Quai d'Orsey giving the OK to the military to hang around playing Frisbee, cricket or boule until the autumn of this year.

The reasoning. Saddam Hussein is a spent force. This is the part that baffles many people in the near vicinity. We have to be careful on this point as surely there is no consensus of opinion spread throughout the Arab world. While a majority in northern Arabia have a large degree of scepticism as to the morality of an attack on Iraq, it has to said that Shiites and Kurds would not share such scepticism. People in the Gulf area must also be, at the very least, more ambiguous about the possibility of war. The opposition and exiled inhabitants of Iraq definitely want Saddam toppled and they speak with so much optimism that one would think that the exercise has already taken place or is only a few minutes away.

Other Arabs view the situation differently. They certainly think that Saddam's overseas adventures are moribund. They point to many years in which he has not strayed beyond his borders and has little or no weaponry to prise open the skull and economy of any foreign power. They would point to the declaration of North Korea. Here, the Koreans have said they have specific nuclear arsenals and any talk of sanctions is a declaration of war. Many see the latest American to Baghdad as just one more manifestation of anti-Arab sentiment. Some believe that it is linked to pleasing the state of Israel and others definitely point to oil as the major driving force.

It may be very true that being a regional superpower going to war with other states in the region may be a thing of the past for Iraq. It seems also obvious that going to war with two countries, e.g., North Korea and Iraq, is not a scenario that even Capitol Hill would want to invoke, despite Donald Rumsfeld's gung ho language that America could achieve victory in both military theatres. The military coalition knows that some Arab opinion is infuriated by the suggestion of a US-led attack on Iraq, but one has to presume that they think the price is not too high.

I doubt that Israel plays much of a part in this scenario. Israel is more crippled by the Islamic Jihad than it ever was by Baghdad. Anyway, America's largesse to Israel knows no bounds. Tel Aviv has secured an extra $4 billion in military aid.

There are many contracts to be given to oilmen if the Saddam regime is threatened, but I wonder if that is the major reasoning behind the apparent intent to bring an end to the regime in Baghdad.

The view of Washington/New York. America at the moment wants to prove that it is reasonable and wants the thumbs up from the international community. President George W. Bush has therefore shown that he seeks this authority via the UN. This authority has been given via the Security Council (15-0 and including Syria). I suspect that if there had been a vote in the General Assembly, the vote would also have decisively shown that weapons inspectors should undertake a comprehensive survey of Iraq to discover if the regime is hiding any pertinent information that might be associated with biological, nuclear or chemical weapons. That is how it stands at the moment. When the US-led coalition decides to act, then it is a moot point how much authority the UN will have in the second “ballot”.

Relationship between Washington and the inspectors. There has already started a campaign to downplay Hans Blix's role. Reports suggest that he is not tough enough with Baghdad (despite the fact that this team has the most draconian powers ever).

My feeling is that the inspection team is in a no-win situation. So far, no offensive material has been found. I believe that Washington is not interested in such fine details. If the UN team finds serious flaws in Iraq regarding weapons of mass destruction, then of course this gives a green light. However, the green light has already gone on and the weapons inspectors will be forced to cut short their investigation as the US swings into action.

To summarise, I believe that the US has already made up its mind and the UN team will be praised but told to pack bags as they have patently failed to rumble the chicanery of the Iraqi leader.

Washington's “hard truth”. This is a shadow game of which we can only glimpse tiny parts.

Washington, with unbridled haste, rejected the 12,500-page document submitted by Iraq that claims no weapons of mass destruction. Washington has evidence that concealment is under way. It claims that there are many gaps in this huge document. It claims to have shown some of this to Blix, but no breakthrough. Even Condoleezza Rice has said that there is no “smoking gun”. There is no evidence that connects Saddam's aspirations to any terrorist networks.

Baghdad. Baghdad reiterates that it is free of any weapons that are specifically designed for the purpose of disseminating nuclear, chemical or biological warfare. It claims that some things that it has are for dual purpose (civilian rather than military).

Any independent ideas. Despite the fact that Saddam was in breach of many of the original resolutions of the UN, many people were becoming disturbed by the sanctions and how they affected the Iraqi population, e.g., thousands of deaths; Iraq seemed to be winning the war regarding lifting the sanctions, through splits within the Security Council. Bush senior was only interested in chasing Saddam out of Kuwait, much to the chagrin of the Shiites and Kurds; Clinton never proposed any military strike against Iraq. So why is Bush junior so determined to end the regime of Saddam?

Sept. 11. It is doubtful that if this terrible and traumatic event had not taken place the US would have committed itself to the overthrow of the immoral Taleban regime or would have even seriously considered mounting an offensive against Iraq. When the event took place, ideas changed. Columnist Greenway writing in the “Boston Globe” believes that this unrelenting effort to disgorge regimes, anathema to Mr and Mrs Average of Baton Rouge, is driven by conscience. Greenway believes that there is much guilt within the mind of the president that he did not detect the awful events that unfolded on that Tuesday morning and the real reason why the might of America is aimed at Baghdad is really a way of saying sorry to the American populace.

So while the real Inspector Hound is trying to find anthrax in some forlorn factory to the north of Baghdad, his fate has already been decided by a cabal of worthies somewhere on Pennsylvania Avenue.

Time to replace fanaticism with intelligent politics

The Daily Star, 1/10/03

The multiple scandals dogging Ariel Sharon and his ruling Likud Party have gladdened the hearts of Israelis who understand the perils inherent in their prime minister’s polices vis-a-vis the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular. Just a few weeks ago, opinion polls showed the Likud and its allies headed for certain victory. Now the gap has been significantly narrowed, and the moderate/leftist opposition has a real chance to unseat the government. Anyone who wants peace to break out in this part of the world has an obligation to help make that happen.
Various members of the Likud Cabinet and their underlings have grumbled that foreign governments (including those of Egypt and Britain) are displaying favoritism toward Amram Mitzna’s Labor Party. Let them. The Likud’s ideology amounts to crypto-fascism, and among the movements in its orbit are Shas (kleptomaniacal theocracy), Herut (racist mysticism), the National Religious Party (ethnic cleansing), and Yisrael B’Aliya (apartheid for parvenus). This motley assortment of closet Brownshirts is in no way deserving of even common courtesy from political leaders in other countries, let alone deference of the sort that might keep justice from prevailing.
There is little room for error if Sharon and his allies are to be driven from power. More than two years of violence has hardened a wide section of the Israeli electorate, making more and more people susceptible to the claptrap peddled by the hard right. To counter this, all those who know that Mitzna is the best hope right now have to pull their weight. Arab governments can help by signaling their enthusiasm about the prospects for peace with him at the helm; Western leaders can indicate to the Israeli people that re-electing Sharon can only increase their isolation; Arab-Israelis can finally make their voices heard by turning out in overwhelming numbers to back the only party with a shot at defeating the Likud; and even Palestinian militant groups can pitch in by, at long last, ending the attacks that give Sharon so much of his appeal.
Now is the time for the intelligent politics of mutual self-preservation. The Arab Peace Initiative falls into this category, as do most of the suggestions put forward thus far by Mitzna. At the other end of the spectrum lie the bigoted demagoguery and reciprocal butchering espoused by fanatics on both sides. There is no room for neutrality between these two approaches: One either stands fully behind the voices of reason or one accepts to have the fates of two peoples decided by crazies.
The only existential threat faced by Israelis comes from within, not without, and it is embodied by rabble-rousers like Sharon. He and his cohorts have long exploited the natural predilections of a historically abused people by predicting disaster around every corner and then making sure it happens whenever they can. Their only product is the chaos that rules the Middle East today. The time has come for them to sink into the past, but that won’t happen without a concerted effort by those of all faiths who share the belief in a better future.

Making war and peace in Jerusalem

By Rami G. Khouri

The Daily Star, 1/10/03

The signs are visible on the street and in talks with people from all walks of life here in Jerusalem that three significant political developments are taking place among Palestinians and Israelis. First, the current, violent course of local history is increasingly being determined by mass popular sentiments on both sides, while leaders often only react to events without being able to guide them.
In Israel and Palestine alike, the center of gravity of political decision-making and ideology continues to shift from the top toward the bottom, from the government to the community. Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat spend more and more time these days issuing a dizzying combination of statements, warnings, threats, pleas, and promises that make more noise than impact. Both men are nearly immobilized by the mass anger and fear of their respective populations and the intense ideological competition within their very pluralistic political establishments. They act like cheerleaders, rather than real leaders.
At best, Sharon and Arafat can try to manage popular fear and anger; at worst, they feed and aggravate their people’s fear and anger by pandering to these emotions, usually choosing political expediency over statesmanship.
The populations on both sides are resigned to keep fighting in their respective ways, seeing guns and bombs as the only immediate means to protect or to liberate themselves. The idea that significant movement toward a negotiated peace may come from the collection of aging men that holds official power in Israel and Palestine is fanciful dreaming, and most Israelis and Palestinians know this. Yet, paradoxically, both leaderships continue to enjoy strong popular support only because in times of war and mass fear the citizenry rallies around the flag and seeks protection behind the man with a gun.
Second, some Israelis and Palestinians have started to question the effectiveness and appropriateness of current policies, and to ask whether new directions should be pursued. The collapse of the trust and hope that pertained in the immediate post-Oslo years of 1994-96 has been replaced by tough attitudes and military actions; the Palestinians see this as legitimate resistance against Israeli occupation and colonization, and the Israelis see it as legitimate self-defense and security maintenance. Yet militarism has not achieved the strategic political or national goals of either side. The current strategies and policies, like the current leaderships, are characterized by a numbing and growing legacy of failure.
So minorities in both communities have started to explore other, peaceful means of achieving Israeli and Palestinian legitimate national rights means such as immediate, unconditional negotiations, non-violent civil disobedience, mutual recognition, and others.
These attempts are unlikely to bring about different policies any time soon. Their significance is unclear, and should not be exaggerated. The majorities want to keep fighting, until they are offered alternatives to achieve their rights through negotiations.
Third, as a two-state solution seems less likely to materialize any time soon, some are exploring radically different permanent resolutions of the conflict, most of which are deeply frightening to the other side. Israelis increasingly speak of unilateral separation from the Palestinians - building a wall to keep the Palestinians away from Israeli population centers which one Israeli academic has described as a form of “internal ethnic cleansing.” Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories for their part increasingly speak of a single bi-national, democratic state in which Israelis and Palestinians are virtually equal in number (about five million each). Neither idea is attractive or acceptable to the other side.
Unpleasant as it may be, there is no doubt that the current political and emotional environment is the result of fear, anger, and militarism that both people can sustain for many years, despite the associated human suffering and drop in living standards.
Both sides see themselves as fighting for their very survival, and in such existential struggles there is no such thing as battle fatigue. The only thing we can say for sure right now is that this war will not end because people will get tired of fighting.
It’s probably also safe to assume that it will not end through external intervention, for perhaps the only phenomenon that matches the failure of current Israeli and Palestinian policies has been the legacy of failed American mediation in the quest for comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace and resolution of the Palestine issue.
The resolution of this conflict will have to come from within Palestine and Israel; but there are no signs of that now, and we should stop looking for them for a while. We have not yet reached the point where majorities in both communities see how they can live comfortably with the national demands of the other side.
I can think of three things that might cause this to happen: when thousands on each side die in a single day due to attacks by he other; when economic collapse reaches a point where Israelis and Palestinians start to die from poverty rather than from warfare; or when gifted statesmen and women emerge from the darkness to lead Palestinians and Israelis beyond their fears, into the land of their hopes and rights.
Jerusalem and its powerful spiritual legacy tells me that this will happen one day, but the warring citizens of Jerusalem also tell me that this will not happen any time soon.

Rami G. Khouri writes a syndicated column

Has the tide turned against another Gulf war?

By Patrick Seale

The Daily Star, 1/10/03

It is time to put the question everyone is asking: Will the United States and Britain attack Iraq? Yes or no? No one not even the man in the White House can yet answer that question with total certainty, but several indications suggest that the tide may have turned against the war.
Two unforeseen factors outside the Middle East have worked in Iraq’s favor. First, the Washington hawks’ argument that Iraq must be disarmed by force has been punctured by the Bush administration’s mild, “diplomatic” response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. If the acute danger from Pyongyang’s “real” weapons of mass destruction can be defused and neutralized by negotiations, surely the dubious threat from Baghdad’s “alleged” weapons can be dealt with in the same way. International public opinion, not least in the United States, is now reaching this conclusion, and this must certainly inhibit President George W. Bush from deciding to attack.
The crisis in Venezuela is the second factor no one foresaw. Venezuelan oil exports have been severely reduced by the six-week-long general strike which is threatening to bring down the regime of President Hugo Chavez. If a war were also to disrupt Iraq’s oil exports, the world oil market would lose a total from both producers of some 5 million barrels daily. Such a large amount could not be quickly made up by other producers, even if OPEC increases production. As a result, oil prices, already well over $30 a barrel, would soar still higher, dealing a severe blow to the already depressed American and world economies. This factor, too, must cause Bush to pause.
A third factor, perhaps even more important than the other two, is the growing hostility of British opinion towards the war, as reflected in Parliament and the press, and in numerous public meetings and interventions by prominent personalities. George Monbiot, a leading columnist of The Guardian newspaper, called this week for “a massive, though nonviolent, campaign of disruption” if Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to take Britain into war with Iraq.
There has also been a public clash on the subject between two members of the British cabinet, notably Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who tilts in favor of a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and his more hawkish colleague, Defense Minister Geoff Hoon, whose responsibility is to prepare British forces to fight.
In a major foreign policy speech last Tuesday, Tony Blair himself seemed to signal a retreat from war when he urged President Bush to “listen back” to the international community’s fears over Iraq. He warned of the danger of “chaos” if the world were split into “rival poles of power; the US in one corner; anti-US forces in another”. He also cited the threat from “pent-up feelings of injustice and alienation”, mentioning in particular not only poverty and global warming but also the stalled Middle East peace process.
Blair is evidently feeling the need to show some independence from the United States and to distance himself from the neoconservatives and Zionist extremists in Washington who are pressing for war. He also wants to reassure the Europeans, who are largely against the war, of Britain’s commitment to Europe. Blair’s speech is important because, without the political backing of America’s most important Western ally, it is doubtful whether Bush would dare to go to war.
Jack Straw said this week that Britain had always wanted a second Security Council resolution authorizing military action in the event of an Iraqi “material breach” of its obligations. He thereby contradicted the United States, which has made it clear that it does not consider a second resolution necessary. But the US would nevertheless need international cover for any action it might choose to take. Having chosen to go the multilateral route, it could not at this stage act alone.
Moreover, a major American ally such as Germany has reaffirmed its opposition to war, while France’s President Jacques Chirac has said that war should only be a last resort. The first secretary of France’s Socialist Party, Francois Holland, has said France should use its veto at the Security Council if the US tried to force through a Resolution authorizing war. Russia’s foreign minister has, in turn, warned the US against unilateral military action.
In the region, Turkey’s Prime Minister Abdullah Gul has completed a tour of Arab states in which he has sought to assure his hosts that Turkey has no enthusiasm for war. Parliamentary approval would be needed for any Turkish participation in military action. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, has said that any provision of facilities to American forces would be dictated solely by the kingdom’s national interests. Syria’s President Bashar Assad has made clear that, in spite of his country’s past differences with Baghdad, he is totally opposed to war. Meanwhile, there have been anti-war and anti-American demonstrations in both Pakistan and Bahrain.
Developments on the ground in Iraq do not seem to point to war. For one thing, after inspecting more than 200 sites in Iraq, the UN weapons inspectors have so far failed to discover any trace of weapons of mass destruction.
Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, is due to report to the Security Council on Jan. 17, and many diplomats are predicting that his report will be favorable. In other words, there is as yet no pretext to justify military action against Baghdad.
Meanwhile, however, a contrary message is being sent with the continuing US military buildup against Iraq, to which Britain is making a small but significant contribution. As Tony Blair said in his speech this week, “The price of influence is that we do not leave the US to face the tricky issues alone.” The theory behind the build-up is that Saddam Hussein will agree to disarm peacefully only when the threat of military action against him is imminent and wholly credible.
The trouble is that there are those in Washington and Israel who want to go to war, regardless of whether or not Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. For them, the weapons issue has been a sideshow. Their wider aims have to do with American and Israeli regional hegemony, the breaking of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation, and control over oil.
The regional gamble of Ariel Sharon, Israel’s hard-line prime minister, depends on war. If the US attacks Iraq, he will almost certainly seize the occasion to strike at Hizbullah, and perhaps at Syria as well, and expel or kill the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, completing the destruction of the Palestinian Authority.
If Saddam Hussein does not provide a pretext for military action, the frustration of the hawks in both Washington and Israel will rise to dangerous levels. It can safely be predicted that they will then start criticizing Hans Blix and dismissing the work of his weapons inspectors as incompetent and inadequate. They will accuse Saddam Hussein of deception. And if necessary, they will seek to manufacture a pretext for war, a not too difficult task.
Meanwhile, they are trying to provoke the Iraqi leadership to anger, and perhaps goad it into an impulsive act of hostility, by a campaign of psychological warfare. Rumors have been floated that Arab leaders are pressing Saddam Hussein to quit and seek asylum overseas. In view of Saddam’s character and record, this is a wholly unrealistic scenario.
The New York Times this week carried a detailed report, obviously “leaked” by an official source, outlining American plans for a post-Saddam Iraq. US military control would be assisted by a civilian administrator, perhaps designated by the UN. Key officials would be put on trial but people who helped overthrow the regime would be spared. Although the US would seize the fields and restart production, oil would remain “the patrimony of the Iraqi people.” Iraq’s “territorial integrity” would be preserved, but the American military would run the country for at least a year and a half.
Such arrogant reports should not be read as a credible blueprint for the future. They are intended to undermine Iraq’s will to resist, and if possible trigger a coup against Saddam. They reflect the growing nervousness of the hawks who fear that war might be avoided after all.
The key question now is this: After all his bellicose threats and his call for “regime change,” can Bush now back down and still save face?

Patrick Seale is a veteran Middle East analyst.

Where is the Syrian-American relationship headed?

An Arab press review, By The Daily Star, 1/10/03

There’s much Arab media interest in the subject of Syrian-US relations, following the conclusion in Damascus of the second round of the ostensibly “unofficial” but closely watched “dialogue” between the two sides.
Arab newspapers offer conflicting initial assessments of the outcome of the three days of discussions, in which Syrian and American delegations including serving and former diplomats and officials as well as academics and business and media people debated bilateral and regional issues.
The leading pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat portrays the talks as having succeeded in bridging important differences between the two sides. It splashes its front-page with the Syrian foreign ministry’s statement describing the gathering as “constructive and helpful” and indicating that “clear understanding was reached over a number of issues that are extremely important for the region, for ties between Syria and the US and for Arab-American relations.”
But Saudi-run pan-Arab Al-Hayat headlines that the American and Syrian delegates differed sharply over the issues of Iraq and Palestine, with the Syrian side insisting that a US war on Iraq would be totally unjustified. The paper’s sources nevertheless emphasize “the importance of this dialogue, which is unofficial despite the participation of officials on both sides, in putting forward viewpoints and proposing compromises,” as well as “correcting Syria’s distorted image in the American media.”
The Beirut daily As-Safir reports that the subject of Iraq dominated the meetings in Damascus, which are organized by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, set up and named after the former US secretary of state, and follow a first round of talks held in Houston, Texas in May last year.
As-Safir quotes the institute’s director and former US ambassador to Syria, Edward Djerejian, as saying while last year’s “dialogue” session helped “break the ice” between the two sides, in their latest talks they delved deeper into various bilateral and regional issues, and began considering “solutions.”
Djerejian also indicated the two teams who are due to hold a third parley in Houston, though no date has yet been determined might eventually draft and publish a set of policy “recommendations.” He said there was support high up in the US administration for the “dialogue,” and while cautioning against “giving ourselves too much importance,” said the discussions could influence the policies of both governments.
Djerejian suggested it would be “useful” for the US to engage in “unofficial dialogue” with other important countries with which it has serious differences, “like Iran.”
Lebanese commentator Sarkis Naoum suggests Syria’s behavior during a prospective American war on Iraq could be the key to determining how its relationship with the US develops.
In a just-concluded three-part news analysis published in the Beirut daily An-Nahar, Naoum writes that the close security and anti-terrorism cooperation between the two sides post-Sept. 11 has failed to translate into an overall improvement in relations. Palestine and Iraq continue to divide the two countries, especially with the pro-Israel neo-conservatives wielding so much clout in Washington.
Quoting Washington insiders who favor improved US-Syrian ties, Naoum says the Americans feel the high hopes vested in Bashar Assad when he became president have not been realized. His failure to deliver promised political and economic reforms, while perhaps attributable to resistance from “mainstays” of the Syrian regime, leaves Washington wondering whether his cautious “wavering” between reform and the old order is a “temporary policy” while he strengthens his home front position, or “the most that can be expected of him.”
Naoum argues that “regional conditions” have not helped the Syrian president institute reforms. He inherited office just as the peace process was melting down and the far-right was assuming power in Israel, then had to cope with Sept. 11 and its fallouts, and now faces the prospect of war on Iraq. He appreciates how vulnerable all this makes his country, and so has taken a number of steps such as reining in Hizbullah and endorsing the US-authored UN resolution on Iraq aimed at enabling him to “strengthen his position and face up to the gathering storm in the region.”
The late Hafez Assad did something similar in 1990, when he joined the US-led coalition against Iraq and the US-sponsored peace process, thus securing “international protection” for Syria to offset the collapse of Soviet backing. But circumstances have changed: there’s no prospect of restarting the peace process; the US administration is under heavy pressure to force Syria to crack down on the Palestinian organizations it hosts and get Hizbullah disbanded; and the Syrian president is in no position to join any US-led coalition against Iraq. “Accordingly, he will not obtain the international protection which his father secured by joining the coalition in 1990.”
Naoum’s sources go on to argue that Damascus needs to do more to gain favor with Washington, and adopt a “strategy” to safeguard it from the “super hawks” in George W. Bush’s administration who want to adopt a “identical or comparable” policy toward Syria as the US has done toward Iraq and whose position will be strengthened if America succeeds in enforcing “regime change” in Baghdad. That would also greatly increase the risk of Syria and Lebanon being mugged by Israel.
The elements of the strategy Syria needs to pursue to counter the Bush administration’s super hawks are well known, Naoum remarks. “But the key element which is certain to be well-received in Washington and specifically within the US administration would be for Syria to decide to prevent the emergence of any movement opposing or resisting the anticipated military blitz against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and against the regime which the US is expected to install in Iraq afterwards,” he writes
Naoum reports that moves are ostensibly already being made to establish a “national resistance” to oppose the future US presence in Iraq, and the Americans know that, for these efforts to succeed, they will need “Syrian help, cover or protection.” So they want Damascus not just to withhold assistance to these efforts, but to actively help foil them.
Whether this appeases the American super hawks remains to be seen, Naoum concludes. They believe a “major dose of force” in the Middle East would cure all America’s problems there, “from Iran to Saudi Arabia,” and want to start with Iraq while enabling Israel to use that war to achieve some of its aims. Those aims may include mugging Lebanon and Syria, he says, but Israel’s chief objective relates to its conflict with the Palestinians: it wants to change Palestine’s “demography,” and “the arena for that will be the West Bank,”
Saad Mehio predicts in the UAE daily Al-Khaleej that there is likely to be an upsurge in suicide bombings in Palestine as the start of the anticipated blitz on Iraq approaches, despite the Bush administration’s efforts to “cool down the Palestinian front as the Iraqi and Middle Eastern front heats up.”
A variety of “regional forces” are bound to “use the Palestinian card” as a weapon in the pending conflict, which is set to “change all the Middle East map’s features,” he reasons.
“No one engaged in the current game of life and death in the region could even consider neutralizing this valuable and potent card. And no one means no one not Saddam Hussein, not Iran’s mullahs, not Syria, and naturally not Osama bin Laden.”
That means it is a near certainty that the period between now and the start of the US invasion of Iraq will be “a period of martyrdom operations par excellence,” he says. “The more efforts the US exerts to make its invasion of Iraq swift and ‘clean,’ the more the regional forces concerned will strive to make it protracted and costly.”
The reasons for that are evident, Mehio writes. If the US scores an easy and inexpensive victory in Iraq, it will “quickly and inevitably move to achieve similar victories against a considerable number of regional forces who figure on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s hit-list.”
The fact “the Palestinian front has been left open” provides all those forces with the opportunity to “open new fronts” of their own, perhaps starting in Palestine and eventually moving on to America proper. In that sense, the recent twin suicide bombings in Tel Aviv could prove to be only “the start of a deluge.”
France’s shifting position on Iraq is noted with disapproval by Joseph Samaha, editor-in-chief of the Beirut daily by As-Safir, who sees in President Jacques Chirac’s latest speech on the subject “unmistakable” signs of a French tilt in favor of going along with a US-led war.
Having earlier taken a strong independent stand against American unilateralism (a policy described by Samaha as “Paris I”), Chirac is now evidently inclined to defer to the US (“Paris II”). The French media depicted his speech as an attempt to prepare French public opinion which remains overwhelmingly opposed to war, and will still take much convincing.
Samaha suggests that one reason for Chirac’s U-turn is the failure of Arab and regional states to lend meaningful support to Paris’s earlier drive to restrain the Americans. But the key to understanding Chirac’s policy shift could be Washington’s recent hints that it doesn’t mind post-Saddam Iraq being run by a “temporary international administrator” rather than an American military governor, as had earlier been touted.
The “political meaning” of this is that rather than keeping all the “spoils” of war for itself, the US is willing to see them “distributed more or less fairly” among the countries that agree to join it. Consequently, “policy becomes determined not by the scope of the threat Iraq poses, but by the gains that can be made from making common cause with Washington.”
To Samaha’s mind, France’s policy shift illustrates one of the biggest ironies of the Iraq crisis: the more the UN arms inspectors confirm that Iraq does not appear to possess doomsday weapons, the more support the US rallies for war. “It’s as though the real job of the inspectors is to confirm that Iraq is void of these weapons in order to persuade the waverers that the risks of waging war (to destroy non-existent weapons) are minimal,” he remarks. After six weeks of inspections, no trace has been found of the arms programs which the US and Britain claimed Iraq was developing. “Nevertheless, these claims are gaining supporters, not the least important of whom is Chirac.”
As-Safir’s editor adds as an afterthought that in Lebanon, while President Emile Lahoud’s declared views echo “Paris I,” Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s position is plainly closer to “Paris II.”
“This is not a value judgment, merely an observation that even over an issue as grave as Iraq, the two men resemble parallel lines,” he writes. “Is it not time for this farce to be ended, so we can learn what the official Lebanese attitude really is to the ‘gates of hell’ that could be about to open?”
Pan-Arab Al-Quds al-Arabi takes issue with those Arab states who are reportedly working on plans to try to persuade the Iraqi president to resign and go into exile as a way of averting war on his country.
The paper sees the recent spate of media reports suggesting he might do so as part of an American disinformation campaign. Although Baghdad denied the reports, it didn’t need to, it writes, “for no one who knows Iraq and its leaders’ mentality could possibly believe that President Saddam Hussein, after all these years of standing fast in the face of the embargo and assassination attempts, would defer to a request by the US president to leave Iraq so that he can step in as invader and occupier without any confrontation.
“Those calling for the Iraqi president’s departure are falling for the American propaganda war, which is trying to blame the current crisis with Iraq on its president,” Al-Quds al-Arabi writes in its main leader. “Such naive over-simplification amounts to collusion in America’s neo-imperialism … The war on Iraq is not aimed at disarming it or promoting democracy and freedom, but at seizing its oil, placing it under occupation and breaking it up along sectarian and racial lines.”
Iraq’s cooperation with the UN over arms inspections has been exemplary, the paper points out, and yet Arab leaders continue to put the onus on Baghdad rather than Washington to prevent war, and urge the Iraqi president to go into exile to spare his country from being attacked. “Perhaps one of those Arab leaders should set an example by stepping down himself, and allowing his people to freely elect a president or king to replace him,” it suggests.

Prosecute Sharon and his government for warcrimes
By Ray Hanania | Gulf News, 10-01-2003
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Just as the world ignored the murder of European Jews just prior to World War II, the world is ignoring the war crimes of the Israeli government and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

During the current conflict, the Israeli government has violated nearly every basic human right of the three million Palestinians, rejecting the principles of the Geneva Convention.

Demonstrating American government's hypocrisy, the Bush administration has blocked every United Nations resolution intended to censure Israel. This American government's double standard allows the Israeli army to commit war crimes with impunity. It is one reason why many nations oppose the Bush war against Iraq, which is targeted for violating the UN resolutions.

The Israeli government is engaged in criminal conduct. It created a new term called "extra-judicial killing," which means Israel can murder civilians and call them terrorists, whether they are or not. In most cases they are not, but Israel also blocks independent probes of their actions, too, restricting media coverage only to those that are pro-Israel.

Here's a short list of some of Israel's government war crimes:

Jenin Massacre: In April 2002, an Israeli force of tanks, helicopters firing missiles and hundreds of soldiers invaded a refugee camp in Jenin. They conducted house-to-house demolitions as they searched for alleged wanted Palestinians. Because Palestinians are prohibited from investigating Israeli military actions, initial reports mistakenly put the number of civilians killed at several hundred.

This was one of the few times a UN team was permitted limited access many weeks later, because among the 75 dead were 23 Israeli soldiers killed by resisting Palestinians. A total of 52 Palestinian civilians were murdered, two-thirds of them women and children. As it wasn't in the hundreds, it wasn't a 'massacre'.

Much of the exaggeration was conducted by the Israel controlled media, which quoted Palestinian spokesman Saeb Erakat as saying up to 500 civilians were killed in a massacre. When the transcript of his statements was examined, no such claim was made. Yet it was widely misreported and used as evidence that no massacre had occurred.

Human shields: Israel uses Palestinian civilians as 'human shields' in their attacks against civilian areas. The Palestinian and Israeli civil rights organisations have been able to document this practice. Unable to deny the charges filed by these groups to the Israeli Supreme Court, the Israeli government replied it ordered the practice to end. But, they said they are encouraging soldiers to seek out civilians willing to assist its military operations. In other words, if they volunteer to stand in front of an Israeli occupation soldier, it's OK.

UN worker murdered: On December 21, 2002, an Israeli sniper using a telescopic lens shot UN worker Iain Hook in the back from 25 metres. At first, Israel blamed the death on Palestinian 'terrorists'. The evidence showed the Israelis were not under attack, and the only people doing the shooting were Israeli soldiers.

Hook did not die right away but bled to death because of Israel's policy of refusing to allow medical teams to respond immediately to injuries. Hundreds of Palestinian civilians have died in the same manner as Israeli soldiers watched.

Ironically, the United Nations couldn't even condemn Israel's crime. The United States stepped in and blocked a Security Council resolution denouncing Israel for the murder.

Civilian Homes bombed: In July 2002, an American-made F-16 Israeli fighter jet dropped a one-tonne bomb on a crowded apartment building in the middle of the night in the Gaza Strip. They killed Hamas activist Sheik Salah Shehadeh, his wife and their four children. They were all in their beds sleeping. Eight other Palestinians, sleeping in their beds, were also killed, including five more children.

More than 140 other civilians, all sleeping in their beds, were seriously wounded and left homeless when the multi-storied building and several adjacent buildings were destroyed. It was the sixth such attack by Israel on an apartment building complex.

These war crimes fuel Palestinian revenge, but remain as evidence for cases that someday they will be prosecuted in an international court.

Creators Syndicate

Ray Hanania is a well-known Arab-American columnist.

Greece should visit Iraq

Gulf News, 10-01-2003
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Less than a week into its presidency of the European Union, EU, Greece has surprised its fellow members by declaring its intention to visit the Middle East next month, with a view to averting war with Iraq. While it is not clear yet when exactly the trip will be made, it has been announced that the Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou is expected to visit Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. Papandreou's declared aim is to persuade Arab nations to play a bigger role in mediating between the United States and Iraq. He is hoping that Arab nations can persuade President Saddam Hussain to conform to UN resolutions in their entirety, in the belief it will avert war and guarantee peace.

However, Papandreou would do better if he was to visit Iraq and speak to Saddam Hussain direct. Papandreou would not be held hostage by a belligerent Iraq; on the contrary, it is very probable he will be dealt with courteously and listened to politely, for anything else is likely to be interpreted as being provocative in the extreme and an incitement to war - just the sort of excuse that Britain and America are seeking.

In speaking to Saddam on a one-on-one basis, Papandreou's rating will increase immeasurably, as well as that of Greece and the EU, which has thus far been a silent witness to events in Iraq. By putting over the EU position and its alleged desire not to go to war other than as a last resort if all else fails, it is possible that Saddam will take cognisance of the message and act in accordance with the wishes of the international community. A visit to Saddam by a senior diplomat may bring home the message that, while war is not desired by the West, if there is no other option, such a measure will be taken.

Set new world agenda - Blair

Gulf News, 10-01-2003
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British Prime Minister Tony Blair has said that Britain's role in the world includes continuing to be the 'closest ally of the U.S.' and using this influence to 'broaden their agenda'. The PM was setting out several principles guiding Britain's role in the world today, which included its relationship with the Muslim world, in a speech to British ambassadors at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Leader-ship Conference in London on Tuesday. The Prime Minister's speech:

A country always has to know its place in the world. For Britain this is of special importance. At the end of the 19th Century we were an imperial power. A century later the Empire was gone. Naturally, and despite the pride of our victory in World War II, our definition seemed less certain. Our change in circumstances affected our confidence and self-belief. Yet today I have no doubt what our place is and how we should use it.

What are our strengths? Part of the EU; and G8; permanent members of the UN Security Council; the closest ally of the U.S.; our brilliant armed forces; membership of Nato; the reach given by our past; the Commonwealth; the links with Japan, China, Russia and ties of history with virtually every nation in Asia and Latin America; our diplomacy - I do believe our Foreign Service is the best there is; our language.

What is the nature of the world in which these strengths can be deployed? The world has never been more interdependent. Economic and security shocks spread like contagion. I learnt this graphically in the 1998 financial crisis; everyone knows it after September 11.

Nations recognise more than ever before that the challenges have to be met in part, at least, collectively. Also culture and communication driven by technological revolution are deepening the sense of a global community. Look at the FCO strategic goals you set out in your paper. Each of them has a direct domestic impact. Yet each of them - whether free trade through the WTO, combating climate change or the threats to our security - can only be overcome by collaboration across national frontiers.

Fundamentalist political ideology now seems an aberration of the 20th Century. But religious extremism through the misinterpretation of religion is a danger all over the world, not because it is supported by large numbers of ordinary people but because it can be manipulated by small numbers of fanatics to distort the lives of ordinary people. As the FCO point out in another paper, wars between nations seem less likely - at least outside of the Continent of Africa - but flashpoints remain and in any event, the crucial thing is that no conflict we can contemplate can possibly remain localised.

What does all this mean? It means that the world today has one overriding common interest: to make progress with order; to ensure that change is accompanied by stability. The common threat is chaos. That threat can come from terrorism, producing a train of events that pits nations against each other. It can come through irresponsible and repressive states gaining access to WMD. It can come through the world splitting into rival poles of power; the U.S. in one corner; anti - U.S. forces in another. It can come from pent-up feelings of injustice and alienation, from the divisions between the world's richer and its poorer nations. The threat is not change. The world and many countries in it need to change. It is change through disorder, because then the consequences of change cannot be managed.

This has been understood, at least inchoately, ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Then the call was for a new world order. But a new order presumes a new consensus. It presumes a shared agenda and a global partnership to do it.

Here's where Britain's place lies. We can only play a part in helping this - to suggest more would be grandiose and absurd - but it is an important part. Our very strengths, our history equip us to play a role as a unifier around a consensus for achieving both our goals and those of the wider world.

Stating our aims is relatively easy and they would be shared by many other countries: security from terrorism and WMD; elimination of regional conflicts that can afflict us; a stable world economy; free trade; action against climate change; aid and development. Jack set them out clearly yesterday. The question is: how as a matter of diplomacy do we achieve them? What are the principles of foreign policy that should guide us?

First, we should remain the closest ally of the U.S., and as allies influence them to continue broadening their agenda. We are the ally of the U.S. not because they are powerful, but because we share their values. I am not surprised by Anti-Americanism; but it is a foolish indulgence. For all their faults and all nations have them, the U.S. are a force for good; they have liberal and democratic traditions of which any nation can be proud. I sometimes think it is a good rule of thumb to ask of a country: are people trying to get into it or out of it? It's not a bad guide to what sort of country it is.

Quite apart from that, it is massively in our self-interest to remain close allies. Bluntly there are not many countries who wouldn't wish for the same relationship as we have with the U.S. and that includes most of the ones most critical of it in public.

But we should use this alliance to good effect. The problem people have with the U.S. " not the rabid anti-Americans but the average middle ground - is not that, for example, they oppose them on WMD or International terrorism. People listen to the U.S. on these issues and may well agree with them; but they want the US to listen back.

So for the International community, the MEPP is also important; global poverty is important; global warming is important; the UN is important.

The U.S. choice to go through the UN over Iraq was a vital step, in itself and as a symbol of the desire to work with others. A broader agenda is not inimical to the U.S.; on the contrary. For example the U.S. decision to back a new relationship between Nato and Russia has made both Missile Defence and Nato enlargement easier and less divisive.

The price of British influence is not, as some would have it, that we have, obediently, to do what the U.S. asks. I would never commit British troops to a war I thought was wrong or unnecessary. Where we disagree, as over Kyoto, we disagree.

But the price of influence is that we do not leave the U.S. to face the tricky issues alone. By tricky, I mean the ones which people wish weren't there, don't want to deal with, and, if I can put it a little pejoratively, know the U.S. should confront, but want the luxury of criticising them for it. So if the U.S. act alone, they are unilateralist; but if they want allies, people shuffle to the back.

International terrorism is one such issue. The fanatics have to be confronted and defeated - in ideas as well as militarily as I shall say later. WMD is another. I want to make it clear. In February 2001, at my first meeting with President Bush I said this was the key issue facing the world community. I believe that even more today. The latest revelations about North Korea are a manifest wake-up call to the world. This shouldn't divert us from tackling Iraq and WMD. There will be different ways of dealing with different countries. But no one can doubt the salience of WMD as an issue and the importance of countering it. North Korea's weapons programme and export of it, the growing number of unstable or dictatorial states trying to acquire nuclear capability, the so-called respectable companies and people trading in it: this is a real, active threat to our security and I warn people: it is only a matter of time before terrorists get hold of it.

So when as with Iraq, the international community through the UN makes a demand on a regime to disarm itself of WMD and that regime refuses, that regime threatens us. It may be uncomfortable, there will be the usual plethora of conspiracy theories about it; but unless the world takes a stand on this issue of WMD and sends out a clear signal, we will rue the consequences of our weakness.

America should not be forced to take this issue on alone. We should all be part of it. Of course, it should go through the UN - that was our wish and what the U.S. did. But if the will of the UN is breached then the will should be enforced.

Jack Straw has today set out for Parliament in more detail our policy objectives on Iraq.
So when the U.S. confront these issues, we should be with them; and we should, in return, expect these issues to be confronted with the international community, proportionately, sensibly and in a way that delivers a better prospect of long-term peace, security and justice.

Second, Britain must be at the centre of Europe. By 2004, the EU will consist of 25 nations. In time others including Turkey will join. It will be the largest market in the world. It will be the most integrated political union between nations. It will only grow in power. To separate ourselves from it would be madness. If we are in, we should be in whole-heartedly. That must include, provided the economic conditions are right, membership of the single currency. For 50 years we have hesitated over Europe. It has never profited us.

And there is no greater error in international politics than to believe that strong in Europe means weaker with the U.S. The roles reinforce each other. What is more there can be no international consensus unless Europe and the U.S. stand together. Whenever they are divided, the forces of progress, the values of liberty and democracy, the requirements of security and peace, suffer. We can indeed help to be a bridge between the U.S. and Europe and such understanding is always needed. Europe should partner the U.S. not be its rival.

Thirdly, we should engage with the countries who by dint of land size and population are bound to be ever greater economic and political powers, in order to seek common ground. Russia, China and India are all countries in a process of transition. Their power will be enormous. How they develop will affect crucially our own security and prosperity. With the U.S. and within Europe as well as on our own account we should be helping in their path of change, whether in the WTO, on issues of peace and security or in the UN Security Council itself. With Japan, we should ensure we remain its principal partner within Europe, yet another reason for being influential in Europe ourselves.

Fourthly, our history is a strength, provided we lose any lingering traces of imperial arrogance and recognise countries will only work with us as equals. But that said, working with us is what many want and probably more than any other former colonial power, our Empire left much affection as well as deep problems to be overcome.

For many of those countries, our relations today are being transformed, with DfID helping to give us a relationship of equality, trust and partnership. We should deepen it at every turn. Not just through commerce and conventional diplomacy but through the British Council, the World Service, through encouraging students from abroad to study here, through political dialogue.

Fifth, there can be no new consensus, no new order, no stability, without tackling the appalling poverty that afflicts nearly a half of the world's population. Action to deal with this - possible with the right vision and imagination - is the best investment in its own future the developed world could make. For the developing world, Britain should be their champions. For example in opening up markets through the WTO; and working with Africa, to make their NEPAD a reality.

Sixth, we need to construct a better framework within which the international institutions, like the IMF and World Bank help countries deal with their difficulties and make progress. The problem here is often that what the IMF and World Bank say - indeed what the world says - is intellectually correct; but the political pain can be unbearable or the political system too fragile to take the medicine.

I started to reflect on this as a result of the European enlargement process. If you had said five years ago, all 10 countries would join and in 2004, people would have thought it wildly utopian. But EU and Nato membership has been a remarkable magnet for reform. And look at Turkey now. We ask countries in Latin America, in the Middle East, in Asia and Africa to undertake vast change. Yet it isn't often placed within a broader political context where there is some specified and obvious gain, some goal to aim for.

This is where the international community needs to develop mechanisms for encouraging the developed nations to put more vision, energy and creativity into fashioning the right pull-factors so that countries are able to mobilise their people in favour of reform. It might be on a regional basis. It might be in terms of trade or security or help with governance. But without it, too many politicians in developing countries will know what is the right thing to do, but struggle to do it. Britain has the political and intellectual capacity to help create this framework. Latin America is the place to start.

Seventh, we must reach out to the Muslim world.

This is about three things. It is about even-handedness. The reason there is opposition over our stance on Iraq has less to do with any love of Saddam, but over a sense of double standards. The MEPP remains essential to any understanding with the Muslim and Arab world. The terrorism inflicted upon innocent citizens is wicked and murderous and undoubtedly will bring strong action from governments. No democratic Government could do otherwise. That is not the point. The point is that unless there is real energy put into crafting a process that can lead to lasting peace, neither the appalling suffering of the Palestinians nor the carnage of Israelis will cease. At the moment the future of the innocent is held hostage by the terrorists.

But reaching out to the Muslim world also means engaging with how those countries move towards greater democratic stability, liberty and human rights. It means building pathways of understanding between Islam and other religious faiths. This seems an odd thing for a politician to say - but then I am used to clerics offering me advice. But we need to engage with mainstream Islam at a theological as well as political level. Inter-faith dialogue is one important part of greater understanding. Those who abuse true Islam have to be challenged by ideas and values as much as by security and arms. They will recruit new volunteers as fast or faster as we imprison or destroy the old ones, unless we are helping those within the faith of Islam who are speaking out in favour of moderation, tolerance and sense.

Again Britain, with its understanding of the Arab world and its tradition of religious tolerance can help.

In the end, all these things come back to one basic theme. The values we stand for: freedom, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, are all universal values. Given a chance, the world over, people want them. But they have to be pursued alongside another value: justice, the belief in opportunity for all. Without justice, the values I describe can be portrayed as "Western values"; globalisation becomes a battering ram for Western commerce and culture; the order we want is seen by much of the world as "their" order not "ours".

The consensus can only be achieved if pursued with a sense of fairness, of equality, of partnership. Our role is to use all the strengths of our history, unique in their breadth for a country our size, to unify nations around that consensus.

One last thing we, Britain, need: confidence in ourselves.

This is not a time for British caution or even British reserve, still less for a retreat into isolation on the basis of some misguided view of patriotism. This is a time for us to be out in front; engaged; open; creative; willing to take bold decisions. All it needs is courage and confidence. You, like the British people, have plenty of both. When you put your minds to it, there is no one better. I saw it in Kosovo and Afghanistan. I've seen it in countless European Councils; I've seen it in the passion and commitment of DFID; in the recent negotiations in the UN.

I see it every time I meet the most junior of your staffs in any Embassy in the world who have only one motivation: an enthusiasm to do the best for Britain in a noble cause. Now is the moment to make our future as exciting in impact, if different in character, as our history.

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