Feb 4, 2003 Op Eds

Feb 4, 2003 Opinion Editorials http://www.aljazeerah.info

George Bush Sr. learned the hard way that winning a war is not enough to win an election. Bill Clinton defeated him in 1992 because he understood what Bush Sr. did not, that the economy is first and foremost where politics happen in the US. Political issues, unless they are of the gravest importance, are not the prime concern for Americans.

“It’s the economy, stupid!” is a lesson that German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is now learning the equally hard way. He had hoped that his high-profile opposition to US policy on Iraq which saved him from defeat in last September federal elections would again give victory his Social Democrat Party (SPD) in Sunday’s state elections in Lower Saxony and Hesse. Instead, his party has been administered one of its most crushing blows and a personal one for him too. Lower Saxony is his own home territory; he won the elections there in 1998 before going on to become federal chancellor.

People voted in their droves against the SPD for one overriding reason: they do not trust him to deliver on the economy. For them, like the Americans, that is the big issue, not foreign politics. He will no doubt take comfort from fact that for some three years prior to last September’s vote, the SPD saw its support plummet in state election after state election yet still managed to win the federal contest, if only just. His barbed comment when casting his own vote on Sunday that this was, after all, not an election to the federal parliament suggests that he may do just that. But it would be an act of the grossest self-delusion. The big difference between last September and now is that the scale of Germany’s economic malaise can no longer be avoided. With spiraling unemployment, rising taxes, budget deficits publicly condemned by the EU and threatened strikes by nurses, fire-fighters and other public sector workers, Germans see themselves heading for unrelenting hard times — and as far as they are concerned, it is all Schroeder’s fault.

Ironically, with the opposition Christian Democrats now firmly in control of the upper house of the German Parliament, it will be easier for him to force through the package of austerity measures and tax hikes which are needed if the deficit is to be reduced but which the German public and members of his own party so firmly dislike. As business-friendly policies, the Christian Democrats cannot afford not to support them. That may help the economy, although it will not help his popularity.

The fact that Germans were unmoved by his anti-war message begs the question whether he will now start to tone it down. It is possible; there are plenty of Germans worried about the long-term effects, particularly the economic and commercial effects, of antagonizing the US. But the more likely scenario is that he will beat the Iraqi drum even louder. It is the only drum he has. Even if they were insufficiently motivated by it, it is genuinely popular with most Germans.

But however much he beats it, it will not help him at home. International issues do not win elections. What electors want, be they American, German or anyone else, is economic competence. Schroeder is going to have to perform miracles if he is to convince Germans that he has that ability.

Israel’s use of Sudan to encircle Egypt
By Hassan Tahsin, Arab News, 2/4/03

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In order for Israel’s conspiracy to be completed, it must find its way into Sudan. The country was torn by conflict, the struggle reaching a peak from 1983-2002. Foreign forces, headed by Israel, took advantage of the upheaval and sought to embroil Sudan in the struggles of its neighbors. Israel played a dual role in the Ethiopian-Eritrean struggle, supporting Eritrea’s bid for independence.

Israel also managed to make Khartoum a transit station for Falasha Jews expelled from Ethiopia and this led to a cooling of Sudanese-Arab relations and consequently affected the Sudanese government’s ability to confront separatist movements.

In light of the special relationship, based on shared ideology and a common history, that links Egypt and the Sudan, a symposium took place in the Academy for Research and African Studies in the University of Cairo; its title was “Sudan’s future in light of the latest changes”.

The participants in the symposium dealt with a number of interconnected issues relating to Sudan’s situation today and how to overcome the problems and crises that it faces, especially the southern separatist movement. The symposium concluded with a number of recommendations. One deals with Sudan’s internal issues, another with its relationship with neighboring countries and Arab, African and international organizations and finally, special recommendations pertaining to Egyptian-Sudanese relations.

What is of most importance is to look at what is required of Egypt to support Sudan in its time of crisis, in light of the fact that its stability and unity is an extremely important matter for Cairo which itself is charged with moving forward more rapidly to confront the Israeli invasion of the nations around the African lakes. The recommendations of the symposium are as follows:

The need for Egypt to share in efforts to reach a new settlement and consolidate its role in reaching understanding between its Sudanese brethren and not to absent itself and leave the door open for negative separatist influences.

It is necessary to support Sudanese asylum seekers in Egypt and helping them to overcome their daily problems and to take special interest in their educational and health requirements.

There was also a recommendation that the year 2004 be the Year of Africa in Egypt — concentrating on Sudan.

Workshops will be organized as an adjunct to the Academy in which Egyptian and Sudanese experts from the north and south would participate and which would conclude with recommendations related to finding a settlement on a scientific basis. There is also a need to provide accurate information about Sudan to all who require it and organizing a comprehensive media program to follow up African problems and to make sure that Egypt’s voice is heard in the countries of the continent. These steps in addition to the other recommendations may be useful to a certain degree — but alone will not be enough to prevent Sudan from being divided up.

Therefore, I believe that in order for any efforts to succeed in this matter, foreign interference in Sudan’s affairs must end, whether that interference is due to a desire to monopolize the oil found in the country or to encircle Egypt and threaten Arab security. Otherwise the struggle will become more violent — especially if Egypt is forced to interfere more positively.

Splits in US intelligence agencies say something

Jordan Times, 2/4/03

IT IS no small matter that the US intelligence services are divided over the administration's push to link Iraq with Al Qaeda in a bid to strengthen Washington's case for a war on Baghdad. The New York Times report on Sunday quoting officials as saying several Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) analysts complained of exaggerated and scant evidence connecting Iraq to Al Qaeda, certainly begs the question: If the US government can't get its branches and agencies to agree on something as important as this, what other differences lie beneath the surface of the arguments in favour of war? President George Bush has repeatedly hinted that his government has enough evidence to establish a link between the Iraqi regime and Osama Ben Laden's Al Qaeda network. On Friday, his vice president, Dick Cheney, told fellow Republicans at the party's national headquarters in Washington: "His [Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's] regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda." But Cheney presented no evidence. In fact, all the evidence submitted on this point is still unconvincing to most countries. Now with CIA and FBI analysts expressing doubt about the accuracy of the evidence establishing a link between Iraq and terrorism, US Secretary of State Colin Powell's task to present evidence to the UN Security Council on Wednesday becomes that much harder.

The most incriminating proof that Washington has been able to come up with was a visit by a member of Al Qaeda to Baghdad for medical treatment.

Given the traditional hostility between Al Qaeda and the secular regime in Iraq, all the US efforts to establish a link between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and international terrorism remains dubious. Unless Powell can bring forth more damning information about Baghdad's alleged link to terrorism, this stratagem should be abandoned. If the US is determined to go to war against Iraq, it must do so on a more tenable basis than mere speculation. Washington must not float speculative assertions when there is no evidence to substantiate them. The US case for war against Iraq remains hinged on whether it has a mass destruction weapons programme. Since both Hans Blix and Mohammad Al Baradei are now planning to again visit Iraq, Washington and the rest of the world must put off a final judgement till these UN weapons inspectors conclude their work. If this requires more time, so be it.

Europe, the Iraq crisis and historical analogies

Rosemary Hollis

Jordan Times, 2/4/03

WHEREAS THE United States seems to view the Iraq crisis as a defining moment for the president's doctrine of preemption, for Europe it is fast becoming a defining moment for the future of the European Union, too. The goal of a common foreign and security policy for the EU membership has been severely undermined by public displays of disunity and divisive rhetoric across the Atlantic.

When France and Germany issued a joint statement in favour of diplomacy, rather than resort to force to resolve the Iraq crisis, they undermined the line taken hitherto by US Secretary of State Colin Powell in favour of handling it through the United Nations. Powell's position requires the threat of war to be real if Iraq is to take seriously the call for its disarmament embodied in UN Resolution 1441. Overnight, Powell's rhetoric turned more bellicose and some of the hawks in Washington issued an ironic public thank you to the Europeans for delivering the “reluctant warrior” to their camp.

Compounding an already tense situation, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the Franco-German stance as the voice of “old Europe”. His definition of the new Europe was given expression when eight European governments, including prospective EU members Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (along with Britain, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and Italy), issued their joint statement in support of the tough US stance on Iraq.

Just as the Germans and French did not consult or coordinate with fellow EU members in issuing their communiquÈ, so the eight signatories to the counter statement, titled “United We Stand”, did not clear this with EU headquarters in Brussels or the current EU presidency, Greece. It could take a long time to restore unity on Europe's foreign policy front, unless the shock of these recent events galvanises Europeans to repair the damage.

In any case, the Franco-German stance reflects the public mood across Europe better than the “gang of eight”. For the most part, popular European antipathy to US policy on Iraq is not just an expression of blanket anti-Americanism. Public criticism is rather directed at the Bush administration, for its disregard for multilateralism, from its dismissal of the Kyoto protocols to its disdain for the International Criminal Court. Bush may have gone to the UN for support on Iraq, but not to be restrained.

The East Europeans are openly appreciative of the role played by the United States in standing up to the Soviet Union, which contributed to the collapse of that empire and their own liberation. Poised, however, to join the European Union, they are focused on embracing the attributes of this enterprise and looking forward to deriving the economic and social benefits that go with membership. They do not want to be expected to choose between America and Europe.

Rumsfeld's characterisation of old and new Europe makes no sense in historical terms, only as an expression of Bush's dictum, that you are either with us or with the terrorists. And herein lies another difficulty. In Europe, the view prevails that a war on Iraq will compound the threat of terrorism not reduce it. The governments of Britain and France differ in their assessment of the imminence of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons programmes, but they are at one in believing that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be allowed to fester.

Neither France's display of independent judgement nor Britain's demonstration of support for Washington over Iraq has achieved any mileage on the Palestine question. The fact that this made only one passing mention in Bush's State of the Union address illustrates the point. On this, the United States cannot hear, either for domestic reasons or because of a different strategic assessment of the malaise that besets the region.

Curiously, Europeans now find themselves in a shared predicament with the Arabs in their dealings with the United States. In neither case do they define themselves and their problems as the US administration defines them from the outside. However, when they beg to differ, they are not listened to and must stand up and be counted, either on side with Washington or designated irrelevant at best and hostile at worst.

The spectre facing the Arabs is, of course, more dire than that facing the Europeans. The latter are only suffering from quarrels over how to deal with the Americans. The former are about to face a US-led war in their midst. Both can agree, however, that the Bush administration seems so patently disinterested in the advice and warnings of its Arab and European friends and allies, that confidence that Washington knows what it is embarking on is undermined.

Perhaps because this is the beginning of a new millennium, there is much talk of turning points in history. Certainly, various historical analogies have been raised to define the stakes in the current crisis. Europeans reflect on the sequence of fateful decisions that led the continent to war in 1914 and how misplaced were the predictions that this would be quickly and easily concluded.

In that connection, of course, there is the analogy between contemporary US plans for Iraq and how the British depicted the Mandate there in the 1920s. Certainly echoes of that imperial era are in many minds. Also, the British and French debacle at Suez is recalled, both of them having so completely overdrawn the threat posed to them by Gamal Abdul Nasser. No historical precedent is an exact comparison, of course, and this time the United States is in the driving seat.

In France, at least, the question is asked whether the United States is in fact about to embark on an adventure akin to its war in Vietnam. If so, it is argued, best not become entangled too. By contrast, some sage voices in the United States are warning that the French may be in danger of following the British mistake in the 1930s when they initially sought to appease Adolf Hitler rather than confront him militarily.

The fact that all these and more analogies are being cited demonstrates the seriousness of the current crisis. The latest indications of fallout in European and Transatlantic relations shows how the dimensions go well beyond the Middle East.

However it is resolved, war or not, this crisis will also have implications for future relations between Europeans and Arabs, as well as between both and the United States. In that sense, it is certainly 1914-18 revisited, but in the context of globalisation. The best that can be hoped for is that war will indeed be brief and casualties limited, but thereafter it will take a generation or more to work out the implications for the regional and global balance of power.

Exit the Arab system, enter a new order

By Saad Mehio

The Daily Star, 2/4/03

Everything about the six-way conference on Iraq held in Istanbul recently reeked of history. The venue was the city from which the Ottoman Turks set forth to build one of the greatest empires the world has ever seen. The timing was utterly American, with the US on the verge of embarking on an enterprise premeditated to change the map of the region. Then there was the human element, with representatives of the three main population groups in the Middle East Arabs, Turks and Persians meeting together for the first time in many years.
Yet despite these deep historical connotations, the Istanbul conference failed to make history.
The six foreign ministers from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey came to Istanbul in a reaction to events they could not control. The conference was totally different to those held in the last century in Versailles, Paris or Vienna, where European leaders used to decide the fate of nations. In fact, it was more like a gathering of Third World officials meeting to discuss what was being concocted for them and not to chart their own destinies.
Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul summed it up when he said: “We expect that war, should one take place, will make us all losers.” Gul described himself as a man trapped by two irresistible forces: the United States, Turkey’s main ally for 50 years, and the Turkish people, 80 percent to 90 percent of whom reject America’s designs on Iraq.
Yet this does not mean the Istanbul conference was a waste of time.
Turkey invested a lot of political capital in the conference. Ankara wanted to portray itself to its people as doing the impossible to avert the threat of war against a fellow Muslim country. Ironically, it is precisely this impression that will help Turkey join the American war effort in due time.
Ankara will thus succeed in playing a clever game: Exerting strenuous diplomatic efforts (through Gul’s recent Middle Eastern tour and the Istanbul conference) to prevent war breaking out, and simultaneously making preparations to join the US in overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Indeed Turkey has already agreed “in principle” to allow the US to use its territory and airspace to invade Iraq.
This was divulged by a NATO spokesman who announced that the alliance had acquiesced to an American request to take the necessary measures to defend Turkey against Iraqi counterattack should Ankara decide to join the war.
According to London’s Financial Times, Turkey’s diplomatic and military balancing act reflects the deep concerns now pervading the Middle East, where leaders and officials are doing their level best to prevent war even as they prepare to join the winning side when hostilities begin in earnest.
Many analysts agree that the recent diplomatic frenzy was (at least partially) calculated to provide political cover for a number of countries such as Turkey and Egypt to join the American war plans which are opposed by most of their peoples.
The message which Turkey and the other five countries that met in Istanbul wanted to convey to their peoples was this: “We have done the impossible to save Iraq, but Saddam’s obstinacy and hard-headedness are responsible for all the catastrophes that will take place. Where we are concerned, we have no other option but to join America in order to minimize our losses.”
Seen from this angle, the Istanbul conference was nothing more than an attempt by the participants to absolve themselves of responsibility for the blood that will be shed in the imminent war between the US and Saddam Hussein.
So much for the Turkish angle. But what about the Arabs?
Where the Arabs are concerned, the most significant development that took place in Istanbul was talk of a phased Saudi-Egyptian initiative based on the following steps:
1. Dispatching a delegation to Baghdad to persuade Saddam to step down in favor of a “neutral” Iraqi general, or, alternatively, to persuade him to accede to all American demands to settle the crisis. These demands include getting rid of all nonconventional weapons, disbanding the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard, holding free elections, joining the Arab-Israeli peace process and trying Iraqi war criminals before an international war crimes tribunal.
2. Should Saddam reject these two options, the UN Security Council would be urged to issue an amnesty excluding 100 of Iraq’s most notorious war criminals, to encourage Iraqi generals to rebel.
3. After this resolution is issued, the 1990-91 Gulf War coalition would be rebuilt, with Arab armies joining up with the Americans on the march to Baghdad.
Both Turkish and Arab proposals seemed to enjoy Washington’s blessing, despite the fact that some American circles believe the time has passed for the CIA to instigate a coup in Baghdad, and there is no alternative to waging war on Saddam.
Taking all these positions into consideration, we will arrive at the conclusion that the Istanbul conference was held with the express purpose of placating the peoples of the Middle East and the Americans all at once in other words, to serve both the diplomatic and military options at the same time. Such irony can only happen in that land of ironies, the Middle East.
It has now transpired that Turkey’s Islamist government had called for the conference as a grand diplomatic maneuver possibly planned to achieve the following objectives:
1. To tighten the political noose around Saddam Hussein’s neck, to coincide with the anticipated completion (by mid-February) of Iraq’s total military encirclement.
2. Allowing relevant Arab and Muslim countries the “right” to participate in the imminent American war under the pretext that they tried to save Saddam’s skin but he refused.
3. Laying the groundwork for a new regional order in the Middle East.
The last point is perhaps the most significant, since recent Turkish diplomatic moves give substance to the rumors that a new regional order is in the offing. According to these rumors, America is determined to establish a new order centered on Turkey, Israel, Jordan and post-Saddam Iraq. Other Arab countries and Iran will eventually join this new order after their regimes have been “reformed.”
It was interesting to see Gul apply officially for Turkey to gain observer status in the Arab League even as it was engaged in diplomatic and military activity vis-a-vis Iraq. The only explanation for these actions is that Turkey is preparing itself to play a new role in the Middle East.
So where do we go from here?
Where the Americans, Israelis and Turks are concerned, the road is clear and paved with lucrative strategic and economic benefits.
As for the Arabs, nothing is clear except for the dangers. This is the price that has to be paid by all regimes that turned their backs on their peoples and relied on foreign powers to survive. It is, in short, the result of dictatorship and tyranny.
Soon, when Istanbul II is held (and it will definitely be held after the Iraq war) a new historical phase will begin in the Middle East a phase in which Arab regimes will have to witness their own demise.

Saad Mehio is a Lebanese journalist and writer.

Bush has yet to win the argument for war
By Abdeljabbar Adwan

The Daily Star, 2/4/03

For a democracy to wage war against another country in this age, it has to fulfill a number of conditions beforehand: It has to gain parliamentary approval, convince the electorate, prepare its forces for a rapid war with minimal casualties and do some economic arithmetic.
If the war in question were of a defensive nature, countries wouldn’t have to wait for UN approval, unless they needed a moral and material prop from other nations. If, on the other hand, the war were neither defensive nor strictly necessary from the points of view of Parliament, the voters and world opinion, then the decision to go to war would become very complicated, since any small mistake would lead to the immediate fall of the government.
That is why the problems facing US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in initiating war on Iraq are so complex. According to the vast majority of Americans, Britons, world opinion and world governments, Iraq is vastly different from Afghanistan, whether in its involvement in the Sept. 11, 2001 outrage, its relations with terrorist organizations or its adoption of a fundamentalist system.
Iraq also differs from Afghanistan where its military strength and its ability to cause casualties among attacking troops are concerned. Moreover, a war would cause immense casualties among Iraqi civilians, and could lead to unforeseen consequences.
In short, the dangers are immense, and any initial American victory will only mark the beginning of far more serious problems.
Bush has already secured (conditional) congressional approval. He has the ability to mobilize his armed forces for action (in fact, he has already done so). Yet so far, he seems unable to convince the American people not to mention world opinion and the UN of the correctness of his policies vis-a-vis Iraq. Moreover, the US is not prepared economically for such a major endeavor.
Consequently, going to war would be a major gamble that could put the future of the administration (and its ally in London) at risk unless new factors turn up to make war inevitable. American voters would never forgive Bush for undertaking such an adventure, unless the war were strictly necessary, very clean, ended quickly, replaced the Saddam Hussein regime with a better government with no negative consequences, and didn’t result in an increase in terrorist attacks. This seems impossible at the moment.
On average, three out of every four adults in Western countries oppose this war. In Britain, for example, nine out of 10 people believe Bush will attack Iraq in any case because he is interested in that country’s oil reserves. But opinions can change if the war is supported by a UN resolution. UN chief arms inspector Hans Blix’s recent report, as well as Iraq’s cooperation in implementing Security Council Resolution 1441, however, caused France, Russia and China to oppose the idea of a new UN resolution legitimizing war. In other words, a majority of the five permanent members of the Security Council are now clearly and unprecedentedly against the US and want the weapons inspectors to continue their mission.
The Bush administration has lost the moral high ground on this issue; arm-twisting at the UN even military victory in the war cannot change that. On the other hand, the American people have been gaining more and more respect from peoples around the world. There is growing solidarity between the American people and anti-war movements elsewhere that can have two results: first, less likelihood Americans will be alienated from the rest of the world after the war; and second, terror attacks targeting the US and/or Britain won’t find support from those peoples who have been directly affected by the war. Consequently, terrorism would wither away because of the erosion of its support base since people are loath to harm their allies in opposing war.
Thanks to its stubbornly unilateralist pro-war approach, the Bush administration has:
l Lost the worldwide sympathy and the support America gained as a result of the Sept. 11 attacks.
l Caused friction within NATO, with many member countries opposing war and others supporting it out of fear of angering Washington.
l Caused tensions within many European nations because of the pressure Washington exerted on their governments to back the war on Iraq. The European Union was negatively affected, and its efforts to formulate a common foreign policy were undermined.
The European government that is suffering the most as a result of the early and unlimited support it gave to Bush’s policies is the British government of Tony Blair. Over the last several weeks, Blair has been incessantly trying to convince his people that they are under threat and that war with Iraq would help avert it. In his eagerness to win over British public opinion, Blair has exaggerated the terrorist threat in such a way that there is now a real danger of racial disharmony breaking out in Britain.
Blair stated in Parliament’s House of Commons that “barely a day goes by” without discovering new dangers. He is also on record as having warned that “there are no limits to the potential threats that you could imagine” from terrorists. The UK is “spending hundreds of millions of pounds on trying to prepare ourselves for any potential terrorist threat … We could spend tens of billions of pounds doing it and we could still not identify where the attack was actually going to come from.” Whereby he informed the Commons Liaison Committee that “we can see evidence from the recent arrests that the terrorist network is here.”
Economically, it is hard to calculate the potential losses that might arise if war breaks out. No one can tell how long it will last, or how much it will cost. Some experts predict that the overall cost including the cost of rebuilding a stable Iraq will be in excess of a trillion dollars.
The American economy can certainly do without this additional burden. In his State of the Union address, Bush admitted that the US economy is in trouble. He said: “Our first goal is clear: We must have an economy that grows fast enough to employ every man and woman who seeks a job. After recession, terrorist attacks, corporate scandals and stock market declines, our economy is recovering yet it’s not growing fast enough, or strongly enough.”
According to the latest opinion polls, more and more Americans are unhappy at the way Bush and his team are running the economy.
These are only some of the early tangible consequences of Bush and Blair’s policies. War, moreover, is full of mostly unpleasant surprises, as well as loss of life. Its results cannot be gauged ahead of time. That’s why we can only say: God help us all!

Abdeljabbar Adwan is a Palestinian analyst.

Little faith in Arab leaders as war approaches in Gulf
An Arab press review, By The Daily Star, 2/4/03

There are conflicting accounts in the Arab press of moves to convene an emergency summit of Arab leaders to consider the prospect of Iraq’s being invaded by the United States within the coming few weeks.
Support for the idea is voiced from Baghdad, where the Babil newspaper, run by Saddam Hussein’s son Odai, endorses Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa’s suggestion that next month’s scheduled annual Arab summit in Bahrain be brought forward.
Raheem Mazeed writes that with the Arab League trying to “contain America’s foolish threats with the help of some European states that want to distance themselves from America’s hegemonic policies, why shouldn’t an emergency Arab summit be held to discuss these aggressive threats and take a unified Arab position toward them?”
The Arab states could base their stance on the resolutions adopted at last year’s Beirut summit, or on “a new resolution that firmly and clearly condemns the American threats and supports Iraq’s transparent position, which is committed to the resolutions of international legality and calls for any dispute, of whatever type or form, that may arise from the work of the inspections teams to be resolved in the context of the United Nations and international law.”
That would send out a “powerful message to the war advocates” that Arab leaders are united with their peoples in opposition to military action, the Iraqi commentator says. With “American, British and Zionist forces” being readied for war, the least the Arab states can do is “bring their summit forward by a month” to address the situation.
The Qatari daily Ash-Sharq also backs the call for an early summit, while noting that Arab capitals are divided about the matter. Some want it held in March as originally scheduled, others favor postponing it until the situation in the region “settles,” and a third group which appears likely to prevail proposes convening it this month, but in Cairo rather than Bahrain, the paper says.
It argues that with the US and Britain acknowledging their intention to initiate armed hostilities in a matter of weeks, it is essential for the “Arab order” to act quickly to try to avert war by diplomatic means. The general public throughout the Arab world is seething with indignation and apprehension at America’s conduct, and the contrast between its treatment of Iraq and its pampering of nuclear-armed Israel.
“It is therefore no longer acceptable for the Arab order to suffice with mouthing verbal opposition to a war that is on the verge of being imposed on the UN Security Council, or with the role of onlookers in the war Ariel Sharon is waging on the Palestinians. It has become an urgent imperative to move on to practical stands, formulated at a summit, to prevent war and spare the people of Iraq and the entire region its horrors, and to stop Israel’s massacres in the Palestinian territories and its exploitation of the world’s preoccupation with the Iraq crisis to impose facts on the ground,” Ash-Sharq says.
A columnist in Jordan’s Ad-Dustour daily says the reluctance of Arab leaders to get together on Iraq “raises questions” about their “growing vulnerability to US pressure” and their inability to act independently.
Mazen al-Saket writes that when it was decided two years ago to institutionalize Arab summits as regular annual events, the decision was interpreted as a new commitment to collective Arab action. So was Saudi Arabia’s proposal to use the next summit to propose a package of measures aimed at promoting reform within, and enhanced cooperation among, the Arab states. But their evident reluctance to hold an emergency summit on Iraq reverses that impression and is a “depressing sign of continued impotence and evasion of national responsibilities,” he says.
“It is not important where the summit is held or if there is a consensus in favor of attending. The important thing is for Arab leaders to hold it with their minds set on confronting the threat of war and on acting clearly and decisively to prevent it,” Saket writes.
In Libya, which has announced plans to leave the Arab League in protest at its ineffectiveness, the daily Al-Zahf al-Akhdar says the reluctance of some Arab regimes to hold an emergency summit adds up to “dereliction of national duty by the official Arab order.”
The paper says it looks as though a meeting of Arab foreign ministers is to be called instead of a summit, but argues that the ministers are not authorized to make policy, and convening them would achieve nothing.
Al-Zahf al-Akhdar stresses that the Arabs are at a critical juncture in their history. The Iraqi people are threatened with mass massacre and the takeover of their oil resources, he says, the Palestinians are being slaughtered by Ariel Sharon, and the future of the entire Arab Gulf region hangs in the balance, as does the fate of other Arab countries that have been identified as “prizes” by American strategists.
“If all of this does not warrant an Arab summit, that is certainly something no rational mind can absorb, unless the players are hiding something,” the Libyan daily remarks.
Saudi commentator Daoud al-Shiryan says the Arab states are resigned to war and feel that they have “no choice” but to go along with it.
“There is no doubt that the Arabs loathe this war, fear its terrifying consequences on Iraq and the region, and mistrust America’s intentions in Iraq, which they do not have the capacity to counter, influence or even understand,” Shiryan writes in his column for the Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat. “The way they (Arabs) have been talking and acting since the beginning of the crisis shows clearly that they are in a tough historic predicament, and are prepared to go to the ends of the Earth to change the denouement that has become inevitable. But, at the same time, they cannot avoid coordinating with Washington over every detail and complying faithfully with its every request not because America is an adversary whose friendship is indispensable, but because they are convinced that their national interests are at stake.”
Accordingly, Shiryan argues, they have no choice other than to “overcome the contradiction between their wishes and their policies” in the near future and “play the same role that the European states did in Yugoslavia taking part in the war and in the formation of an alternative government in Iraq, and using cooperation with America to ensure an Arab presence inside Iraq after US forces have invaded it and it has become international territory that is open to everyone.”
Jordanian commentator Sultan Hattab writes in Amman’s Al-Rai that if Arab rulers do decide to get together on Iraq, they are more likely to end up providing succor to the US than helping protect Iraq as they did at their 1990 Cairo summit, which was convened after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
If another Cairo summit is convened now, it will not be able to prevent war on Iraq or ease its consequences, says Hattab. “Rather, it will bear witness to the final moments, place the Arab order at the service of the conspiracy, and adapt to American policy so that it is not accused of obstructing or opposing it a charge that every Arab country wants to avoid having leveled at it.”
All the Arab regimes are looking to uphold their narrow interests. They don’t expect Washington and London to heed Arab objections when they are contemptuous even of Western public opposition to war, and so “they suffice with maintaining a stony silence or nodding their heads without letting on if they are doing so in agreement or disagreement” with the unjustified targeting of a fellow Arab people.
Hattab writes that Iraq’s Arab neighbors may live to regret their apathy when they see the country transformed into an “American stick” with which to beat them. Kuwait, and even Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, suffered as a result of the Iraqi regime’s invasion of Kuwait. But “they will suffer much more” when Washington invests a client regime in Baghdad that it favors over them, and demands that they foot the costly bill for establishing it, on the grounds that it was for their sake that the previous regime was deposed.
The Arab peoples despair of their leaders and set no store by the proposed summit, Hattab says. At their last gathering in Beirut, they failed to use the vast resources at their disposal to curb Sharon’s ongoing slaughter of the Palestinians, and they are not going to be able to prevent America’s carnage in Iraq. Had they been serious about trying, they would have found somewhere other than Istanbul from where to issue their call for a peaceful solution, and they would not have put all the onus on Baghdad to prevent war, sparing the US any criticism.
The reason Arab summitry has become so emasculated is that it no longer reflects the views and aspirations of the pan-Arab nation, but only the individual fears of petrified governments “that are not coming together to face up to the dangers, but to justify what will happen and foot its bills,” Hattab writes. “If an Arab summit convenes in these circumstances, it will make people more not less fearful.”
Similar views are expressed by Talal Salman, publisher of the Beirut daily As-Safir, who says that “the Arab regimes are in a mess as a result of their weakness, unpopularity and inability to bear the weighty burden that has been foisted on them.”
They have no say in the confrontation Washington is planning, yet feel a need to save face by holding a pro forma meeting about it. They are in no position to mediate, and they don’t dare declare a frank and unambiguous “no” to both American policy and Saddam Hussein who neither trusts nor is trusted by the other Arab rulers.
“Nothing frightens the Arab regimes more than the prospect of meeting at summit level,” Salman remarks. “They fear a summit that is incompletely attended, whatever the pretexts (as the Beirut summit showed). Their quarrels and fears and mistrust of each other will in addition to the harsh US pressure they are under determine the outcome, and so the conferees’ sole concern will be to keep up appearances. In other words, image, as ever, at the expense of substance. And that will only intensify their peoples’ resentment of them. Unable to deal with the issue at hand, the summiteers could be reduced to false witnesses whose gathering is presented as proof either of their collusion or their dereliction of duty. And the punishment for either crime is too much for them to take.”
If an Arab summit is held, it won’t even witness a split like the 1990 split at the Cairo summit, Salman predicts. The military participation of the Arab regimes is not being demanded although it has been “imposed” on some of them but they will be required to provide “political cover” for George W. Bush’s war on Iraq. And that could be too much to bear given the political, economic and security burdens they are laboring under. Their unpopularity makes them apprehensive in the present, and the behavior of the Bush administration that is leading them “blindfolded” into war on their land and against their people makes them fearful of the future.
“There are no convincing justifications for a war that they can market; but neither can they prevent ‘what has been written’ in America (and as always in Israel too), and ‘neutrality’ amounts to betrayal on two counts,” he remarks.
With the Americans poised to flatten Iraq as a prelude to giving it a “democratic future,” and vowing to nurture the creation of a Palestinian state that is not only whole and sovereign but democratic as well, “what more do the Arabs want?” Salman quips. “The Israelis have the long experience of bringing about democracy via occupation in ‘backward’ countries like Palestine, and now the Americans are coming to replicate the experiment by occupying another backward country like Iraq. And we mustn’t forget that America’s pledge of democracy for the Arabs has prompted rulers who have long governed by divine right to promise to empower ‘the people’ to participate in government, provided they are forbearing, farsighted and patient enough. Isn’t an agenda like that sufficient to make for a successful Arab summit?”

Blair walking the edge
By Linda S. Heard | Gulf News, 04-02-2003
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With just a day to go before the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell attempts to convince the United Nations that Iraq is a clear and present danger to the world, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair is once again on a round-robin diplomatic shuttle.

It is hardly surprising that the former South African leader and Nobel Prize winner Nelson Mandela condemned Blair for his apparent unconditional support for American foreign policy saying, "He [Blair] is the foreign minister of the United States...".

Mandela reserved even harsher criticism for the American leader George W. Bush accusing him of wanting to plunge the world into a holocaust and of disrespecting the United Nations.

Bush feels confident enough to warn the UN not to become "an empty debating society" while he enjoys the support of some 49 per cent of the American people. When Bush says, "the America we prize is not our gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity", he has an appreciative home audience. Blair, however, is far from being in such a happy position.

Instead, according to a recent poll, more than 80 per cent of the British people do not want war with Iraq, over 40 per cent saying a firm "no" to war even if such a course were to be rubber stamped by the United Nations.

Blair is also facing serious opposition to his war plans from trade union leaders, who have historically made up the Labour Party's support base; almost all of Britain's Anglican bishops; more than 150 of his own Labour backbenchers and even members of his own cabinet.

The most outspoken of Blair's cabinet detractors is Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development. Short warns of the possibility of a massive humanitarian disaster and large numbers of civilian casualties.

The British leader is also being accused of sparking a potential split in Europe. A letter signed by the leaders of seven governments, including Blair, showing their solidarity with the U.S. was published in seven leading newspapers in Europe, including The Times of London last week.

The letter pits new Europe against France and Germany - referred to by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as "old Europe" - and has offended Greece, currently holding the EU rotating presidency.

So why is Tony Blair set on aligning himself and Britain with the Bush administration's foreign policies, seemingly willing to incur the displeasure of most of his own people, the church, the entire Middle East and the more influential members of the EU?

Tony Blair is, in fact, walking a diplomatic tightrope. After the events of September 11, 2001, Blair was the first world leader to rush to the side of the American President and declare that Britain would stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. in its war on terrorism. Blair is also aware of the benefits Britain gains from an amicable trans-Atlantic alliance, especially in the defence field.

One year ago, most Britons would have agreed with him wholheartedly but now the mood on the street has changed. The British, by and large, are not persuaded that Saddam Hussain poses an imminent threat to either America or Britain and various polls have shown that they view George W. Bush as a far greater threat to humanity than the Iraqi leader.

A major anti-war demonstration to be held in London on February 15 will show just how many of the British people are prepared to vote with their feet over this issue.

The president's laid-back Texan style does not go down at all well in dear old Blighty. Many Britons shudder at Bush's quasi-religious rhetoric and most consider him arrogant. When Bush utters such hubris-laden, grandiose statements as: "History has called the United States into action and we will not let history down," the British tend to be either appalled or amused.

Such is the negative image of Bush in Britain that the British Prime Minister is frequently called to rush to the defence of his tough-talking colleague across the pond.

As close as the pair obviously are, judging by their body language at a press conference following their recent powwow at the White House, their discussions were probably not as cordial as they attempted to present.

Bush probably didn't appreciate having his arm twisted by the British Prime Minister to ask the UN for a second resolution or to give the weapons inspectors more time to do their jobs.

Bush kicked off the conference by pursing his lips and snapping at a journalist who had the temerity to break the one question rule. "He has a habit of doing that," he grumbled to Blair.

When he was asked whether there was any evidence that Iraq was involved with September 11, he mumbled curtly and barely audibly that there wasn't. This apparent U-turn prompted a clairvoyant-sounding Tony Blair to come to his rescue and explain that while there is no current evidence linking Iraq with Al Qaida, Saddam Hussain may supply the terrorist group with weapons of mass destruction in the future.

A British reporter asked the president why he had plans to invade Iraq on his desk six days after September 11 and was told in no uncertain terms that America's attitude to its enemies had altered after the attack on its own soil. The U.S., he said, was no more interested in a policy of containment. "We must deal with threats before they hurt the American people."

This is just the kind of statement that much of the world finds offensive. Why should Iraqis be killed, just in case their leader may pose a threat to the American people in the future? The underlying presidential message appears to be: we're looking after ourselves, and the heck with the rest of you.

Finally, when a British reporter asked the president whether Colin Powell would be submitting convincing hard evidence on February 5 to the UN sceptics, George Bush's ego was visibly bruised. He appeared irritated that the case he had been putting up for the necessity of disarming Iraq by force if need be, hadn't already been embraced. Obviously the world isn't quite as gullible as Bush might like.

Reading between the lines, it looks as though Powell is only going to come up with more of the same during tomorrow's presentation, perhaps with a few extra embellishments.

Powell hasn't been short on embellishments lately. Some of them have been so patently false that Hans Blix was driven to complain at the way his interim report had been misused to provide a pretext for war.

Blix denied Powell's claim that Iraqi officials were moving around illicit materials before the inspectors could reach them, or that Iraq was sending its scientists out of the country to prevent them from being interviewed.

There was another glaring "error" in Bush's State of the Union speech, which was not highlighted by Blix. In his address to the nation, Bush said the Iraqis have been importing aluminum rods to assist in manufacturing nuclear weapons, whereas the day before El Baradei had clearly stated that the contentious rods were being used for more innocuous purposes, as verified by his inspection teams.

Given that Powell probably won't be able to come up with the casus belli sought by America's detractors over this issue, will at least nine of the 15 members of the Security Council, be persuaded to vote "yea" if the U.S. were to propose a new resolution giving America a clear mandate to use force against Iraq?

With Tony Blair and Colin Powell "working the phones" which translated means that they will be bribing, begging and bamboozling, the unwilling may be brought on side. Much depends on France, which has the power of veto. Although France is extremely unlikely to vote positively, it might well decide to abstain when push comes to shove.

In the event that the U.S. does not receive the backing it seeks from the UN, Bush has threatened to go it alone or with a coalition of the willing. We have yet to see just how many willing will put up their hands, and their hands in their pockets.

The British Prime Minister has much to lose. If Blair persists in going ahead without the cover of the United Nations, he might well fall off that tightrope and lose his position as leader of the Labour Party to one of his Cabinet colleagues. There are several waiting in the wings, and he knows it.

The writer is a specialist writer on Middle East affairs.

Seeds of division in the new-found unity
By Mustapha Karkouti | Gulf News, 04-02-2003
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It is certainly a risky gamble and he knows it.

By siding fully and wholeheartedly with United States president, George Walker Bush, Britain's Prime Minister, Tony Blair may have decided this could be his opportunity to leave his mark in world politics.

It is not unlikely that Blair sees this moment in Western alliance history as his own moment of history as well. A moment which could provide him with the necessary momentum and prestige to establish himself as a world leader and a national figure of 21st century's Britain.

He can see that one of his predecessors has managed to do just this by simply going to war with Argentina over the Falklands early in 1980s. By declaring war on the Argentine military junta many thousands of miles from home, Lady Thatcher affirmed herself as a powerful politician on the world stage.

More significantly, the Falklands victory provided the "Iron Lady" with the much needed esteem and authority to achieve two vital goals: becoming the absolute leader of the conservative party for at least a decade, and guaranteeing her reelection for second and third terms.

But will Tony Blair be as fortunate as Lady Thatcher? It all depends on the course of what seems to be now as "inevitable" military action against Iraq: with, or without United Nations Security Council second resolution, and whether the European unity will be maintained.

More importantly and as far as Tony Blair is concerned, it depends on whether the British prime minister can pull along his own party and its ground roots, and maintain the unity of his Labour parliamentarian base.

There are doubts that he could achieve both, or either of these two aims. On the one hand, there seems now clear division within Europe, of which Blair is playing a big role which might push efforts to develop harmonious and comprehensive EU foreign policy many years back.

Under the much disputed banner of "our strength lies in unity", the British leader counter signed a joint article published in the London's Times with seven other leaders calling on Europe to back the U.S. in the battle to disarm Iraq's president Saddam Hussain.

Five of the current European Union members, Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Denmark lined up with counterparts from Poland, Hungary and the Chez Republic - all joining EU in May 2004 - to close ranks with Washington.

In their appeal to back President Bush's current policy, the already labelled "gang of eight" was calculably keen to snub Germany and France, which are both leading EU opposition to war, with varying degree, and blocking moves by Nato to give even limited support to the U.S.

The eight leaders in their article reminded France's Jacques Chirac and Germany's Gerhard Schroeder that they had also signed up to UN Resolution 1441, itself a victory for European attempts to keep the crisis on the multilateral track.

The rest of EU members, including Greece, the current holder of the union rotating presidency, were not consulted. Nor were Chris Patten, the EU's external relations commissioner, or Javier Solana, its foreign policy chief and himself a Spaniard.

Many believe that the article, orchestrated by Jose Maria Aznar, the centre-right Spanish Prime Minister, was totally unnecessary, un-European and very peculiar to the normally quiet and subtle British diplomacy.

In Brussels, diplomats said in the context of Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Defence Secretary's attempts to divide Europeans between "old Europe" and "new Europe", it is obviously unhelpful that separate statements are issued in this way.

Additionally, most of the central and eastern European nations, formerly members of the Soviet bloc and hungry for American aid and investments, due to join the EU next year or in 2007 are reluctant to alienate the U.S. By and large, these countries' leaders aspire to be invited to the White House and be seen sitting next to the leader of the most powerful country in the world and satisfy their egos back home.

A number of these countries have recently joined Nato and are eager to demonstrate military solidarity with the alliance's most powerful member. This includes not only the three non-EU signatories of the open letter backing the U.S., but also other countries such as Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

The five EU signatories have all ignored public opinion in their own countries over the issue of war in Iraq. According to the EOS Gallup Europe poll the vast majority in the UK, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Denmark oppose a war not supported by the UN.

An overwhelming percentage of the British population says they are against such a war.

Additionally, in Spain 79 per cent also oppose military action without UN backing. Danish and Portuguese opposition registered 72 per cent. Meanwhile, in Italy 79 per cent express their opposition to their own prime minister's policy of close alliance with the U.S.

The U.S. has already decided which Europeans the administration would be willing to welcome as their allies over Iraq's crisis, and it is very risky - to say the least - for a prime minister who keeps repeating his intention to maintain Britain "at the heart of Europe."

But the main challenge is closer to home where eventually Blair's fate will be decided: either he will come out of this as a Thatcher-like leader who would leave a legacy behind, or as someone who helped implant the seeds of division in a continent still in the making.

The writer is the former president, Foreign Press Association in London.

Blair doing the runaround
Gulf News, 04-02-2003
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American President George W. Bush, conscious that his father, when president, lost all popularity after the 1991 Gulf War to domestic problems, is presenting a budget to Congress, one of the largest in history, aimed at producing a major deficit for the country. This, from the surplus that was left him by his previous incumbent, Bill Clinton. Bush junior is very conscious of proving himself to be "the better man" (than his father) by getting a second term in office next year. But it will require much more than has so far been done on the domestic front if he is to succeed in that direction. For not only are his domestic policies questionable, his foreign policies leave much to be desired, in the eyes of the majority of the American public, who are still to be convinced of the necessity of going to war against Iraq.

Bush's colleague in arms, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, proving the taunt made by Nelson Mandela that he was acting "more like a U.S. foreign secretary" is today in France, trying to persuade President Jacques Chirac of the worthiness of France becoming an ally in the fight against Saddam Hussain's regime. But Blair will have to be nimble footed and fleet of tongue if he is to sway the worthy old French politician from his already declared view. It being a "let's see the evidence" stance. The last time Blair was in France, it was shortly after Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder had made a "done deal" on the EU, leaving Britain on the sidelines. The response to that, from Britain, was not recorded, but it provoked Chirac into saying he [Blair] was the rudest person he had ever met. It will prove to be a masterly act of diplomacy on the part of Blair if he can get Chirac on side after that.

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