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Ankara takes new line in foreign policy
By Mohammad Noureddine, The Daily Star
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BEIRUT: Ankara’s position on the current
Iraq crisis signaled a new course in Turkish foreign policy. After decades
of adhering to Kemal Ataturk’s maxim of “peace in the homeland, peace
in the world,” which resulted in Turkey distancing itself from
involvement in regional and international problems, the country appears to
have embarked on a new path. Turkey now appears prepared not only to take
part in international events, but also to have adopted the new American
idea of pre-emptive war.
The first test of this new policy direction will be unsurprisingly
the planned US invasion of Iraq.
Over the last several months, Turkey made a point of acting in keeping
with “international legitimacy” a.k.a. the UN. This was the
position of Turkey’s Islamists as well as its secularists. The
Islam-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) government publicly
embraced the goal of trying to avert war and seeking to find a peaceful
solution to the Iraq crisis. In this, Ankara was driven by what it
perceived as the myriad threats and dangers to Turkish interests of a war
on neighboring Iraq.
Yet since late January, Turkey has pursued a “dangerous” policy where
the rules governing its relations with its immediate neighbors are
concerned:
1. Ankara has apparently decided to ignore the ceiling of international
legitimacy. It no longer feels bound by UN resolutions in its actions
vis-a-vis Iraq. Prime Minister Abdullah Gul went so far as saying that the
UN is not the sole source of legitimacy in international affairs, and that
a common position adopted by a group of countries would have equal
legitimacy. It was this new position that prevailed in all the subsequent
negotiations Ankara held with Washington involving details of the planned
invasion of Iraq.
Acting outside the remit of international legitimacy signaled the
beginning of a new phase in Turkey’s relations with neighboring states
with which it has longstanding disputes, including Cyprus, Greece,
Armenia, and Syria.
This new position was not without its supporters inside the country.
Well-known Turkish commentator Mehmet Ali Birand, for example, urged
Ankara not to insist on upholding international legitimacy where Iraq is
concerned, in order to avoid being called upon to apply the same standards
in Cyprus. UN resolutions view the Turkish military presence in Cyprus as
an occupation. The fact that a major regional power like Turkey has
decided to ignore international legitimacy puts the entire region face to
face with a new might-is-right situation (of which Israel is the major
proponent).
2. With the agreement it reached with Washington concerning Iraq, Turkey
has violated even its own constitution. Article 92 of the Turkish
Constitution states that the army can only be deployed outside the
country’s borders (and/or foreign troops can only be stationed on
Turkish soil) in cases deemed legitimate in international law. Turkish
legal experts agree that such a situation would arise if Turkey were
attacked by a foreign power, if there were a UN resolution sanctioning
such actions, and if Turkey acts according to a decision
by NATO.
Since none of these conditions are met in such a case, Turkey’s
participation in an invasion of Iraq is illegal as far as the Turkish
Constitution is concerned.
But Turkish officials seem to be acting out of Turkish national interests
rather than international law. AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared
more than a month ago that, “Turkey cannot remain outside the
equation,” and that its interests dictate that it take part in any war
so that it can influence what happens afterward. Gul meanwhile said Turkey
must act in tandem with its “strategic partner and ally,” the United
States.
It therefore becomes plain that Turkey’s actions vis-a-vis Iraq lack any
basis in international law. It has embarked on a course quite
unprecedented in the history of its foreign relations. Since the dialogue
between Washington and Ankara involves only interests, then it can only be
expected that the two sides would agree on all the issues discussed.
The fact that agreement has been arrived at only gradually has its
reasons. Ankara needs time to convince Turkish public opinion of the
wisdom of joining the war. Over 90 percent of the Turkish people oppose
war, while 78 percent are against any Turkish participation. The ruling
AKP, moreover, has to contend with widespread opposition among its
supporters to taking part in an aggressive war against a fellow Muslim
nation.
For its part, Washington has not been in a hurry to enlist Turkish
support. The Americans might have decided to keep the “Turkish card”
up their sleeve until the last possible moment, hoping that the Iraqi
regime might fall without a war being necessary.
America’s relationship with Turkey resembles in many ways that between a
married couple. They are fated to remain together, even though they might
differ from time to time over mundane details. Washington is in dire need
of a northern (Turkish) front to make the war as quick and costless as
possible. For its part, Turkey needs American economic support, as well as
Washington’s backing over such issues as Cyprus, Greece, Armenia, and
the European Union.
Turkish interests in Iraq are another story, being stronger than
international law and good neighborliness combined. The political,
military and economic agreements Ankara signed with Washington totally
reflect the fact that it intends to deal with Iraq and its population as
if the country were part of its own territory.
Otherwise, what does it mean that the Iraqi Kurds must be disarmed after
the war? What does it mean that the Iraqi Kurds must be prevented from
entering Kirkuk and Mosul? Why should Ankara be interested in which Iraqi
faction controls the oil fields of Iraq? Why is Turkey demanding
“rights” for the Turkmen of Iraq? Why does Turkey reject the
establishment of a federal system of government in Iraq? What is the
meaning of Ankara’s insistence that a Turk must be included in the
administration that would rule Iraq after the overthrow of the current
regime? Why should Ankara insist that Iraq have a unified army?
What business is it of Ankara’s with all these strictly domestic Iraqi
affairs even if it means preventing the rise of an independent
Kurdish state in northern Iraq? What would the Turks say if told that the
Turkish Army must not interfere in politics? Would they agree to being
asked why the (chiefly Turkish Kurd) southeastern parts of their country
are so underdeveloped, for example?
The Turkish-American agreement about war on Iraq will subject that country
and perhaps later the entire Middle East to a new American-Turkish
Sykes-Picot. It is not entirely implausible, in fact, that Israel is also
in on the deal. Such an arrangement would herald a new era of negative
relations between the countries and peoples of the region, the
catastrophic implications of which are only too plain to see.
Mohammad Noureddine is a Beirut-based
expert on Turkish affairs