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Wounded in an unfought war: Europe, United
Nations and NATO
By Joseph Samaha
The Daily Star
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Even before it starts, the war on Iraq has claimed a number of wounded and
left them seriously hurt. These are no ordinary casualties. They are none
other than the United Nations, the European Union and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
It is now obvious US President George W. Bush only ever turned to the UN
Security Council under duress. He was persuaded to do so by his secretary
of state, Colin Powell, amid fierce quarrels with figures within the
administration who hold the world body in contempt. Some maintain that
British Prime Minister Tony Blair also played his share in this
persuasion. But what effectively happened is that a compromise was struck
in Washington: We go to the Security Council, but only to present it with
a choice with us or against us, either fight “evil” alongside us,
or else face the same fate as the League of Nations. This had nothing to
do with espousing multilateralism or searching for common ground. The US
merely went through the motions of respecting the rest of the world and
this only on condition that it does as the Americans say.
This move culminated, after several weeks of debate, in Resolution 1441.
But as soon as it was passed, Washington and London proceeded to interpret
it according to their objectives, by maintaining that it authorizes them
to go to war unless Iraq proves its innocence of their charges against it.
While everyone held their breath awaiting the verdict of the UN arms
inspectors, US administration spokespeople served notice that they do not
take the inspections seriously because the Iraqi regime is expert at
deception. This begged the question of why Washington was so insistent on
enhancing the arms inspectors’ powers in the first place, if it is only
interested in Baghdad belying itself and confessing that everything it has
said to date, all 12,000 pages of it, is pure fabrication.
Meanwhile, as the inspectors were working and encountering no obstacles,
the military buildup in the theater of operations was stepped up. Some
optimists chose to console themselves by considering these forces to be
supporting the arms inspections by putting pressure on Iraq. Others saw
them implementing an agenda that envisages no endgame other than war.
The American right thought Bush had fallen into a trap and that the
priority now was to rescue him so he could regain his freedom of movement
and step out of the inspections-WMD impasse and into war-“regime
change” mode. Powell momentarily became this camp’s No. 1 enemy, with
calls even made for his resignation. Although Powell defended himself, he
did not resist for long.
The basic contradiction between what Washington actually wants and what it
professes to want was bound to come to a head. That happened after the
inspectors submitted their first report. While the proponents of
disarmament concluded from it that the inspections should continue, the
administration hawks feared that might make war impossible.
He went further, presenting his country’s case to the Security Council
in person, and compromising his reputation for seriousness by unveiling a
dossier in which spin superseded substance. He didn’t convince many
people about Baghdad’s links to Al-Qaeda. He didn’t change the
experts’ views about the alleged enrichment of uranium. He didn’t add
anything new to what had already been reported about chemical and
biological activities. And he committed the gaffe of praising the British
dossier, which turned out to be plagiarized from student theses and
unrelated to accurate “British intelligence.”
Washington’s behavior is inconsistent with treating the Security Council
as an international body composed of sovereign independent entities. It
gave it a choice between being an extension of its own policies, and being
marginalized. Either way, the council risks losing credibility, along with
any chance of sustaining a system of international relations that respects
the rules the world devised over the course of the past few decades. The
US implicitly rejects both the notion that every state can have its own
viewpoint, and the idea of medium-sized nations wielding veto power.
The fact that Germany happens to be the current president of the Security
Council meanwhile sharpened the quarrel between the US and Britain on the
one hand and France and Germany on the other. There are three main schools
of thought in Europe. Germany advocates a peaceful approach that rejects
war even if authorized by the council. Britain espouses subordination to
America to the extent of being prepared to do without such authorization
should Washington so decide. France, for its part, defends what could be
termed an “Atlanticist” position if one were to accept that the
Atlantic is an ocean with two shores and that the European one is entitled
to have its own view, and to try to persuade others of it.
It must be stressed that these political differences emerged out of strong
European public opposition to a war waged without international sanction.
But instead of looking for solutions, Washington launched a campaign to
isolate the Franco-German axis. Hence the pro-Washington and
anti-Berlin/Paris posture struck by eight European leaders, with the aim
of signaling that Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac don’t speak for
the EU. They stressed in their statement that they would not allow the
transatlantic relationship to be weakened because of Iraq. What they
didn’t allude to was Washington’s primary role in weakening it, not
just due to Iraq but also because it opposes the emergence of an
independent EU.
The crisis that ensued within Europe over Iraq thus raises questions about
the entire future of the EU. Is it on course to develop such an identity,
as France and Germany want (albeit to varying degrees), or merely to
become a colossal market as the Americans desire (with British backing)?
The question arose after the decision was taken to expand the EU, amid the
constitutional debate over powers, voting rights and mechanisms. But it is
evident from the injuries sustained by the Europeans that America’s
architecture for the world leaves no space for entities that might develop
independent leanings. It envisages a union of European political midgets,
who trade with each other and don’t disturb the American monopoly.
NATO fared no better than the Security Council or the EU. It may be
expanding too, but in reality it is in decline. NATO almost lost its
rationale when the Socialist Bloc collapsed, before regaining some
functionality in the Balkan wars. But it was not long before it was pushed
to the sidelines again in the Afghan conflict, even though it had invoked
its Article 5 in support of the US in that war for the first time in its
history. Washington reciprocated with the slogan that “the mission
defines the coalition,” thus deeming the former Soviet republics, Russia
and Pakistan to be more important than the likes of Germany, France and
Italy. NATO nevertheless expanded a second time, and signed a partnership
treaty with Russia. But that only served to reaffirm Washington’s
earlier redefinition of both threats and theaters of operations.
When the US moved to the Iraqi item on its agenda, it put into practice
the principle that the task determines the coalition. Despite being aware
of the opposition within NATO to its Iraq policy, it insisted on raising
the subject under the guise of protecting Turkey. It did so before Ankara
had made up its mind, and with countries like Belgium, Germany and France
threatening to use their vetoes. This was no coincidence. The clear aim
was to demonstrate NATO’s military irrelevance and Washington’s
preference of a “coalition of the willing.”
All of this indicates Washington is intent on nurturing satellites within
the international and Western institutions that are supposed to deal with
major political and security matters. In so doing, it has no qualms about
undermining bodies like the Security Council, the EU and NATO. These are
the pre-war casualties, and we have yet to see what becomes of the Arab
League, for example, after the war.
Joseph Samaha is the editor in chief of the
Beirut daily As-Safir.