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Fresh doubts cast on US case, but buildup to
war continues
An Arab
press review, By The Daily Star, 2/25/03
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With Iraq dominating the news, pan-Arab Al-Quds
al-Arabi leads with the story that the country’s former military
industries minister revealed when he defected in 1995 that Baghdad had
destroyed all its stocks of proscribed weapons after the 1991 Gulf War.
The paper highlights reports in the US media that Hussein Kamel briefed UN
arms inspectors, the CIA and British intelligence separately about the
destruction of the stocks, but his disclosures were hushed up at the time
in the hope of securing further information from Baghdad.
Nevertheless, the revelations reinforcing doubts about the existence of
the arms programs the US and Britain accuse Iraq of possessing are
overshadowed in the press by accounts of the unfolding diplomatic battle
over Iraq at the UN, and the accompanying inter-Arab row.
Newspapers see no end in sight to the dispute between Arab countries over
the impending Arab summit conference, which Egypt hopes to convene on
March 1 but Iraq wants deferred until mid-March. Commentaries and
editorials echo the differences between the governments over both the
timing and purpose of the proposed gathering.
Al-Quds al-Arabi says Baghdad is justified in asking for the Arab summit
to be postponed until after the UN Security Council meets on March 14 to
hear the next report to be submitted by the arms inspectors. A summit held
before then would be “meaningless,” it argues in its leader.
The paper says the Baghdad government is also right to fear that some Arab
leaders want to use an early summit to strong-arm Iraq into making
concessions. “For it is manifested that what is sought from the
impending summit is a demand for the Iraqi leadership to surrender to US
pressure, relinquish power voluntarily, and hand over Iraq to American
occupation without casualties.”
It says that the “vast majority” of Arab citizens “want the summit
to convene for one single reason: to mobilize all Arab energies and
resources in defense of Iraq and against the aggression that targets
it.” But the Arab regimes have other ideas. The majority of them are
“colluding in the American aggression” by providing base or transit
facilities to US invasion forces, “and the only difference is that some
like Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE are open about their guilt,
whereas others like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan prefer to do
things on the quiet.”
A successful summit in the eyes of the Arab public would be one that takes
a stand against aggression. “But as the Arab regimes will not take a
stand against America either because they covet its continued financial
aid or because they fear its sword their summit will facilitate the
aggression by putting the onus of preventing war solely on the Iraqi
regime i.e., it must relinquish power and go, and if it doesn’t it
will be to blame for the devastation of Iraq and the slaughter of its
people,” Al-Quds al-Arabi says.
The Qatari daily Al-Sharq sees no rationale for deferring the summit,
given the fast-moving pace of developments. The paper agrees with Egypt
that the summit should be held as soon as possible, noting that an
Anglo-American blitz could be imminent and it would be pointless to defer
the meeting until after military action had been initiated. Instead, the
Arab leaders should prepare themselves to “deal with the new realities
that will emerge” after the Security Council’s March 14 session, it
says.
“The Arab leaders need to meet quickly in order to reinforce
international efforts opposed to war on Iraq,” Al-Sharq writes. They
need to take practical steps to try to “replace the Anglo-American drive
to war with a further opportunity for fresh international diplomacy aimed
at pushing Baghdad, Washington and London toward a compromise.”
In the Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat, Jordanian journalist Salameh
Nematt writes that the Arab summit “will not be able to change anything
unless it puts forward a bold initiative that offers an alternative to an
American-led military invasion.”
He says the “suggestion” meekly made by some Arab governments that
Saddam and his senior lieutenants go into exile in order to spare Iraq war
was unconvincing, “because it was unrealistic and unaccompanied by
practical steps to implement it.” The Iraqi regime would be unlikely to
accept such an offer “were it not underpinned by measures to ensure its
implementation by force, the only language Saddam Hussein’s regime
understands.”
Nematt goes on to propose that “if the Arab states are worried about
Iraq and its people, rather than protecting the regime and its leaders,
the Arab summit could regain the reins of the initiative by calling on the
Iraqi regime to relinquish power or else face the prospect of the use of
force with Arab military participation in keeping with the will of
the international community as represented by UN Resolution 1441.”
He reasons: “If most countries of the region see US military
intervention as a threat to their security and stability, their only
option given Washington’s insistence on its stand is to
eliminate the reason for that intervention, even if that entails the
formation of a joint Arab military force to do the job in conjunction with
Iraqi opposition forces inside the country.”
Nematt writes that “it may have become too late if it was not
impossible in the first place for the member states of the Arab League
to agree on a move aimed at seizing the initiative from Washington. But it
is not too late for the Arab parties to play a role in formulating
Iraq’s future after the regime has been overthrown. Yet this requires
that they do not suffice today with opposing a war that is unavoidable,
but insist on actually taking part, if only symbolically, in the process
of change.”
“The Arab League didn’t object to Syria’s (1976) military
intervention in Lebanon to save it from a ruinous civil war, and it should
not object to the participation of Arab parties today in the process of
change aimed at saving Iraq and the Iraqis from a regime that relishes
contriving crises and wars,” he writes.
In Egypt’s semi-official Al-Ahram, Mohammed Assayed Saeed suggests the
best hope for a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis lies in a process of
political change in Baghdad initiated by the regime itself. Discussing the
prospects of averting war, Saeed says many regional and international
players see a military coup that deposes President Saddam Hussein but
keeps the Iraqi state intact as the “best alternative.” But this is
most unlikely to happen, he judges.
So on the assumption that Saddam’s regime is not going to be deposed
from within, it has three options, Saeed figures. The first is to prepare
to defend itself and the country in a protracted war. Saddam may want to
go down in history as a man who resisted the much-feared superpower to the
finish. But, in reality, the Iraqi Army is unlikely to put up any fight in
the face of a US invasion. Those urging Baghdad to brace for a showdown
are thus courting both the devastation of Iraq and the humiliation of the
regime.
Saeed suggests that an alternative option is for the Iraqi president to
hand over power to a military commander or junta, which would then offer
the US whatever it wants in terms of disarmament and political reform.
Washington has hinted it would favor such a course, and it would also
please key regional players because it would “largely preserve the
prevalent political and demographic equation.” The new people in charge
in Baghdad would have to open talks with the opposition and make reforms,
initiating a process of gradual political change.
Saeed writes that this would not necessarily spare Iraq war. The US might
not consider any political change in Baghdad sufficient unless it
provides it with near-total control over Iraq. But it would make it much
harder for the US to justify military action.
A third option, which Saddam Hussein might choose, would be to inaugurate
a sweeping political process that “generates a political dynamic that
blocks war.” This would entail Saddam and many of his top aides stepping
down, but handing power to an interim civilian administration rather than
the military. It would then convene a constitutional convention to draw up
a new constitution followed by free, internationally supervised pluralist
elections.
Saeed says he has no illusions about how difficult it would be to persuade
the Iraqi president to relinquish power voluntarily, either to the army or
to a civilian administration. “But we must not suffice with saying that
it is the last hope. We must work quickly toward it. For it is the only
hope of saving Iraq from destruction and possible humiliation too,” he
remarks.
Iraqi Kurdish commentator Sami Shourosh meanwhile raises the prospect of a
US invasion of Iraq triggering a new war between Turkey and the Kurds on
both sides of the border. He warns in Al-Hayat that it would be an
“exorbitantly costly error” for Washington to allow the Turkish Army
to deploy in northern Iraq, like Ankara has been demanding as part of the
“price” for allowing US troops to invade Iraq from Turkish territory.
Shourosh writes that although the Americans have been trying for months to
involve Turkey in their impending campaign, they want it to assume a
“limited” facilitating role like that played by Pakistan in the
Afghanistan war.
But Turkey, “which is yet to be rid of the burden of its Kemalist
legacy,” is more ambitious. “It is looking to seize on the war in Iraq
as an opportunity to transform itself into an effective and principal
regional power in the Middle East, and to emerge with as many spoils as
possible,” he says. Convinced that the US is only going to war because
of Iraq’s oil, Ankara sees nothing wrong in demanding its share from
Iraqi Kurdistan especially especially the Kirkuk and Mosul oil fields.
Ankara also believes the difficulty the US has had recruiting other allies
for its war “redoubles both Turkey’s importance and the price it can
demand for its cooperation which includes deploying its military in
northern Iraq, and trying to secure an important stake in government in
Baghdad to offset Iran’s anticipated future role.”
But Shourosh cautions that Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq
would ultimately prove very costly to the Turks themselves.
The local (Iraqi Kurdish) population is not well disposed to Ankara, and
would view its forces as an occupying army. Anarchy and armed clashes
would ensue, as well as proxy warfare between local Turkmen groups
sponsored by Ankara and the local Kurds.
Moreover, a Turkish thrust into Iraq would backfire at home. The military
establishment, whose political wings have been clipped in recent months,
would regain the ascendancy. That would jeopardize the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government’s reform program, and also inflame
tensions with Turkey’s own Kurdish population (estimated at 12 million).
Indeed, says Shourosh, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) insurgency in
Turkey could reignite the moment Turkish forces march into Iraq.
Shourosh adds that Turkish intervention would also invite similar action
by Iran. Tehran has indicated its willingness to sit on the sidelines
“if intervention in Iraq is confined to American forces,” but if the
Turks wade in, the Iranians could well feel compelled to do likewise. Even
if they decided against direct intervention, the Iranians would be certain
to provide every help and assistance to all opponents of Turkish
involvement in Iraq, be they Islamists or others.
Al-Quds al-Arabi publisher/editor Abdelbari Atwan says the way the US has
apparently deferred to Turkey over the future of northern Iraq should come
as a wake-up call to the Iraqi opposition groups that have aligned
themselves with Washington.
“America won’t respect either its promises or its allies,” he warns
them. “What it wants are not allies but clients, which it can quickly
discard once it has used them, just like paper tissues (not to use a more
fitting metaphor). Thus it has abandoned the Kurds and sold them out to
Turkey, agreeing to disarm them and end their current special status, and
shattering their dreams of a federal or independent state.
“And it has forsaken the Iraqi opposition groups which it used for years
as a propaganda smokescreen, openly announcing that it will install a US
Army general as governor of Iraq and then an American civilian
administration,” Atwan writes.