Opinion, August 2003, www.aljazeerah.info

 

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The victory of extremists 

Hassan A. Barari

Jordan Times, Tuesday, August 26, 2003

 

THE FACT that US President George Bush staked his personal prestige on the roadmap convinced many analysts that the Israelis and the Palestinians would at long last enjoy a long period of tranquility. Yet, the latest bout of violence has proven that such optimism was misplaced and premature. Many now fear that the Israeli and Palestinian assault might herald a full-scale confrontation thus leading to the clinical death of the roadmap. Regardless of such speculations, one cannot help but to draw three main different, yet interrelated lessons. First and foremost, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon must have been relieved by the untimely cessation of the hudna. Sharon was explicit, right from the start, that the hudna was a unilateral Palestinian issue and did not commit Israel to anything. MK Yossi Sarid wrote in Maariv on Friday that despite the fact the public liked the hudna, the government as well as the chief of staff hated it. Ehud Yaari, an Israeli political analyst, in an interview with the Israeli television channel two last Thursday, argued that Israel was respecting the ceasefire with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and that the hudna was internal Palestinian business. Implicit in most Israeli statements is that the hudna was a function of weakness on the part of the Palestinians. The working assumption is that the Israeli army managed to inflict on them unbearable damage. For this reason, compromise with these “terrorist” organisations is rather unnecessary. Put differently, they still believe that “Might is Right.”

Judging by the conduct of Sharon's government, and here is the nitty-gritty of the matter, his government is not qualified to make peace. Put bluntly, there is not an Israeli partner to talk with. The foreign policy of this government is still, by and large, driven by an outdated revisionist ideology that believes in the primacy of using force in international politics. Seen in this way, it is conspicuous that with such a government, peace remains a mirage. The best this government can do is to arrive at a provisional agreement by which tranquillity can be realised but the pace of settlement goes unfettered.

That this government has been manipulating every single event to perpetuate the state of conflict is undisputed. Therefore, it is time the Israeli public realises that this government does not represent the peaceful inclinations expressed by scores of public opinion polls. One is struck by the fact that effective or fighting opposition does not exist in Israel. It is appalling how this government is not held accountable despite the fact it has the worst record in the history of Israel in all aspects: The security has never been worse, the economy is in stagnation, and the papers are full of stories about government corruption. Shimon Peres is busy with preparation for his birthday and, hoping Sharon will invite him to join a national unity government, he is loath to upset him. More importantly, the wobbly opposition has failed markedly to present an alternative approach to all aforementioned outstanding issues that interest the Israeli public. With the absence of the system of checks and balances needed for sound decision-making, Israel is in real trouble.

Even Israeli journalism seems overwhelmed by the pace of events. I was a bit scared by how the Israeli press, save for Haaretz, is presenting the conflict. I was browsing the Israeli daily Maariv on Friday to see if a debate exists over the latest cycle of violence. To my astonishment, page one and three featured photos of Hamas and Hizbollah leadership as playing cards, just as the American press presented Saddam and his men. The daily dubbed them the “kingdom of terror.” It does not take much to see that the attempt to link international terrorism and these organisations serves to justify the government's inability to make a decent peace. Obviously, this sort of journalism has failed to address the root cause of this violence, which is occupation. This should be the starting point for any analysis of the situation. Occupation generates resistance and terror, and we cannot reverse this sequence. So far the Israeli media has been unsuccessful in providing the public with the courage to see through self-delusion and to admit the ultimate truth about the occupation.

The second conclusion pertains to the Palestinians. Time and again, Palestinians have been easily provoked by Sharon's bullying tactics and have fallen into his trap. I have argued frequently that Sharon's weakness is in the political arena and not in the military one. The six-week relative calm helped bring a marked external pressure on Sharon. Thus, American-Israeli differences on key issues have begun to come to the fore. Not surprisingly, Hamas returned to let Sharon off the hook. Judging by their actions during the 35 months of the Intifada, one cannot help but recognise that despite statements to the contrary, these organisations do not seek peace. They are interested in sabotaging the peace process by clinging to the idea that they have the right to resist occupation. While this argument is morally one hundred per cent true, they have failed to convince us how they are going to drive the occupation from the Palestinian lands when Israel has the strongest army in the region. Those who toy with the idea of driving Israel away by force are not facing reality. By sticking to the right to resist, they have failed to see another less expensive, yet more efficient diplomatic avenue for realising their national objective.

It is palpable that the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organisations do not really acknowledge the superior authority of the PA. Throughout their relatively short history, they were neither part of the PLO nor the PA, thus remaining outside the organisational framework of the Palestinian national movement. The efforts made by Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Mazen and Palestinian security chief Mohammad Dahlan to assimilate them through the hudna arrangement have failed. Certainly Abu Mazen is in an unenviable position, as he is facing a truly serious dilemma. In other words, Abu Mazen is perplexed about how to crack down on these organisations without it leading to a civil war. Alternatively, Abu Mazen can duck and resign, thus declaring his failure. It seems that he is in a situation akin, but not identical, to Ben-Gurion's on the eve of proclaiming the state, when his authority was seriously challenged by the Jewish underground Irgun and Lehi.

A different but nevertheless relevant issue is the fact that Palestinian President Yasser Arafat proved to be resourceful and shrewd. Contrary to all Israeli speculations that he would do his best to undermine Abu Mazen, he disappointed the Israeli government by lending his support to Abu Mazen despite the wrangling between them. Indeed, Arafat was not against Abu Mazen but opposed the efforts to unseat him. Even with the attempts to sideline Arafat, he managed to keep head above water. Arafat must have known that Hamas and Sharon would do the dirty work for him and for this reason adopted the wait and see strategy.

The third lesson is that both the Palestinians and the Israelis are incapable of reaching a solution on their own. The trust between the two sides does not exist. There should be a solution imposed on both sides by an external factor. The United States as well as other influential players can do this job. An international force should be deployed between the two sides instead of the controversial security wall. The United States and the European Union can adopt the carrot and stick policy to compel the Israelis and the Palestinians to accept the imposed solution. Leaving the two sides alone to address their problem has proven to be a long futile exercise.

To sum up, Palestinian and Israeli pragmatists have yielded to the pressure of right wing forces in both communities. What is needed more than ever is for the pragmatic camps of both sides to link together in a brave show in order to win over anti-peace forces in their respective societies. An external factor is crucial for a lasting solution. Only then will peace have a chance. Failing to do so means extremists on both sides shall celebrate their victory.

 

 



 

 
Earth, a planet hungry for peace

 

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).
The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).

 

 

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