War critics blame Rumsfeld but it was Perle who bowed out Joseph Samaha aljazeerah.info

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War critics blame Rumsfeld but it was Perle who bowed out

Joseph Samaha

The Daily Star, 4/5/03

The first phase of the American-British invasion of Iraq is already over, and the second has begun.
The Americans say their forces accomplished all the objectives set out for the opening phase: They secured the southern Iraqi oil fields, prevented the Iraqis from targeting Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan with missiles, seized control of the deep water port at Umm Qasr, weakened Saddam Hussein’s grip on power, and exhausted the Republican Guard. Not everyone is convinced though, the main reason being that the level of expectation has been continually raised in Washington, and the results of the campaign subjected to extremely harsh scrutiny.
It is not an exaggeration to say based on statements made before the war by American, British, and Australian officials, as well as offshore Iraqi opposition leaders that the campaign was expected to go something like this:
1. An eager population would welcome the invading troops to Iraq.
2. There would consequently be no need for an occupation force, since the mission would be one of liberation. The invaders would promptly make their way to Baghdad amid much rejoicing. Iraqi Army regulars were expected to change sides and accompany the Anglo-American force on its march to the capital.
3. Even if Baghdad were not to rise against the regime, a long siege would not be necessary. The isolated Iraqi regime would soon lose control of the capital.
4. An American military governor would be installed to rule over the country with the help of local dissidents and the exiled opposition. Power would gradually be turned over to pro-American Iraqi elements.
5. These changes would have a domino effect on neighboring countries. Regimes that try to resist (such as Iran and Syria) would be threatened with a similar fate.
6. Success in Iraq and the Middle East would enhance Washington’s global standing vis-a-vis its opponents. While the latter rue their lot, the US would proceed to “reform” international institutions as it sees fit.
This phase ended the moment it came out in the open that the Iraqis were not about to welcome the invaders with rice and ululation. In fact, the Iraqis resisted and refused to join the invading force. This was a shock greater than Turkey’s refusal to allow the Americans to open a second front.
The Shiites of Iraq did not allow their anger at the regime to affect their position toward the invaders. The positions adopted by the Shiite inhabitants of Basra, Najaf and Karbala varied between a sulking neutrality and active resistance. The stance adopted by the Shiites of Iraq came as a bitter blow to the Orientalists who had persuaded American military planners that the campaign would be a cakewalk. They proved that while being Shiites, they are also Iraqis. To be fair, the Shiites of Iraq had already proven their patriotic credentials during the long war against fellow Shiite Iran. The 12 years of economic sanctions caused them to hate the US almost as much as Saddam Hussein.
Neither should we overlook the fact that Iraqi Shiites share the overwhelming Muslim opposition to American policy in the region, and fully back the Palestinian people in their struggle against US-backed Israeli oppression.
In addition, the fundamentalist nature of the American plan for Iraq played a major share in dissuading the Shiites from supporting the invaders. Pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiites were disheartened by George W. Bush’s decision to include Tehran in his “axis of evil.”
The Iranian leadership and the Tehran-based Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) blew hot and cold on the American invasion; but the unexpected steadfastness demonstrated by the Iraqis opened a rare window of opportunity for the Iranians. “If we were to become the next target,” Tehran figured, “then it would be best for us to see to it that America’s victory in Iraq would be as costly as possible.”
Tehran’s priority in the current war is therefore to make the next one as difficult as possible. Such a position would be incompatible with support for a popular uprising against the central government.
Political shortsightedness was reflected on military performance in Iraq. It became plain soon after military action commenced that the war would be tougher than was first contemplated, that not enough troops had been committed to the operation, and that the advance on Baghdad would have to be postponed so long as the northern front remained closed and southern resistance continued.
It can be said that the resignation of Richard Perle as chairman of the Pentagon’s influential Defense Policy Board marked the end of the first phase of the war. While Perle stepped down nominally over a clash of interests, it was obvious that the way the Iraq campaign has been conducted contributed to his downfall.
The Americans have decided not only to review their war plan, but also to rethink their entire Iraq policy. The war is no longer one of liberation. Washington is in the process of reassessing the situation within Iraq, its relations with the Iraqi opposition, and the way Iraq interacts with its regional environment. It is no longer certain that the US would enjoy the fruits of an easy victory in Iraq, especially if resistance continues.
With such a fundamental change in the fortunes of war, it is simply not enough just to get rid of Richard Perle. The person more directly responsible for misreading the situation is Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
It was Rumsfeld who railroaded senior American officers into accepting his point of view. It was Rumsfeld, through the personal influence he exercises on Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney, who advocated the overoptimistic viewpoints put forward by the Iraqi opposition. It was Rumsfeld who began calling for Iraq to be targeted soon after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks , and it was he who treated the UN Security Council and the Europeans with contempt. Perle might have fallen on his sword to protect Rumsfeld, but that does not absolve the defense secretary of responsibility.

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