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Caoimhe Butterly: The Irish peace activist who stands in the line of fire
By Katie Barlow

The Guardian, Arab News, 11/30/02

Statesmanship
Arab News, 30 November 2002

Turks must be pinching themselves to ensure that they are not dreaming. An opposition politician has actually offered to back constitutional changes that will allow his rival, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the country’s new moderate Islamist government, to overcome a ban that stops him from becoming an MP and taking his place as prime minister.

In such circumstances, maybe the government should not be tempted into making constitutional reform a priority. Erdogan can perhaps function just as well for the present, as party leader outside of Parliament. When the real work is well under way, then the constitutional issues can engaged.

A new opportunity for peace in Mideast
By Nizar Abdel-Kader

Arab News, 11/30/02

By Muna Shuqair

The Daily Star, 11/30/02

Amman is a modern city where teenagers of both sexes flock to American-style fast food joints and shopping malls. In the Jordanian capital’s posh suburbs, where a Western lifestyle holds sway, it is very difficult to imagine that a new phenomenon ­ piety ­ is insidiously growing stronger among Jordanian youth. After all, there is nothing in Amman that could logically lead to religious observance. Jordan embraced modernism very early on, and the close political and cultural relationship with the West ensured that life (at least in some Amman suburbs) was the spitting image of that in the West.
Moreover, the relative liberalism embraced by the Jordanian regime, as well as its openness to the West, made the processes of Westernization and modernization proceed in a natural and seamless manner. This was helped along by the fact that many Jordanians traveled to the United States to study. Many stayed on, which helped build cultural and social relationships between the two countries. Jordanian-Palestinian migration to the US also introduced many aspects of American life to Jordan.
Nevertheless, it now seems that modernity and Westernization is not as deeply ingrained in Jordan’s social fabric as it is in Lebanon, for example. Lebanon enjoys a much older and more profound heritage of Western liberalism than Jordan does ­ no doubt due to Lebanon’s greater geographical and cultural openness to Europe and the wider world.
By contrast, Jordan’s relative geographical isolation, its vast deserts and the proximity of its towns and cities to deserts ensured that Bedouin values lurked just below the Western facade of the Jordanian character.
Nevertheless, life in Amman is broadly similar to that in the West, although with a more laid-back and relaxed attitude.
It was in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan ­ and in the last two years in particular ­ that the phenomenon of religious observance became more and more noticeable in the Jordanian capital. Young people who had never been interested in Islam before started going to mosques to pray. Many can be seen in Mosques performing the Ramadan night prayer known as taraweeh, a highly commendable ­ but voluntary ­ act of worship of up to 20 prayer units. At the same time, the Muslim veil became more widespread among young women. (Although it cannot be said that the veil is a new phenomenon in Jordanian life, having been introduced by the last Islamist “awakening” in the 1970s, it nevertheless was restricted mainly to the poorer social stratas.)
The veil cannot be said to be a strictly religious manifestation; it also has social and material elements, and can be said to be an expression of social conservatism. At any rate, the veil, which used to be the preserve of the lower social classes, is now widespread among the more prosperous and educated Amman elite as well.
It would be wrong to say that the events of Sept. 11 and their aftermath are responsible for the renaissance of Islam in Jordanian society, for this type of religious observance is unrelated to the brand of political Islam that resulted in the Sept. 11 attacks. Nor can the Jordanian Islamic revival be seen as a response to political events in the region ­ especially in Palestine and Iraq. It is, in fact, related to an issue that is both simple and immensely complicated at the same time: the role played by Arab satellite TV channels during the month of Ramadan in particular.
During Ramadan, most of these satellite channels give a lot of air time to preachers who address the young in particular. The most popular of these “Muslim televangelists” is an Egyptian named Amr Khaled who has succeeded in becoming the “star of Ramadan.”
Khaled represents a new breed of Muslim campaigner; an urbane young man in his 30s, Khaled appears on TV in a suit. His message is as easygoing as his appearance suggests. Khaled delivers his message not in the threatening “fire and brimstone” style of traditional preachers, but in a more down to earth fashion. He jokes, he concentrates on the positive aspects of Islam, and he seems aware of the problems facing the young. Khaled is also ubiquitous. He appears twice a day on Saudi Arabia’s Iqra satellite channel. He even appears on Lebanon’s relatively raun-chy LBC during Ramadan.
Khaled tells Muslim youth stories about the Prophet Mohammed and his disciples. He dedicates entire episodes to talking about the caliphs who succeeded the Prophet; he urges his viewers to take up the Muslim veil and pray regularly. But he also calls on his young audience to care about their appearance; he tells them of the importance of keeping abreast of modern technological advances; while beseeching them to obey the tenets of Islam, Khaled urges his followers to study and make something of their lives.
That is why it is not uncommon that when a young Jordanian is asked when he or she began to pray, the answer comes back: “Since I saw Amr Khaled!”
Khaled’s strictly religious message did not prevent the Egyptian press in particular from attacking him. This was understandable, given the concern that his converted hordes can be seen as the “sleepers” of political Islam who could be called upon when the time comes. These young people come not only from poorer backgrounds, but also from more prosperous and educated social classes. That is why there is a constant fear that the faith of these young people could be exploited by extreme Islamist organizations.
Unlike Egypt and Algeria, however, Islamist political currents are not widespread in Jordan. Besides the small Islamist cells that are uncovered from time to time, there is no active Islamist current in the Hashemite kingdom. The main Islamist political movement in Jordan is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was born and matured under the stewardship of the Jordanian regime, and is known for its moderation and flexibility.
The Muslim Brotherhood, however, no longer commands the same level of public support that it used to. As a result of its participation in successive Jordanian governments, the Brotherhood lost a lot of mass appeal. Despite boycotting the last 1998 national elections, the Brotherhood failed to regain its popularity.
It can therefore safely be said that the brand of Islam so popular among Jordanian youth today has nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, it is a “supra-Arab” phenomenon, in the sense that it pervades all Arab countries and peoples. Driven by a need among youth for faith, their inclination toward piety and yearning for a distinctive cultural identity, this religious phenomenon has haphazardly crossed boundaries and infiltrated entire societies.
Up to the present time, it does not seem that specific political movements have tapped this religious current. It has not yet been used for political gain. It is a purely faith-driven current that might have been strengthened by the West’s hostility to Islam. No one can accurately predict which way this current will develop. Yet since it is generally not organized, its political effectiveness is limited ­ for now.
In short, religious piety at the moment is part of the current cultural scene that is affected by (and interacts with) various political, social and economic factors.
The more important issue is how this current will react to imminent developments, and who will be able to infiltrate, lead and politicize it.
As yet, these are hypothetical questions.

Muna Shuqair is a Jordanian political writer. She wrote this special to The Daily Star

By Abdelwahab El-Affendi

The Daily Star, 11/30/02

When is an Islamist not an Islamist?
A standard criticism of Islamist activists is that they deliberately lay a potentially exclusivist claim to Islamic legitimacy. By describing themselves as “Islamic movements,” they imply that everyone else is not Islamic, or at least not Islamic enough. This “monopolistic” claim is seen in itself as a threat to rivals, and is used as a basis of condemnation of these groups. Bans on Islamic parties are often justified on this basis.
Islamists protest that their claims are in no way monopolistic, since nothing prevents others from doing the same; many in fact do, as there are several rival “Islamic” groups in every country. They also argue that the claim to be Islamic is no more a judgement on others than the appellation “democratic” or even “Christian democratic” for Western parties implies that rivals are not as Christian or as democratic as they should be.
However, these arguments don’t cut any ice with opponents, who continue to insist that any Islamist claim is potentially subversive and conflictive. This led some moderate Islamist groups to abandon any reference to their Islamic credentials in party names.
The Islamic Trend Movement in Tunisia led the way, abandoning that name in 1988 and adopting the name Ennahda (Renaissance) Party. That didn’t work either, as the party remains banned despite its explicit commitment to the secular Tunisian Constitution.
Its counterparts in Algeria and Morocco fared better. Algeria, which in 1992 banned the main Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), allowed two others, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas, (formally known as the Movement for a Peaceful Society) to operate legally. (This probably indicates that the FIS’s main fault in the eyes of the authorities is its popularity, rather than its Islamic ideology.) In Morocco, the modern Justice and Development Party is allowed to operate legally, and more than doubled its share of parliamentary seats (from 14 to 42 in the 352-seat legislature) in September’s general elections, to the surprise of many.
In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which swept to a convincing electoral victory on Nov. 3, vehemently denies any Islamist leanings. Led by the popular former Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the party has split from the “Islamist” Fazilet (Virtue) Party which was banned in June 2001. Fazilet was in turn a successor to the Refah (Welfare) Party, banned in January 1998. Neither Fazilet nor Refah ever claimed to be Islamist, and all three parties vowed to uphold the secular system of the Turkish Republic. In fact, the “Islamists” have been vehemently arguing that they are the true guardians of secularism, as they would definitely limit the state’s intervention in religious matters and allow more personal freedom of religious practice.
The fact that their opponents were unconvinced, and that Erdogan himself was banned from running for political office after being accused of harboring radical Islamist intentions, shows that the question is rather more complex than appearances indicate.
The problem is not that “Islamists” lay claim to the coveted resource of Islamic legitimacy, as it is clear that the Turkish “Islamists” (as such exist) are careful to deny such a claim as vehemently as St. Peter denied Christ on that fateful night. Where they are concerned, any of their rivals are welcome to this resource; they want nothing to do with it. They are, as they never tire of repeating, not Islamists, but rather Muslim democrats. Democracy, not Sharia, is their ultimate goal.
Try telling that to their critics, though. They will all tell you they are not sincere in their claims and denials.
The main problem with the Islamists in the eyes of their critics, it appears, is not what they say or do, but that they exist. Worse still, that they are popular.
During my last visit to Istanbul, secular intellectuals unanimously expressed the fear that, if left unchecked, the Islamists would take over Turkey in less than 20 years. (That turned out to be rather over-optimistic, since it took them less than five to sweep to power.)
A leading Tunisian official told an American journalist a few years ago that his country would never allow the Islamists to run for office because they would certainly sweep to power. This appears to be the rationale of the very repressive anti-Islamist policies adopted by countries such as Egypt.
Ironically, though, Islamist opponents also speak repeatedly of the “failure of political Islam” and issue periodical predictions about the imminent demise of Islamism as a vital force. To support these claims, they site the disastrous performance of Islamist regimes in countries like Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan.
There is also ample evidence of disenchantment with Islamist politics elsewhere, exemplified by splits and internal squabbles.
Is the problem then, that the Islamists are very popular, or rather that they are  extremely unpopular?
The answer is, paradoxically, both.
Islamist popularity appears to defy all odds and confound all predictions. This year, Islamists managed convincing victories in the Egyptian elections, where the Muslim Brotherhood became the main opposition party in Parliament, although it is not officially recognized and despite the elections being far from fair. Islamists scored important wins in Morocco and Pakistan. Two years ago, the two main moderate Islamist parties swept to the presidency and the speakership of Parliament. In Iran, the moderate Islamists led by President Mohammad Khatami won a landslide victory last year.
However, it is clear that the rising popularity of these groups is proportionate to their projection of a more moderate image. In other words, they become more popular to the proportion that they become less “Islamic.” But the support they enjoy appears to be closely related to their Islamic character, however diluted it may be. Public opinion in the Muslim world seems to favor groups that are not hostile to the Islamic heritage, but ones that are not intent on imposing a narrow and strict interpretation of Islamic doctrine.
This may be a pointer to the future of Muslim politics. So far, Islamists have been a dual obstacle to democracy: first by voicing hostility to democratic norms, and second by providing the pretext for entrenched regimes that cite the Islamist threat to justify their opposition to democratic change.
But if the trend that we see in Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Morocco, and elsewhere continues, then both these obstacles will be removed in one go. As Islamist groups emerge that are both committed to democracy and very popular, then the pretexts of the opponents of democracy will disappear, while an unstoppable pressure for democratization will build up. This may be just what the Muslim world needs at this moment. Turkey, for once, is pointing the way forward.

Abdelwahab El-Affendi is a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster.

The Daily Star, 11/30/02

In Bob Woodward’s recent book, Bush at War, an inside account of the debate within the Bush administration that led to US military action in Afghanistan and the decision to confront Iraqi President Saddam Hussein ­ President George W. Bush is quoted saying that, “At this moment in history, if there is a world problem, we’re expected to deal with it. It’s the price of power. It is the price of where the United States stands. We will.”
It’s obvious the US has taken on the role of global policeman. It has been interfering in the internal affairs of far away countries that don’t threaten the US or its vital interests, and imposing its own policies upon them. In fact, the US has been passing legislation for the express purpose of imposing them on other countries.
If we assume, for argument’s sake, that America is justified in taking on such a role, then the least we could expect would be that it would exercise a level of fairness and treat all countries equally in order for the exercise not to become a terrorist-imperialist concept that exploits some peoples to the advantage of others.
At any rate, the Americans cannot expect to play the role of global policeman and avoid criticism at the same time, especially if they neglect evenhandedness.
On Sept. 30, for example, Congress passed ­ and Bush signed into law ­ the Foreign Relations Authorization Act that includes a provision that requires the US to identify Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Even Bush made clear his administration would not follow that part of the legislation, known as “Section 214” because it views it as nonbinding, and said “US policy regarding Jerusalem has not changed.”
Bush was unhappy with this provision because its inclusion in the State Department spending bill was interference in his constitutional authority regarding foreign policy, and not because he rejects the principle of military occupation. In the case of Jerusalem, the least the Americans can expect from this interference is to infuriate all Muslims.
On Oct. 21, Bush also signed into law the Sudan Peace Act, legislation passed by the House and Senate. This act, about which the Sudanese government was not consulted, threatens Khartoum with sanctions if it does not sincerely work toward ending the civil war, and bringing peace to southern Sudan. As everyone knows, it takes two sides to have a war. The act did not require the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement rebels to fulfill the same conditions, nor did it threaten SPLA rebels with sanctions.
And how is Sudan to be judged according to the act? Only days after it was passed, the rebels launched an attack against government forces, thus violating a one day old peace agreement. The SPLA objective was apparently to provoke a confrontation between Washington and Khartoum in order to improve their own bargaining position.
Since mid-April, efforts have been made by the pro-Israel lobby in Washington to pass the Syria Accountability Act. The act cites Syria’s purported support for “terrorism,” continued military presence in Lebanon, cooperation with Iraq and development of weapons of mass destruction as reasons for imposing penalties on Damascus, such as economic sanctions, barring investments and downgrading diplomatic ties. Israel, however, wants the US to maintain pressure on Damascus, chiefly to divert attention that it is occupying Syrian territory on the Golan.
This American interference encouraged certain Lebanese factions to demonstrate against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Following the Nov. 15 attack on Jewish soldiers and settlers in Hebron, the US demanded that Syria close down the Damascus offices of Islamic Jihad. Such pressure would have been understandable had the Americans been making demands of Israel to settle the Golan issue, the Palestine question, and the issue of Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon.
In recent weeks, the Americans have also raised the issue of Syria’s nuclear program, despite its peaceful nature and the fact that it is under supervision by the International Atomic Energy Association. Even the CIA said that the Syrian nuclear program is used strictly for scientific and research purposes, as did the US State Department.
Israel’s advanced nuclear weapons program, however, never rates a mention by the Americans. There is no US pressure on Israel, no criticism, and not even expressions of concern about safety at the Israeli nuclear plant close to Arab countries.
Washington has totally ignored Arab requests for the Middle East to be declared a region free of weapons of mass destruction. Syrian President Bashar Assad and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak jointly made such a request on Nov. 18 in Damascus.
These are a few examples  ­ without mentioning the damage US sanctions have inflicted on Iraq.
Therefore, the global policeman is biased and led by the Israeli right-wing. In recent years, thanks to its unlimited support for Israel, US policy has caused the Palestinians untold damage. The US seems to have surrendered completely to the Israeli lobby. No one can dare say that the Arabs reject peace with Israel.

Abdeljabbar Adwan is a Palestinian analyst.

Hard pill for Canadian Liberals to swallow
Toronto | By Nihal Kaneira  | Gulf News, 30-11-2002


Without doubt, the Canadian Alliance MP, Jason Kenney, was using the embarrassing comment to get some political mileage against the Jean Chretien government in the House of Commons in Ottawa.

Still, his analysis as to why a top official of the prime minister's office was prompted to call U.S. President George W. Bush a "moron" at the Nato summit in Prague, made a lot of sense. This is the way Canadian Liberals view Americans, he said. It is typical of their knee-jerk anti-Americanism.

"Otherwise, do you think one good friend will treat another by calling its leader a moron," Kenney asked, and then asserted: "Canada-U.S. relations have deteriorated to their lowest level in decades because of this kind of knee-jerk anti-Americanism."

The "What a moron" remark was a diplomatic faux pas of epic proportions, and Prime Minister Jean Chretien was perhaps right to accept the resignation of the official concerned - his Communi-cations Director Francoise Ducros  -  as demanded by the country's two opposition parties, Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives.

But the prime minister also made a hash of things, first refusing to accept her resignation, then accepting it and turning it into a circus with some clumsy statements, giving the story more legs and a longer shelf life than it deserved. And the circus is still playing in Canada and the United States.

Mistake

Chretien first mistake was to try to attack the messenger as the villain of the piece. He said the journalist concerned should not have reported the slur because Ducros was using it in a private conversation. But the so-called "private conversation" was taking place in a press briefing room at the summit, and not one, but several reporters had heard it.

Besides, the official making the comment was no bit player in Ottawa, but Chretien's own media advisor and official spokesperson, a savvy lawyer who has a reputation in Canada as the prime minister's "fiercely loyal mouthpiece."

His second blunder was to try to explain away Ducros' gaffe by suggesting that she had perhaps not used the actual "M" word, and then turning round and agreeing that she uses it often. Next, the prime minister compounded it even more, saying that Ducros had actually been defending Bush, not attacking him, in a private comment that went public.

Finally, he made an even more intriguing statement: "Bush is not a moron," he said. "He is a friend. My personal relations with the president are extremely good."

Relationship

That was a real stretch, and most Canadians - even Americans - know it. In fact, as political pundits here say it, the relationship between Chretien and Bush is probably at its nadir and the dislike one feels for the other is visceral. The two men never really have clicked and often seem uncomfortable when they appear on the same stage.

Chretien is yet to be invited to Bush's Crawford ranch, where the president has entertained world leaders who are closest to his heart, like those of Russia, China, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Mexico. Bush has met Chretien several times, but has not invited him up to now to join in activities such as fishing and golfing, which have characterised previous relationships between American presidents and Cana-dian prime ministers.

This is strange, considering that Canada is America's immediate neighbour, a strategic partner and the country's strongest trading partner. The relationship, however, has been deteriorating over the past two years with Ottawa and Washington frequently at loggerheads over a variety of trade disputes and other irritants, including Canadian reluctance to back Bush's hard-nosed campaign against Iraq.

Most ruling Liberals believe the U.S. is trying to drag Canada into another war that they want no part of, and they are terribly unhappy that Americans have given them no leeway over the softwood lumber issue, despite their participation in the war against terrorism.

The recent controversy over ethnic profiling of Canadian citizens and landed immigrants crossing the Canada - U.S. border, the long-running disagreement over Canada's defence spending and Canada's refusal to join the U.S. anti-ballistic missile defence system have further poisoned the relationship.

The persistent refusal on the part of the Canadian government to accommodate American wishes on these issues has given rise to a perception across the border that the ruling elite in Ottawa is anti-American.

For their part, White House officials reportedly refer to Chretien as a "dino," meaning, dinosaur, because he is not easily moved on issues, which Americans consider crucial for continental security in the light of the growing terrorist threats. Canadian officials do not share the same urgency, and even more important, fear an erosion of Canadian sovereignty, if Canada follows the U.S. blindly.

Naturally, many commentators suspect that Ducros' contemptuous remark was a reflection of the current attitude towards the Bush administration in Ottawa, a reflection of the frustration that Chretien and many of his Liberal colleagues are feeling these days as they find themselves forced to climb aboard the Bush bandwagon on a variety of issues, ranging from a potential war against Iraq to allocating more funds to beef up the Canadian military and tailoring Canadian immigration and refugee policies to meet the requirements of U.S. security.

It seems, Chretien officials were counting on, first on the American public and then the international community, to block Bush, or at least slow him down, on some of his ventures, like the current campaign against Saddam Hussain.

Blank cheque

In fact, many Canadian media pundits have been predicting that Bush would falter for months. Instead, the president's clout at home and abroad has increased. He seems to be on a roll, winning the mid-term elections in the U.S, boosting the Republican majority in the House and regaining Republican control of the Senate, getting a congressional blank cheque for taking the war against terrorism to Iraq, if he deemed it necessary, and then going to the UN Security Council and securing unanimous endorsement for a resolution to disarm Iraq.

So when the Canadian delegation saw Bush hijacking the Prague agenda to press his tough Iraq stance once again, muscling Nato allies to give a similar endorsement like he got in the Security Council, while nagging countries like Canada at the same time, Ducros, who is said to be always on a short fuse, flipped, lashing out at Bush with the now notorious "What a moron" comment.

Miffed in Prague

That Canadians were miffed in Prague, there is no doubt. Ducros may be the one who made the headlines, but at least one other Chretien official was equally incensed. A day earlier, Defence Minister John McCallum, bashed Bush in equally strong but more polite language in the Canadian press, telling him to mind his own business when it comes to Canadian defence policy.

McCallum was angry that Bush had chided some weaker members of Nato for not spending enough on their armed forces. Bush had not singled out Canada - or any other Nato ally by name - but Canadians apparently felt the sting, because the American Ambassador in Canada, Paul Cellucci, has been belting out the same tune for months in Ottawa.

"I would not urge the President of the United States or the U.S. ambassador to do my job -  to ask for more defence spending," McCallum fumed on the sidelines of the Nato summit. "I think that is a Canadian matter, I think that a number of Canadians have been ticked off by these demands. So while Mr. Bush may be asking for what I am asking for, I am not asking for his help."

But by the time the summit closed, he not only had the unanimous Nato endorsement of his demand for Iraqi disarmament in the bag, he had the Canadian prime minister agreeing to support the United Nations with military action, if the UN has to confront Iraq, agreeing that Canada will be part of Nato's new rapid-response force to combat terror and contain outlaw regimes that threaten the west, and agreeing - most important of all - to increase funding for the Canadian military in the next budget, reversing a position he has held stubbornly for the major part of a decade.

Bush had won again, and it is a hard pill for Canadian Liberals to swallow.

Bin Laden: Bogeyman in hiding

Al-Ahram Weekly, 11/28/02

 Where is Bin Laden? Why has America, with all its mighty intelligence and overt and covert operations failed to catch him, dead or alive?

Fourteen months have elapsed since the US military campaign targeted Al- Qa'eda hideouts in the mountains of Afghanistan, in Kandahar, Tora Bora, and the rugged terrain near the border with Pakistan. It is only sensible to ask how Bin Laden managed to escape this awesome assault when his nearest aides have fallen into the hands of US intelligence? Only recently Abdel-Rahman El-Nashri, aka Abu-Jalal El-Makki, a key member of Al-Qa'eda, was captured by the Americans. But not Bin Laden.

In an audio recording recently aired by Al-Jazeera and relayed by other international satellite channels, Bin Laden praised the bombings that targeted Moscow, Bali, and a French tanker off Yemeni shores. He threatened more reprisals against US forces and their allies. The recording raised many questions. Even Russian President Putin wondered, in a joint press conference he held recently with President Bush, about Bin Laden's whereabouts and the puzzling inability of the US authorities to locate him.

Having examined the recording and questioned imprisoned Al-Qa'eda members about its authenticity, US experts concluded that the voice on the tape is actually Bin Laden's. Yet US authorities have so far failed to provide information, speculative or otherwise, about Bin Laden's fate. How is he supposed to maintain communication with his aides? How does his outfit manage to finance the terrorist attacks that have taken place or may take place in the future? Is there an alternative secret command running the show in Bin Laden's absence?

Recent issues of Time and Newsweek discussed the question of Bin Laden's disappearance. One theory was that he was hiding with Pakistani tribes on the Afghan border. Another was that he had gone to Yemen, homeland of his ancestors. The latter possibility may explain why US pilotless planes have been deployed in Djibouti to reconnoitre Yemen.

The scant information released by US authorities about Bin Laden may be incongruous, but one thing is clear. The United States is the only beneficiary of the mystery surrounding Bin Laden's fate. Bin Laden's recordings, randomly produced and difficult to authenticate, are being used to scare off outsiders as well as Americans. Meanwhile, draconian laws are being passed in the US. Political pressures are brought on ally and foe alike. And President Bush's strategy to punish members of the so-called axis of evil proceeds unhampered.

Perhaps Bin Laden has been killed, perhaps not. For all we know the Americans may be secretly holding him. Anything is possible, so long as Washington benefits from his legend and the actions attributed to his outfit.

Audio recordings by Bin Laden can be faked. They can be used to justify harsh measures against immigrants, who may now be placed under surveillance, harassed, and discriminated against, on the pretext of minimising threats of violence.

Every day we hear reports of Bin Laden's aides being arrested, of sleeper cells uncovered in Italy, France, Germany, Canada, and elsewhere. Most of the time the charges are later dropped, but the damage to the lives of those concerned is done.

Bin Laden has become the bogeyman security services use to suspend the due process of the law. Innocent people are arrested without charges and thrown in jail for months without trial. A new horizon of human rights' abuses is dawning. And yet another justification, however flimsy, is now available for repressing the Palestinians and attacking Iraq.

What really happened in Jenin

Al-Ahram Weekly, 11/30/02

How did the Israeli army kill UN worker Iain Hook last week? Jonathan Cook seeks answers in Jenin

An office swivel chair is still posted at the third- floor window of 75-year-old Tawfiq Marhad's home. Hidden among the skirts of some heavy blue drapes are a handful of Israel army bullet casings fired during a gun battle between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian militants in Jenin refugee camp last Friday. "I thought we had cleared them all away," says Marhad.

It was from this window that the bullet that killed Iain Hook, 53, a British United Nations worker, was almost certainly fired. He bled to death some time after 1.15pm, after a UN ambulance was blocked by the army from reaching him. Although the autopsy report has yet to be issued, he is believed to have been hit by a single bullet in the back.

The Israeli army, which has admitted responsibility for Hook's death, says the shot was fired after a gun battle with Palestinian militants who were inside the UN compound. According to Israeli reports, Hook was holding a cellphone which a sniper mistook for a grenade. Foreign minister Binyamin Netanyahu has also said that gunmen hid in the compound "seeking to create more casualties".

It is an account the UN spokesman Paul McGann called "totally incredible" on Monday, after a preliminary investigation by a security team that arrived from New York on Sunday.

They are now trying to reconstruct what happened at the compound using a series of phone conversations Hook had with local commanders for several hours from 8am when soldiers began taking over the neighbourhood. Hook had spent all morning appealing without success to senior Israeli commanders for a cease-fire so that some 25 UN staff could be evacuated from the compound.

The United Nations adamantly denies that the compound was infiltrated by Palestinian militants and is equally sure that no gunfire was being returned from inside the area. "The compound is very small and at no stage did we lose control of it. There were no Palestinian militants in the compound," McGann said.

It is a conclusion supported by an Al-Ahram Weekly investigation which throws considerable doubt on the army's version of events. The compound is described by UN staff as like "a high- security petrol station forecourt". It is surrounded on all sides by a 10ft concrete wall, topped by another 6ft of wire netting, and the whole area is covered with a low metal awning. Inside are a few metal cabins in which staff were working on the plans for the reconstruction of the refugee camp, a part of which was destroyed by an army invasion in April. Anyone inside the compound has a very restricted view, only of the top floors of neighbouring buildings. Had Palestinian militants been shooting from inside, the site around Marhad's third-floor window would have been one of the few areas they would have been able to target. But there are no bullet holes anywhere around the window on that part of the building.

Marhad, who was under arrest on the street outside his home along with dozens of other men that morning, was one of the few who was not blindfolded because of his age. He says he watched the soldiers inside his home and at the third-floor window. "There was no firing towards that window," he said. "In fact when I heard the bullet fired that killed Mr Hook, there had been no shooting for many minutes." His story is confirmed by UN sources who say there had been a lull of "tens of minutes" before Hook was shot.

Another inconsistency in the army story is provided by a woman who lives next to the compound. Her home has the only window under the awning, providing an almost unrestricted view of the compound's interior.

The woman, who would only give her name as Hayim, says she was held by the army in that room with her eight daughters all morning. "The soldiers locked us in the room and came up to check on us about every hour," she said. "They took over our shop on the ground floor which has no view of the compound."

The army needs to explain why, if the compound was overrun with Palestinian gunmen, it endangered nine civilians by placing them in this exposed room. It also needs to explain why it did not take the room for its snipers, who could have easily targeted any militants moving around the compound.

Hayim says she talked to Hook on several occasions through the window and that he was moving freely about the compound. "Early on he was gesticulating to people at their windows across the street. Telling them to get down for their own safety. He told me several times to keep away from the window."

UN sources have also observed that even if Hook had been a Palestinian militant holding a grenade, given the 16ft wall and fence and the awning that covered it, it would have been almost impossible for him to have thrown it outside. The fact that he was shot in the back also makes the grenade story improbable.

There is the question too of why an Israeli sniper chose to fire inside the compound when the whole area was sealed. He would have known it was a UN site because it is clearly marked with both large letters "UN" on the awning and a UN flag.

As any militants were effectively trapped inside, and given that Hook was in regular contact with the army by phone, the army could have surrounded the compound and tried to negotiate their surrender.

Testimony given to the UN investigators by staff suggests that the sniper who shot Hook later turned his laser sight on another international UN worker who came outside to call for help. The worker said he saw the red light of the gun on his chest.

Hook, who had only recently arrived in the refugee camp, quickly became a popular figure. Palestinians witnesses uniformly took the view that he was killed because the army wants the UN presence in the camp removed. The UN has been severely criticised by Israel for allowing militants to control refugee camps like the one at Jenin. The UN retorts that it has no security role in the camps.

One Palestinian said: "Mr Hook cared about us and our future. He really wanted to know what we wanted from the new buildings. The soldiers hated people like him for helping us and now they have made their point."

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